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by
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                    On April 10, 1998, the Governments of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Northern 
Ireland entered into the Good Friday Agreement ( The Agreement) designed to end sectarian 
violence, bring lasting peace, and an established government acceptable to all parties to the 
ongoing sectarian violence in Northern Ireland. The agreement amounted to a sea change in the 
relationship for all of the parties concerned, in that it replaced the “Anglo-Irish Agreement”2
which heretofore recognized the Republic of Ireland’s claim to all of Ireland embodied in the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920.3 The Agreement further provided for the people of the entire 
1The Author is a Judge of the New York State Unified Court System and an Adjunct 
Professor of Law at Syracuse University College of Law; J.D. Syracuse University College of 
Law and LLM from University at Buffalo Law School.
2The Agreement, Constitutional Issues, para. 1.
3The Agreement, Draft Clauses/Schedules For Incorporation In British Legislation, para. 
2.
2island to take steps to determine the nature of their relationship between the two existing nations, 
and mandated the Parliaments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom pass such 
legislation necessary to effect that purpose.4 Among other provisions of the Agreement, were 
those that would create legislative and executive bodies in Northern Ireland,5 a Ministerial 
Council between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, made up of representatives of 
each.6, and a British-Irish Council composed of members of the three governments, as well as 
others.7 This article will examine the provisions of the Agreement, the legislation enacted by the 
Governments of Britain and Ireland to effectuate the Agreement, the institutions created to 
implement both the legislation and the Agreement, as well as the relevant court cases involving 
both. In particular it will focus on the issue of arms decommissioning by paramilitary groups, 
which appears to be the primary issue driving the peace process. In examining this issue it will 
be necessary to examine the public positions taken by the various interested groups, political 
4The Agreement, Constitutional Issues, para. 1(iv).
5The Agreement, Strand One.
6The Agreement, Strand Two.
7The Agreement, Strand Three.
3parties and their leaders to provide context in evaluating the successes and failures in the peace 
process.
The “Good Friday” Agreement
   As noted above, The Agreement called for the repeal of the Anglo-Irish Agreement to be 
replaced with a new British- Irish Agreement8, and in addition, recited that it would;
8Footnote 1.
4(1) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is exercised by a majority of the 
people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to 
continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland,9
9The Agreement, Constitutional Issues 1(i).
5In that regard, The Agreement took note of the fact that it was for the people of both the North 
and the South to work out their destiny without any outside interference10, but also recognized 
that there was strong sentiment by a majority of people in Northern Ireland to maintain the status 
quo as part of the United Kingdom.11.
    As noted above, The Agreement  repealed the Government of Ireland Act of 192012, but also 
specifically recited that;
10Ibid, 1(ii).
11Ibid, 1(iii).
12See footnote 2.
6“It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the 
United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this 
section in accordance with Schedule 1.”13
13The Agreement, Draft Clauses/Schedules For Incorporation In British 
Legislation. Schedule 1 authorized the Secretary of State to “direct the holding of 
a poll for the purposes of section 1 on a date specified in the order.” It also 
allowed for successive polls, but at intervals of not less than seven 
years.(Schedule 1, Para. 2 and 3.)
7   In furtherance of the goals of The Agreement, Strand One provided for the election of a 108 
member Assembly from the existing Westminister Parliament districts, which would exercise 
both legislative and executive functions of the existing Northern Ireland government.14 Executive 
authority would be discharged by a First Minister, deputy First Minister and up to ten other 
Ministers having departmental responsibilities, selected on a proportionate basis.15 The First 
Minister and Deputy First Minister are selected by the members of the Assembly voting on a 
cross-community basis.16
     One of the more important features of the Agreement involving the establishment of the 
“Democratic Institutions In Northern Ireland”17, were the provisions to insure that the 
membership making up the institutions reflect all segments of the community.18 To that end, the 
14The Agreement, Strand one, para. 2 and 3.
15Ibid, Executive Authority, para. 14-16.
16Ibid, Executive authority, para. 15.
17The Agreement, Strand One.
18Ibid., Safeguards, para. 5.
8Agreement contains a section called “Safeguards” which provides two formulae for the 
resolution of key issues, including the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister.19
The two formulae set forth in paragraph five (d) of Strand One of the agreement require;
19The Agreement, Safeguards, para. 5.
(i) either parallel consent, i.e. a majority of those present and voting, including a 
majority of the unionist and nationalist delegations present and voting;
9(ii)or a weighted majority (60%) of members present and voting, including at 
least 40% of each of the nationalist and unionist designations present and 
voting.20
20Ibid.
The agreement further provided that all Ministers were required to take a pledge of office in 
which they made a;
10
“commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means;”21
21The Agreement, Executive Authority, Para. 23 and Annex A Pledge of 
Office (b).
Strand Three of the Agreement further established a British-Irish council comprised of 
representatives;
11
“...of the British and Irish Governments, devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales, when established, and if appropriate, elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom, together with representatives of the Isle of Mann and the Channel 
Islands.”22
22The Agreement, Strand Three, British-Irish Council, para. 2.
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The purpose of this Council was to further discussion and agreements between and among the 
various entities on a wide variety of issues.23 It likewise called for the establishment of a British-
Irish Intergovernmental Conference to deal with “the totality of relationships”24 between the two 
governments. Representation in the Council contemplated the highest level of each government, 
specifying the Prime Minister and Taoiseach (Prime Minister of Ireland), respectively.25 All 
decisions made by the Council required the agreement of both Governments.26 Among the 
subjects to be discussed by the Council and quite critical to the peace process was;
23Ibid., para. 3-12.
24The Agreement, Strand Three, British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference, para. 1.
25Ibid, para. 3.
26Ibid, para. 4.
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“Co-operation within the framework of the Conference will include facilitation of 
co-operation in security matters. The Conference also will address, in particular, 
the areas of rights, justice, prisons, and policing in Northern Ireland (unless and 
until the responsibility is devolved to Northern Ireland administration) and will 
intensify co-operation between the two Governments on the all-island or cross-
border aspects of these matters.”27
27Ibid, para. 6.
Strand Three of the Agreement also set forth commitments by the three Governments in the area 
of Human Rights. It required the United Kingdom to;
14
“...complete the incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with direct access to the courts, and 
remedies for the breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to 
overrule the Assembly legislation on the grounds of inconsitency.”28
28The Agreement, Strand Three, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity, United Kingdom Legislation, para.2.
It likewise called for;
15
“A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission with membership from 
Northern Ireland reflecting community balance...independent of Government, 
with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised by the 
Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights,...”29
29Ibid, New Institutions In Northern Ireland, para. 5
It similarly obligated the Government of Ireland to;
“...take steps to further strengthen the protection of human rights in its 
jurisdiction” 
and
16
 “establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit equivalent to 
that within Northern Ireland.”30
30Ibid, Comparable Steps By The Irish Government, para.9.
Once the two Irelands had each established their respective Human Rights Commissions, this 
Strand of the Agreement further contemplated that;
17
“...there would be a joint committee of representatives of the Two Human Rights 
Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human rights 
issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other 
matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all 
democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing measures for the protection 
of the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland.”31
31Ibid. A Joint Committee, para. 10.
Other subjects addressed under this portion of The Agreement were “DeCommissioning,” 
18
“Security,” and “ Policing and Justice”.32
    In the Section covering “Decommissioning”, the parties set forth a number of provisions that 
were particularly interesting in the light of future events. In Paragraph One, they declared;
32Ibid.
“Participants recall their agreement in the Procedural Motion adopted on 24 
September 1997 ‘that the resolution of the decommissioning issue is an
indispensable part of the process of negotiation’, and also recall the provisions of 
paragraph 25 of strand 1 above.”(emphasis added)
Paragraph 25 of Strand One provided that;
“An individual may be removed from office following a decision of the Assembly 
taken on a cross-community basis, if (s)he loses the confidence of the assembly, 
voting on a cross-community basis, for failure to meet his or her responsibilities 
including ,inter alia, those set out in the Pledge of Office. Those who hold office 
should use only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not should be 
excluded or removed from office under these provisions.”(emphasis added)
   Paragraph Two of the DeCommissioning Section invoked the use of the existing “Independent 
International Commission on DeCommissioning”  Furthermore, the Parties in Paragraph Three 
expressly noted that;
“All participants accordingly reaffirm their commitment to the total disarmament 
of all paramilitary organisations. They also confirm their intention to continue to 
work constructively and in good faith with the Independent Commission, and to 
use any influence they may have, to achieve the decommissioning of all 
paramilitary arms within two years following endorsement of the referendums 
North and South of the agreement and in the context of the overall settlement.”
In addition, the parties declared in paragraph Four of this Section that;
“The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress on 
decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both Governments at regular 
19
intervals.”
The Section dealing with “Security” largely imposed obligations on the Government of Britain to 
undertake steps to ameliorate the rather harsh and stringent conditions it had imposed under 
direct rule. These were spelled out in paragraph Two of this section which recited;
“The British Government will make progress toward the objective of as early a 
return as possible to normal security arrangements in Northern Ireland, consistent 
with the level of threat and with a published overall strategy, dealing with;
  (i) the reduction of the numbers and role of the Armed Forces deployed in 
Northern Ireland to levels compatible with a normal peaceful society;
  (ii) the removal of security installations;
  (iii) the removal of emergency powers in Northern Ireland;
  (iv) other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful                     
society.”
This portion of the Agreement also contained a section dealing with “Policing And Justice”. In 
the first paragraph of this Section, the parties acknowledged the historical wounds and scars 
inflicted by the policing institutions, noting that the signatories;
“...equally recognise that Northern Ireland’s history of deep divisions has made it 
highly emotive, with great hurt suffered and sacrifices made by many individuals 
and their families, including those in the RUC33 and other public servants...”
33Royal Ulster Constabulary, the premiere police agency in Northern 
Ireland.
In paragraph two, following this statement, the parties mapped out the future strategy 
20
contemplated under the Agreement, to try to close the breach;
“The participants believe it is essential that the policing structures and 
arrangements are such that the police service is professional, effective and 
efficient, fair and impartial, free from partisan control; accountable, both under 
the law for its actions and to the community it serves; representatives of the 
society it polices, and operates within a coherent and co-operative criminal justice 
system, which conforms with human rights norms...”
To achieve that goal, the Agreement provided in the third paragraph to this Section that;
“ An independent commission will be established to make recommendations for 
future policing arrangements in Northern Ireland including means of encouraging 
widespread community support for these arrangements within the agreed 
framework of principles reflected in the paragraphs above and in accordance with 
the terms of reference at Annex A. The Commission will be broadly 
representative with expert and international representation among its membership 
and will be asked to consult widely and to report no later than Summer 1999.”
This Section, in paragraph five, further spelled out an intention to conduct a wider examination 
of 
the criminal justice system as a whole; declaring,
“There will be a parallel wide-ranging review of criminal justice (other than 
policing and those aspects of the system relating to the emergency legislation) to 
be carried out by the British Government through a mechanism with an element, 
in consultation with the political parties and others. The review will commence as 
soon as possible, will include wide consultation, and a report will be made to the 
Secretary of State no later than Autumn 1999. Terms of Reference are attached at 
Annex B.”
The terms of Reference spelled out in both Annex A, involving the Commission on Policing, and 
Annex B, relating to the review of the Criminal justice system, set forth general non-specific 
issues and proposals for the contemplated overhaul of the two systems but no concrete steps 
regarding either.
  These Annexes were followed by a section dealing with “Prisoners” which provided that;
21
“Both Governments will put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated 
programme for the release of prisoners, including transferred prisoners, convicted 
of scheduled offenses in Northern Ireland or, in the case of those sentenced 
outside Northern Ireland, similar offenses (referred hereafter as qualifying 
prisoners)...”34
34The Agreement, Strand Three, Prisoners, paragraph 1.
This provision was followed by a very important limitation, which could be a real inducement 
for 
all paramilitary groups to honor the terms and provisions of the Agreement. It set forth that;
22
“Prisoners affiliated to organisations which have not established or are not 
maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit from the 
arrangements. The situation will be kept under review.35
35Ibid., para.2. (emphasis added)
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   The Agreement concluded with a Section setting forth objectives for  “Validation, 
Implementation And Review,” including the enactment of a “new British-Irish Agreement 
replacing the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement”36 Validation procedures involved the holding of a 
referendum in Northern Ireland in May 1998 to determine whether there was majority support 
for the Agreement, and, if so, the enacting of legislation by the respective parliaments for the 
approval of Assembly elections in Northern Ireland as well as the establishment of the North-
South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference.37 Finally, each 
Government could review any problems that arose during the operation of The Agreement, 
separately or jointly, and take such remedial action, in consultation with the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, as required.38
    It can hardly be gainsaid that a critical component of the Agreement and, indeed, the peace 
process, was the anticipated de-commissioning of both the unionist and republican paramilitary 
forces. As noted above, Section Seven of The Agreement not only declared this to be “an 
indispensable part of the process of negotiation,”39 but further committed all parties to “work 
constructively and in good faith” with the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning.40
36The Agreement, Strand Three, Validation, Implementation And Review, paragraph 1.
37Ibid., paragraphs 2 and 3.
38Ibid., paragraphs 5-7.
39The Agreement, Section Seven, para. 1.
40Ibid, para 2-3.
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Independent International Decommissioning Body
   The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning had its origins in a joint 
“Communique” issued on November 25, 1995 by the Governments of Britain and Ireland 
establishing a “twin track” process for a political settlement to the disputes in Northern Ireland, 
one track of which would concern decommissioning.41 In the Introduction to the Report, the 
members of that Body42 described their purposes;
41Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 1996.
42The members were George J. Mitchell, former United States Senator from Maine. John 
de Chastelain, from Canada, and Harri Holkeri, former President of Finland.
25
“...the two Governments will ask the Body to:- identify and advise on a suitable 
and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and - report 
whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such 
arms to work constructively to achieve that.”43
43Report of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, 22 January 
1996, para. 7.
Insofar as the means by which the Body would achieve its purposes was concerned, the members 
reserved to themselves the authority to define its procedures, noting;
26
“It will be for the International Body to determine its own procedures. The two 
Governments expect it to consult widely, to invite the relevant parties to submit 
their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in reaching its 
conclusions within its remit, to consider such evidence on the merits.”44
44Ibid., para. 8.
This report went on to spell out some further requirements that would have to be adhered to if the 
process were to be brought to a successful conclusion. In Section III of the Report, it declared;
27
“To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the gun out of Irish politics, 
there must be a commitment and adherence to fundamental principles of 
democracy. and non-violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should affirm 
their commitment to such principles.”45
45Ibid., para 19.
In the next paragraph, they set forth concrete steps that had to be taken in this regard, writing;
28
“Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such negotiations affirm their 
total and absolute commitment: a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means 
of resolving political issues; b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary issues; 
c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an 
independent commission; d. to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any efforts 
by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the outcome of all-
party negotiations; e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in 
all- party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful 
methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may 
disagree; and f. To urge that ‘punishment’ killings and beatings stop and to take 
effective steps to prevent such action.”46
46Ibid., para.20.
 Touching upon a concern that would ultimately become a sticking point as the process began to 
unfold, the members observed;
29
“Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations do so out of 
concern that the paramilitaries will use force, threaten to use force, to influence 
the negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of negotiations with 
which they disagree”47
Given the history of Northern Ireland, it is not an unreasonable concern. The 
principles we recommend address those concerns directly.”48
47Ibid., para.22.
48Ibid., para. 22.
Responding to the second inquiry in the communique, concerning the genuineness of the parties 
commitment to decommissioning, the Body reported in Section IV of the Report, that;
30
“We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on the part of those in 
possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable 
decommissioning on the part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that 
commitment does not include decommissioning prior to negotiation.”49
49Ibid., at para. 25.
31
They went on to report in the next paragraph that their discussions with virtually everyone who 
had a stake in the negotiations revealed a unanimous consensus that the paramilitaries would not 
decommission prior to negotiations occurring despite the desire of all for it to happen50.
   Turning to the issue of decommissioning during the all-party negotiations, the Report 
observed;
50Ibid., at para 26.
32
“One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms must take place before 
all- party negotiations can begin. The other has insisted that no decommissioning 
can take place until the end of the process, after an agreed settlement has been 
reached. This has resulted in the current impasse.”51
51Ibid., Section V. Decommissioning During All-Party Negotiations, para. 
33.
Addressing this impasse, it recommended;
33
“The parties should consider an approach under which some decommissioning 
would take place during the process of all-party negotiations, rather than before or 
after as the parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise...”52
52Ibid., at para. 34.
The Body then went on to recommend specific steps that should be undertaken in the 
decommissioning process, including that;
34
“The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an 
independent commission.”53
“The decommissioning process should take place to the satisfaction of an 
independent commission acceptable to all parties. The commission would be 
appointed by the British and Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with 
the other parties to the negotiating process.”54
“The commission should be able to operate independently in both jurisdictions, 
and should enjoy appropriate legal status and immunity.”55
“Parties should have the option of destroying their weapons themselves.”56
“The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.”57
“Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of armaments, including the 
destruction of weapons by the parties themselves, verification must occur to the 
satisfaction of the commission.”58
“Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be free to organise their 
participation in the decommissioning process as they judge appropriate, e.g. 
groups may designate particular individuals to deposit armaments on their 
behalf.”59
53Ibid, Section VI Recommendations: Guidelines On The Modalities Of 
Decommissioning, para. 39.
54Ibid., para. 40.
55Ibid., para. 41.
56Ibid., at para 44.
57Ibid., at para. 45.
58Ibid., para. 46.
59Ibid., para. 49.
35
“The decommissioning process should be mutual.”60
60Ibid. 
      Following this Report, the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom enacted the 
Decommissioning Act, 1997 and the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997.
The Decommissioning Act of Ireland,1997 and the Northern Ireland Arms                         
Decommissioning Act of 1997
   Despite the ostensible partnership between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom in 
the quest to bring peace to Northern Ireland, perhaps nothing exemplifies the different burdens 
that each country bears than is illustrated by a comparison of the provisions of the 
decommissioning Acts enacted by these two governments to create a mechanism to achieve 
decommissioning.
36
    The statute passed by the Republic of Ireland merely authorizes the establishment of the 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning pursuant to the Agreement entered 
into between itself and the United Kingdom on August 26, 1997.61 In addition to establishing the 
Commission, it does no more than provide for the membership on the Commission,62 authorize 
the Commission to have staff,63 provides for financing and payment of the expenses of the 
Commission,64 and sets forth the objectives of the Commission in only the most general way. On 
this latter subject, the Act provides;
61Republic Of Ireland, “Decommissioning Act, 1997(Independent International 
Commission On Decommissioning)Regulations, 1997", Preamble and para.3.
62Ibid., para. 4-5.
63Ibid., para. 6-7.
64Ibid., para.8-9.
37
“The objective of the Commission shall be to facilitate the decommissioning of 
arms.”65
65Ibid., para.15(1).
It further provides;
“In particular, but without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (1) of this 
Regulation, the Commission shall
(a) consult with the participants in political negotiations in Northern 
Ireland, including the two Governments, and other persons whom it deems 
relevant, in relation to the type of scheme or schemes for the 
decommissioning of arms that should be made and the role it might play 
under and in respect of the scheme or each scheme,
(b)present to the two Governments proposals for such schemes having due 
regard to the views expressed by those it has consulted pursuant to 
paragraph (a) of this Regulation,
(c) undertake, in accordance with regulations or arrangements and with 
any decommissioning scheme (within the meaning of the corresponding 
law), such tasks that may be required of it to facilitate the 
decommissioning of arms , including observing, monitoring and verifying 
such decommissioning and receiving and auditing arms, and
38
(d) report periodically to the two Governments and, through whatever 
mechanism they may establish for the purpose, to the other participants in 
political negotiations in Northern Ireland.”66
66Ibid., para. 15.
39
In contrast, the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997, passed by the United 
Kingdom, not only authorizes the establishment of a Commission,67 but defines a 
decommissioning scheme,68 its duration,69 methods of decommissioning,70 testing of 
decommissioning articles,71 and sets forth provisions for amnesty,72 as well as the rules 
governing the fruits of decommissioning as evidence in any subsequent proceeding73. 
   The “decommissioning scheme” defined in paragraph one of the Act is quite general in that it
defines it as
67Northern Ireland Decommissioning Act 1997, para.7.
68Ibid., para. 1.
69Ibid., para2.
70Ibid., para.3.
71Ibid., para. 6.
72Ibid., para. 4.
73Ibid., para. 5.
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“...any scheme which-
(a) is made by the Secretary of State to facilitate the decommissioning of 
firearms, ammunition and explosives in Northern Ireland...”
The “duration of the decommissioning scheme is set forth at paragraph two which provides in 
pertinent part;
“2.-(1) A decommissioning scheme must identify a period during which firearms, 
ammunition, and explosives may be dealt with in accordance with the scheme 
(‘the amnesty period’)
(2) The amnesty period must end before-
(a) the first anniversary of the day on which this Act is passed, or
   (b) such later day as the Secretary of State may order from time to time          
appoint.
(3) A day appointed by an order under subsection (2)(b) must not be-
     (a) more than twelve months after the day on which the order is made,          
or
     (b) more than five years after the day on which this Act is passed.”
    The “methods of decommissioning” set forth in paragraph 3 of the Act are quite specific, as 
the Act requires that;
“A decommissioning scheme must make provision for one or more of the 
following ways of dealing with firearms, ammunition and explosives (and may 
make provision for others)-
(a) transfer to the Commission mentioned in section 7, or to a designated
person, for destruction;
(b)depositing for collection and destruction by the Commission or a 
designated person;
(c) provision of information for the purpose of collection and destruction 
by the Commission or a designated person;
(d) destruction by persons in lawful possession.
41
  Subsection (2) of this particular section defines a “designated person” as;
“...a person designated by the Secretary of State or, in the case of firearms, 
ammunition or explosives transferred or collected in the Republic of Ireland, a 
person designated by the Minister of Justice of the Republic.”
  This last definition allows for cross-border decommissioning of arms, ammunition or 
explosives kept  in the Republic of Ireland, in addition to Northern Ireland.
   The “testing of decommissioned articles” provided for in Section 6 of the Act supplements the 
provisions governing “amnesty” and the restrictions on their receipt into evidence set forth in 
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act to fulfill the objective of encouraging disclosure and 
decommissioning of firearms, ammunition and explosives by paramilitary groups on both sides 
of the conflict. Indeed the “testing of decommissioning of articles” is more appropriately 
described as a restriction on such testing in that the section provides;
“...(1) A person who has received a decommissioned article shall not carry out, or 
cause or permit anyone else to carry out, a test or procedure in relation to the 
article the purpose of which is-
(a) to discover information about anything done with or in relation to any 
decommissioned article,
(b) to discover who has been in contact with, or near to, any 
decommissioned article,
(c) to discover where any decommissioned article was at any time
     ( including the condition under which it was kept),
(d) to discover where any decommissioned article was in contact with, or 
near to, a particular person or when it was in a particular place or kept 
under particular conditions,
(e) to discover where any decommissioned article was made, or
(f) to discover the composition of any decommissioned article.”
42
  These limitations did not, however, preclude testing to determine whether an article contained 
an explosive or ammunition, the quantity of such explosive or ammunition, and whether it could 
be safely moved.74 Nor did it preclude testing to discover such information during the 
investigation for any offense in which the article was used after it had been decommissioned in 
accordance with this Act.75
   As noted above, the Act additionally provided for “amnesty” for a wide variety of offenses set 
forth in a schedule to the Act.76 Similarly there were restrictions on the use or receipt of such 
articles or evidence concerning their use or possession in any criminal proceedings.77 These 
restrictions, however, had two exceptions. Such evidence could be offered in a criminal 
proceeding by the accused.78 Similar to Section 6(3)(a), such evidence was not restricted in ;
74Ibid., Section 6(2).
75Ibid., Section 6(3)(a) and (b).
76Ibid., Section 4 and Schedule.
77Ibid., Section 5(1) and (2).
78Ibid., Section 5(3) emphasis added.
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“... proceedings for an offense alleged to have been committed by the use of, or in 
relation to, something which was a decommissioned article at the time when the 
offense is alleged to have been committed.”79
79Ibid., Section 5(4).
   The Independent International  Commission on Decommissioning
44
   With the Report of the International Body, and the passage of the Decommissioning Acts by 
the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning was born by Agreement of the two Governments on August 26, 1997.80
   Article Three of the Agreement provided that;
80Agreement on Independent International Commissioning on Decommissioning, 26 
August, 1997.
“The objective of the Commission is to facilitate the decommissioning of 
firearms, ammunition, explosives and explosive substances (hereinafter referred 
to as ‘arms’) in accordance with the Report of the International Body, and the 
regulations or arrangements made under the Decommissioning Act, 1997 and any 
decommissioning schemes within the meaning of section 1 of the Northern 
Ireland Decommissioning Act 1997.”
    Article Four of the Agreement, fleshed out the means by which the objectives of the 
Commission might be met, charging it ; 
(a) to consult with the participants in political negotiations in Northern Ireland, 
including both Governments, and others whom it deems relevant on the type of 
scheme or schemes for decommissioning including the role it might play in 
respect of each scheme;
(b) to present the two Governments proposals for schemes for decommissioning 
having due regard to the views expressed by those it consulted;
(c) to undertake, in accordance with any regulations or arrangements made under 
the Decommissioning Act, 1997, and any decommissioning schemes within the 
meaning of Section 1, and in accordance with section 3, of the Northern Ireland 
Arms decommissioning Act 1997, such tasks that may require it to facilitate the 
decommissioning of arms, including observing, monitoring and verifying 
decommissioning and receiving auditing arms; and
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(d) to report periodically to both Governments and through whatever mechanism 
they may establish for that purpose, the other participants in political negotiations 
in Northern Ireland.”
  Article Five of the Agreement provided that;
“The Commission shall consist of not less than two members. The members shall 
be appointed jointly by the two Governments who may also appoint additional 
members from time to time. The two Governments may jointly appoint one of the 
members as chairperson...”
Finally, in connection with its operation, Article Eight provided;
“Members of the Commission, members of the staff of the Commission, persons 
carrying out work for or giving advice to the Commission and agents of the 
Commission shall be bound not to disclose any information obtained in the course 
of the performance of their functions as such members or persons unless such 
disclosure is authorised by or on behalf of the Commission.”
   On July 2, 1999, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) made 
its initial report to the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom. In paragraph 3 of the 
Report, the IICD declared;
“Since its inception in September 1997, the Commission has sought to put in 
place the measures necessary to facilitate the decommissioning of paramilitary 
arms and then to execute that task.”81
81It annexed a summary of the “...mandate of the Commission, legislation 
governing its role, and actions taken to carry out its task.”
  In the next section entitled “Efforts To Bring About Progress,” it summarized its contacts with 
the various parties which led to a decommissioning scheme being adopted in regulations by the 
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two Governments in June, 1999 ; noting,
“Working with parties that have actual or alleged links with paramilitary groups, 
the Commission assessed that two decommissioning methods would be 
acceptable to the paramilitary groups and  the two Governments. These were 
information leading to discovery of arms and destruction by the paramilitary 
groups concerned, with verification provided to the Commission.”82
82
 Report of the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning, 2 July 1999,para.4.
It went on to spell out the names of the various parties and groups that had appointed 
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representatives to work with it.83  The Commission reported that among the loyalist/unionist  
paramilitary groups, the Ulster Volunteer Force(UVF)  nominated a member of the  Progressive 
Union Party(PUP) to be its “points of contact”.84 The Loyalist Volunteer Force(LVF) nominated 
a Protestant clergyman for this role but he resigned after a year.85 The views of the Ulster 
Defence Association were sought through a member of the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP) but 
that the UDA had not nominated him as its point of contact.86 On the republican/nationalist side 
of the conflict, Sinn Fein nominated a representative but the Irish Republican Army(IRA) had 
83Ibid., para.5.
84Ibid., para. 5
85Ibid. In the Annex to the Report, the Commission reported that “Contact with the LVF 
through their intermediary led to a decommissioning event on 18 December 1998. That 
paramilitary group decommissioned four sub-machine guns, two rifles, two pistols, a sawed-off 
shotgun, 348 rounds of ball ammunition, 31 shotgun shells, five electrical detonators, two pipe 
bombs, two weapons stocks and five assorted magazines. The items described were destroyed in 
accordance with Commission procedures the day they were received and the residue was 
disposed -of the same day also. At the LVFs request the event was covered by the media.”Para. 
20.
86Ibid. In the Annex to the Report the Commission amplified this assertion noting; 
“While the UDA/UFF have not named a point of contact, the leader of the Ulster Democratic 
Party (UDP), Mr. Gary McMichael, and his colleagues, have met several times with the 
Commission.”Para.19.
48
not.87 This observation is of considerable interest since all of the loyalist/unionist groups and 
parties, along with the two Governments and the Independent Monitoring Commission, would 
later claim that Sinn Fein was an alter ego of the IRA, if not one and the same. Indeed, the IICD 
further noted that it had not had 
87Ibid.
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“...any contact with acknowledged representatives of the IRA, Irish Nationalist 
Liberation Army (INLA), the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) or the UDA.”88
88Ibid., para.6.
   The impasse concerning the timing of decommissioning predicted by the International Body on 
Arms Decommissioning in its report almost three years earlier was reflected in more concrete 
and detailed fashion, as this Report recounted;
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“During this period, public statements have been made by paramilitary groups 
regarding their intentions on decommissioning. The IRA said it would not 
decommission its arms, and loyalist groups said that they would not do so until 
they were clear about the IRA’s intentions....No proposal to start actual 
decommissioning had been accepted by any paramilitary group except the LVF. 
However the Sinn Fein statement of 1 July offers promise that decommissioning 
by all paramilitary groups may now begin. The commission expects that Sinn 
Fein’s proposal will be indorsed by the IRA and reciprocated by loyalist and other 
republican military groups.”89
89Ibid., para. 12.
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  In the next section of its Report, in which the Commission detailed meetings it had with ten 
political parties during an eight day period in June 1999, it reported the responses to various 
questions it had put to the parties concerning several aspects of decommissioning.90 Of particular 
interest was whether decommissioning of,
90Ibid., Meetings with the Parties-June 1999, para. 11-14.
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“...all paramilitary arms should take place by 22 May 2000 as set forth in the 
Good Friday Agreement, and in the context of the implementation of the overall 
agreement ?”91
91Ibid., para. 11.
   In response to that inquiry, the Commission reported that;
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“...the responses were generally supportive of the goal of decommissioning but 
varied significantly in their emphasis. Some parties argued strongly for immediate 
and unconditional decommissioning, while others made clear that they adhered 
strictly to the wording of the Good Friday Agreement, or spoke more broadly of 
their support for decommissioning in the context of the demilitarisation of 
Northern Ireland. No party suggested that decommissioning ought not to happen 
by 22 May 2000.”92
92Ibid., para.12.
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 In response to a more detailed two-part question seeking a firmer commitment to the time table 
set forth in the Good Friday Agreement and specific schemes to be used for decommissioning.93
It noted that;
93Ibid., para. 11.
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“There were no responses to Questions (3)(a) or (3)(b) form either the IRA or the 
UVF by the 28 June deadline94. The UVF provided a response which emphasized 
the need for the Good Friday Agreement to be implemented in full and acceptance 
by republicans that the Agreement is ‘the final settlement of the constitutional 
conflict.’”95
94June 28, 1999 was the date this Report was scheduled for release.
95Ibid., para.14
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The Commission concluded its Report with an assessment of the recent developments and its 
proposed formula for implementing decommissioning. It began by quoting the Sinn Fein 
proposal which had been issued the day before and had occasioned the brief delay in the issuance 
of the Report;96
96Ibid., Assessing Recent Developments, para15-21; see also, para.1.
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“...we believe that all of us, as participants acting in good faith, could succeed in 
persuading those with arms to decommission them in accordance with the 
Agreement. We agree that this should be in the manner set down by the 
Independent Commission on Decommissioning within the terms of the Good 
Friday Agreement...”97
97Ibid., para.15.
Evidently encouraged by this development, the Commission;
“...foresees the process of decommissioning following a reasonably predictable 
agenda. We therefore envision the following steps:
(1) The designation of a point of contact who can speak authoritatively for the 
paramilitary group;
(2)Discussions with the designated point of contact regarding;
a. The scheme to be used (i.e. self-destruction with Commission verification, 
or information leading to the discovery of arms by the Commission); 
Modalities (i.e. types and amounts of arms, location of the decommissioning 
event, timing, etc.);
(3) Agreement to proceed with a specific event or events;
(4) Execution of the decommissioning event(s);
(5) Destruction of any residue; and
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(6) Reporting to the Governments.98
98Ibid., para.19.
The Commission concluded with the optimistic hope that;
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“The developments of 1 July give the basis for believing that decommissioning 
can be completed in the time prescribed by the Good Friday Agreement.”99
99Ibid.,para. 20.
  The Commission issued its second report on November 15, 1999 in which it provided an 
assessment of the progress relating to decommissioning based on three of the principles agreed to 
on June 25, 1999 and set forth in the initial report of July 2, 1999. These principles enumerated 
at the outset of the report were;
“An exclusive executive exercising devolved powers;
Decommissioning of all paramilitaries by May 2000;
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Decommissioning to be carried out in a manner determined by the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning.”100
100Report of the International Independent Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD) 15, November 1999
The Report paid particular attention to the two principles involving decommissioning and the 
deadline of May 2000 contemplated by the Agreement. Addressing the participation of the 
paramilitaries, the Commission noted;
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“While there are difficulties and challenges posed by those paramilitary groups 
which are not observing a cease-fire, the contribution of those on cease-fire over 
what is now a protracted period is significant.”101
101Ibid.
It went on to note that;
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“The time is now very short to achieve decommissioning within the time-scale 
intended by the Agreement. Bearing in mind the practical arrangements the 
Commission will need to make, urgent progress is now needed. Having made all 
possible preparations, including numerous meetings with the parties and others, 
we will now play a more active role.”102
102Ibid.
The Commission concluded the Report by laying out a number of steps that needed to be taken 
to bring about decommissioning, observing;
“The process of decommissioning involves a number of steps. To achieve our 
objective it is now urgent that the appointment by paramilitary organisations of 
authorized representatives and the holding of discussions about modalities with 
the Commission take place. Such appointments would represent a significant 
confidence building measure and would demonstrate each organisations desire to 
make further contribution to the process.
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  We call on the paramilitary organisations to respond positively by appointing 
authorised representatives, following which we would set a date for a first 
meeting with each of them as soon as possible after their appointment. We would 
issue a report within days of those meetings.”103
103Ibid.
   Several weeks later, the Commission reported that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had 
appointed a representative;
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“...to enter into discussions with the Commission. We have held an initial meeting 
with that individual. The meeting was frank and useful and a further meeting has 
been agreed.”104
104Report of the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning 10 December 1999, para. 3.
The Commission further reported that it had held a similar meeting with the Ulster Volunteer 
Force/Red Hand Commando (UVF/RHC). In that meeting the representative of that paramilitary 
group restated their position that;
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“...the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement in full, coupled with the 
acceptance from Republicans that the agreement is the final settlement to end the 
constitutional conflict, are the only conditions which will facilitate the process of 
decommissioning weapons.”105
105Ibid., para 4.
The Commission also described a meeting with the representative chosen and appointed by the 
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Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), earlier that same day, which it characterized as “helpful”.106 It 
further reported that;
106Ibid., para. 5.
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“The representative impressed on us a point they made public recently, to the 
effect that ‘disarmament will only be considered in the context of the IRA having 
already begun to decommission its arsenal of weaponry.’”107
107Ibid.
  The Commission ended its report on a note of caution tempered by optimism, noting;
“ We have noted elsewhere our belief that decommissioning cannot be imposed. 
But we believe that the above mentioned achievements provide the context for the 
voluntary decommissioning of arms. In our 2 July report to the Governments we 
noted that a timetable for decommissioning is best agreed with the representatives 
of the paramilitary groups. We believe that still to be the case. Nonetheless, the 
Commission is prepared, if necessary, to state that actual decommissioning is to 
start within a specified period.
68
   The naming of new representatives and the initial meetings we have held with 
them demonstrate some progress. We expect more to follow. As noted in the 
opening paragraph, we will report to the governments in January, and as 
necessary thereafter.”108
108Ibid., paragraphs 6-7.
   On January 31, 2000, the Commission reported again on its discussions with the IRA, the 
UVF, and the UFF. On its contact with the IRA, the Commission noted;
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“The IRA has assured us of the unequivocal continued support of his organisation 
of the current political process. We have been made aware of, and recognise, the 
difficulties facing the IRA leadership in moving on decommissioning at this time. 
We are also conscious that the maintenance of their ceasefire, and those of the 
UVF and UFF, have played and continue to play, an important part in the political 
advances that have been achieved to date and that are progressing. Further our 
contact has very recently emphasized that there is no threat to the peace process 
from the IRA. All of these factors are significant. But our sole task is 
decommissioning and to date we have received no information as to when 
decommissioning will start.”109
109Report of the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD), 31 January 2000, para. 3.
Its contacts with the UVF, the Commission met with similar results, being told by its 
representative he;
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“...reiterated the UVF stance that while it was prepared to consider moving on 
decommissioning, it will not do so until it has received an unequivocal statement 
from the IRA that the war is over.”110
110Ibid., para. 4.
The UFF took an identical stance as the UVF, in which its representatives;
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...confirmed their position stated during our earlier meeting, to the effect that 
while that group too is prepared to consider moving on decommissioning, it will 
not do so until it is clear that the IRA will also decommission.”111
111Ibid., para. 5.
Notwithstanding this apparent stalemate, the Commission vowed to continue its mission but 
sounded a warning to the parties;
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“We will continue our efforts to carry out the Commission’s role in the manner 
and within the same time frame approved by the political parties and the two 
governments. However, given our understanding of the quantity of arms held by 
the paramilitary groups, and the dispersed nature of their locations, we believe a 
time will soon be reached beyond which it will be logistically impossible for us to 
complete our task by 22 May.”112
112Ibid., para. 6.
Less than two weeks later, on February 10, 2000, the Commission reported again . After noting 
the IRA’s commitment to the peace process, it reported on the IRA’s raising of a converse issue, 
namely;
“We note the IRA assessment that the question of British forces and loyalist 
paramilitaries in Northern Ireland must be addressed. While the future of British 
troops is outside of our remit, the elimination of the threat posed by the loyalist 
paramilitary arms is clearly within the Commission’s remit.
  We have been advised by loyalist representatives of their commitment to address 
the issue of their arms in the context of similar action taken by the IRA.
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   In our discussions this week with the UVF and the UFF representatives, each 
confirmed their positions as stated in our 31 January report and the UFF 
representatives further engaged with us on methods of decommissioning and 
related support issues.”113
113Report of the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD), 11 February 2000, para. 4.
   The Commission went on to state that;
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“We find particularly significant and view as valuable progress the assertion made 
to us by the IRA representative that the IRA will consider how to put arms and 
explosives beyond use, in the context of the full implementation of the Good 
Friday Agreement, and in the context of the removal of the causes of the 
conflict.”114
114Ibid., para. 5.
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   The assurances of the IRA notwithstanding, the following day, Peter Mandelson, the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland signed an Order suspending the Northern Ireland Assembly.115 In 
the ensuing period, blame is largely laid on the IRA for this crisis although no decommissioning 
had been undertaken by the loyalist/unionist paramilitaries.  On February 15, 2000 the IRA, in 
response to the suspension of the Assembly announced;
115CAIN Web Service, Chronology, 11 February, 2000. According to the Service, the 
CAIN Web Service is a web site “devoted to providing a wide range of information and source 
material on the Northern Ireland conflict and politics in the region from 1968 to the present.” 
CAIN stands for “Conflict Archive on the Internet. It is based within the University of Ulster and 
is located at the Magee Campus.” “CAIN is also associated with ARK (Northern Ireland Social 
and Political Archive) ARK is comprised of a number of associated web sites including CAIN, 
NILT (Northern Ireland Life and Times) and ORB (Online Research Bank).”
76
“In light of these changed circumstances the leadership of the IRA have decided 
to end our engagement with the IICD. We are also withdrawing all propositions 
put to us by the IICD by our representative since November.”116
116Report of the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD) 26 October 2000, para.4.
This crisis is averted when the IRA released a statement on May 6, 2000 vowing to put its 
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weapons beyond its reach in a verifiable manner.117 This declaration is linked to both further 
decommissioning and restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly . On May 27, 2000, the 
Ulster Unionist Party agreed to re-enter the Assembly and two days later the devolved Assembly 
was restored.118
  Less than a month later, on June 25, 2000, the Commission released a statement in which it 
reported that the IRA was true to their word, reporting;
117Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 26 
October 2000 para.8.
118CAIN Web Service, Chronology 30 May 2000.
“President Martti Ahtisaari and Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa informed the Commission 
today that they have successfully completed an initial inspection of several IRA 
weapons dumps. The two inspectors report that they were shown a substantial 
quantity of IRA arms, including explosives.
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  Moreover, the inspectors have ensured that th weapons are secure and cannot be 
used without their becoming aware that this happened.”119
119Statement of the Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD), 25 January 2000.
   This statement was immediately followed by a report on June 26, 2000, by the inspectors  
concerning the inspection of the dumps in greater detail. In it, Messrs. Ahtisaari and Ramaphosa 
declared;
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“We see our mandate as being the inspection of the contents of a number of IRA 
arms dumps, reporting to the IICD that we have done so, and re-inspecting these 
dumps regularly to ensure that the weapons remain secure.”120
120Report on the First Inspection of IRA weapons dumps by President 
Martii Ahitsaari and Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa, 26 June 2000.
  Turning to the inspection itself, they reported;
“We have now carried out our first inspection. We inspected a number of arms 
dumps. The arms dumps held a substantial amount of military equipment as well 
as other weapons and other materials.
 We observed that the weapons and explosives were safely and adequately stored. 
We have ensured that the weapons and explosives cannot be used without our 
detection.
  We are satisfied with the co-operation extended to us by the IRA to ensure a 
credible and verifiable inspection. All our requests were satisfactorily met.
  We plan to re-inspect the arms dumps on a regular basis to ensure that the 
weapons have remained secure.
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   The process that led to the inspection visit and the way in which it was carried 
out makes us believe that this is a genuine effort by the IRA to advance the peace 
process.”121
121Ibid.
  On October 26, 2000, Messrs. Ahtisaari and Ramaphosa issued a second report concerning the 
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re-inspection of the IRA weapons dumps and their continued security122. In it they noted;
122Report on the Second Inspection of IRA weapons dumps by President Martti Ahtisaari 
and Mr. Cyril Ramphosa, 26 October 2000.
“...The arms dumps have not been tampered with and we confirm that they have 
remained secured.
  We observed that the weapons and explosives continued to be safely and 
adequately stored. We remain confident that the weapons and explosives cannot 
be used without our detection.
  The IRA has fully honoured their commitments and complied with the terms of 
our engagement and we are convinced that we will receive the same co-operation 
in future inspections.
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  We plan to re-inspect the arms dumps on a regular basis and to ensure that the 
weapons remain secure.”123
123Ibid.
On that same date, the Independent International Commission issued a Report describing its 
83
efforts since February 2000124. In addition to the foregoing events, it noted that following the 
inspection of the IRA arms dump on June 25, 2000, the IRA’s representative contacted the 
Commission to formally resume its contacts and publicly announced the same.125 However 
immediate progress would be impeded because;
124Report of the Independent International commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 26 
October 2000.
125Ibid., para. 10.
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“...it was suggested to the Commission that the circumstances surrounding the 
marching season made it unlikely that progress would be made on 
decommissioning during the months of July and August...”126
126Ibid., para. 11.
It went on to report that in the months following the “marching season” the Commission 
attempted to meet with paramilitary groups to further discussions of decommissioning by all 
groups but was unsuccessful in achieving anything concrete, as it noted; 
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“Over a period of six weeks, the Commission was unable to arrange meetings 
with the paramilitary representatives. Meetings with political parties elicited 
reasons as to why they believed the meetings had not occurred. On the republican 
side these were attributed in part to concerns over the implementation of the 
Patten Report on policing, to the slow pace of demilitarisation, and to the 
concerns over republicans wanted for questioning by the authorities. On the 
loyalist side they were attributed in part to the failure of the IRA to respond to 
the+ Commission in practical terms on decommissioning, as well as to internal 
problems associated with the ongoing loyalist feud.”127
127Ibid., para. 13.
Turning to its discussions with the loyalist paramilitary group the Ulster Freedom Fighters 
(UFF), it reported; 
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“On October 17, the Commission met with representatives of the UFF. During the 
discussion they re-iterated their adherence to the terms of the Agreement, 
including to decommissioning. They re-affirmed their decision not to begin 
decommissioning their arms until the IRA started to decommission theirs, 
although they stood by their earlier commitment to the Commission on the 
methods of decommissioning and supporting arrangements. They also pointed out 
that at the present, the ongoing feud between the UFF and the UVF made 
decommissioning both difficult and unlikely in the short term...”128
128Ibid., para.16.
What is incredible about the events described in the Report, is that it recounts the history of the   
loyalist paramilitary groups and political parties refusal to engage in any complementary 
decommissioning as that undertaken by the republican paramilitary (IRA) as described in the 
June 26 Report and, at the same time, demanding additional unilateral decommissioning by the 
IRA, while invoking their need to keep their weapons to further their own loyalist feud. 
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       Almost simultaneously with the October Report, First Minister of the devolved government, 
David Trimble, refused to execute documents nominating Bairbre de Brun, Minister for Health, 
Social services and Public Safety, and Martin McGuinness, Minister for Education as Ministers 
to the North-South Ministerial Council to be held on November 3, 2000.129 Trimble was a 
member of the Ulster Unionist Party and both de Brun and McGuinness were members of Sinn 
Fein.130 The ostensible reason for Trimble’s refusal to make the nominations was;
129In The Matter Of An Application By Bairbe de Brun And Martin McGuinness For
Judicial Review, High Court of Justice In Northern Ireland, [Queens Bench Division (Crown 
Side)(January 30, 2001)](Kerr, J.).
130Ibid,
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 “to persuade Sinn Fein to use any influence it may have to secure 
decommissioning of paramilitary arms in accordance with the Belfast 
agreement.”131
131Ibid.
    Both Ministers sought judicial review of Trimble’s decision.
89
   On December 22, 2000, the Commission reported that no additional progress had been
made since its October 2000 report.132 In this report the Commission noted that in its meetings 
with the loyalist/unionist groups that;
“The UVF representatives have met with us and confirmed the commitment to 
decommissioning they previously gave us. They have warned that in their opinion dissident 
activity has made decommissioning harder to achieve...”133
132Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 
22 December 2000.
133Ibid., para. 3.
It further reported that the IRA had also renewed its commitment to decommissioning made in 
90
previous meetings,134 and that the UVF and UFF had reached “agreement in principle”135 on 
schemes to decommission.
   In The Matter Of An Application By Bairbe de Brun and
                           Martin McGuinness For Judicial Review136
    On January 30, 2001, The High Court of Justice In Northern Ireland, Queen’s Bench Division 
(Crown Side) held that David Trimble’s decision to refuse to nominate the two Ministers from  
Sinn Fein  to attend a meeting of the North-South Ministerial Council meeting in November, 
2000, violated the Northen Ireland Act of 1998, enacted to implement the Good Friday 
Agreement. In an opinion by Justice Kerr, the Court found that the Agreement prized cross-
community representation to such a degree that the failure to make the nominations overrode 
134Ibid., para. 5.
135Ibid.
136See Fn. 127 for official citation.
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Trimble’s objective to pressure the IRA into decommissioning.137 At the outset of his opinion, 
Justice Kerr noted that pursuant to Section 52 (1) of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998;
137In The Matter Of An Application By Bairbe De Brun and Martin McGuinness For
Judicial Review, [2001] NIQB 3, High Court of Justice In Northern Ireland, Queen’s Bench 
(Crown Side) KERF3332 30.01.2001.
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“...the First Minister and the deputy First Minister are required to make 
nominations to the North-South Ministerial Council.” 138
138Ibid.
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In addressing the “legislative framework”139, Justice Kerr cited Section 52(1)(a)  of the Act
which 
empowered the First Minister and deputy First Minister to make such nominations ;
139Ibid.
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“...as they consider necessary to ensure-(a) such cross-community participation in 
the North-South Council as is required by the Belfast Agreement.”140
140Ibid. This is apparently a non-sectarian reference to the “Good Friday” 
Agreement.
He went on to observe further that;
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“Strand Two of the Belfast Agreement does not itself contain any explicit 
requirement for cross community participation in the Council and one must 
therefore look elsewhere to ascertain what is meant by the expression. Strand One  
(Which deals with Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland) provided in 
paragraph 5 that there could be safeguards to ensure that all sections of the 
community could participate and work together in the operation of institutions of 
government, Paragraph 6 required that there should be a register of designation of 
members of the Assembly for the purpose of measuring cross-community support
in Assembly votes. The designation of identity was to be nationalist, unionist or 
other. For the First Minister, Mr. Morgan141 argued that, in effect, the cross-
community dimension intended by section 52 (1) (a) was representation of the 
unionist and nationalist communities. No contrary submission was made and, 
although the provisions of strand one cited above do not deal directly with the 
North-South Ministerial Council, I have concluded that this is what indeed was 
intended. I am reinforced in that view by the provisions of paragraph 30 of Strand 
One. It provided:-
141Counsel representing First Minister David Trimble.
‘Arrangements to represent the assembly as a whole, at Summit level and 
in dealings with other in institutions...will be such as to ensure cross-
community involvement.’
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It is to be noted that the nomination of the Ministers under section 52 (1) must be 
made by the First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly. Mr. Lavery142
suggested that where either the First Minister or the deputy First Minister refused 
to nominate, the other could exercise the power. I do not accept the argument. The 
terms of the provision are explicit; the First Minister and deputy First Minister 
must act jointly. Quite apart from this the entire ethos of the 1998 Act is that there 
should be agreement on a cross-community basis. This would be substantially 
compromised if either the First Minister or the deputy First Minister could act 
alone and without the agreement of the other. I am satisfied that both must agree 
on the appointment of a Minister for that appointment to be effective.”143
142Counsel representing Minister of Education Martin McGuiness.
143Ibid.
Thus, Justice Kerr held that the  provisions of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act, to the extent that it 
incorporated the provisions of the Good Friday Agreement, elevated the principle of cross-
community representation, not only as an end to be achieved, but also as an essential element of 
the decision making framework in achieving that end.
  Turning to an issue raised by Trimble, namely that the First Minister and deputy First Minister 
had some discretion under the Act to determine who to nominate for these positions, the Justice 
declared;
“The nature of the discretion that arises under statute must be determined 
primarily by the statutory provision itself. The principal purpose of the 
nominating duty under section 52 (1) is to achieve cross-community 
representation. But it is clear that even where a purpose is clearly specified may 
undertake tasks which are ‘reasonably incidental’ to the fulfillment of that 
purpose- see DeSmith Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administarative 
Action, Fifth edition paragraph 6-066.
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  I accept that the First Minister could not be required to nominate someone whom 
he regarded as unsuitable in the sense that that person was working against the 
implementation of the Agreement. Indeed, it appears to me that it would be open 
to the First Minister to conclude that a potential nominee was unsuitable for 
nomination because he had not made appropriate efforts to implement the 
Agreement.
  I do not consider, however, that it would be open to the First Minister to refuse 
to nominate a Minister who was in every way suitable to attend the sectoral 
meeting simply because he wished to induce the Minister - or the political party to 
which he belonged - to act in a particular way. The First Minister’s primary duty 
under the section is to nominate Ministers who will fulfil the necessary 
requirement of cross-community participation. In my opinion, he must also have 
regard to the need to nominate a Minister who will be able to participate in a 
meaningful way in the business of the Council. It is not open to the First Minister, 
in my opinion, to disregard the clear intention of Parliament that the Ministers 
nominated to attend the sectoral meetings should be in a position to contribute to 
the work of the Council. Provided he has regard to this, however, and seeks to 
observe the obligation to nominate Ministers on a cross-community basis, he 
enjoys a discretion as to whom to nominate.
....Given the interdependence of the Council and the Assembly within the terms of 
the Belfast Agreement, the conclusion that a minister who was undermining the 
Agreement was not suitable to represent the Assembly on the Council would be 
beyond challenge, not only because of its rationality but also because it would 
have been taken to fulfill the objectives of section 52. By contrast a decision not 
to nominate in order to bring pressure on a political opponent does not involve 
any assessment of his suitability for the nomination nor does it seek to fulfil the 
purpose of section 52.”144
144Ibid.
Turning to the reason acknowledged by Trimble for not nomination deBrun and McGuinness, 
their Sinn Fein membership, Justice Kerr held;
“The First Minister has not claimed that the applicants are unsuited to be 
appointed to attend the sectoral meetings. He has not disputed that their 
appointment (together with other Ministers) would achieve cross-community 
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participation in the North-south Ministerial Council required by section 52 (1). 
The sole reason advanced by him for refusing to nominate the applicants is that he 
believed that this would persuade Sinn Fein to exert  influence to secure the 
decommissioning of paramilitary arms. The issue which arises therefore is 
whether the First Minister may use his powers under section 52 (1) to seek to 
achieve this aim.
  Self evidently, a decision not to nominate in order to bring pressure on a political 
opponent does not purport to achieve the objective of section 52...
   I do not accept that a decision taken under section 52 in order to promote an 
objective of the Agreement that is wholly unrelated to the purpose of that section 
can be upheld...In the present case...the implementation of the Agreement has a 
number of aspects and no single theme emerges either from the Agreement or the 
Act itself. Indeed, in order to promote the objective espoused by Mr. Trimble, 
(decommissioning of weapons) he has adopted a strategy that will inhibit - if not 
frustrate - another objective (effective North-South Council meetings). I have 
concluded, therefore, that the decision of the First Minister to refuse to nominate 
Ms de Brun and Mr McGuiness is for a purpose that is collateral to the purpose of 
section 52 and that it cannot be rescued by recourse to a separate objective of the 
Agreement that Mr. Trimble hopes to secure. It is well settled that a decision 
taken for a collateral purpose will be amenable to judicial review-see for instance, 
In re Cook’s Application [1986] NI 242. the refusal of the First Minister to 
nominate Ms de Brun and Mr McGuiness must therefore be declared 
unlawful.”145
145Ibid.
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  On March 22, 2001 the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, again, 
reported to the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom.146 In the report, the 
Commission stated that;
146Report of the Independent International commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 22 
March 2001.
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“Meetings in recent weeks with representatives of the UVF and UFF confirmed 
their willingness to consider decommissioning their arms, and their general 
agreement on methods and related supporting issues. Both groups continue to 
affirm that they will not move on decommissioning before the IRA does.”147
147Ibid.
The Commission further reported that it had resumed contact with the IRA and the latter had 
agreed to enter into a dialogue with the Commission ;
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“...on the basis of the IRA leadership’s commitment to resolving the issues 
contained in our statement of May 6, 2000 and no other basis.”148
148Ibid.
In its statement of May 6, 2000, the IRA leadership had;
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“...pledged to initiate a process that will completely and verifiably put IRA arms 
beyond use in the context of the statements made by the two governments on May 
5, 2000.”149
149Report on the First Inspection of IRA dumps by President Martii 
Ahitsaari and Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa, 6 June 2000.
In their May 5, 2000 statements the Governments had declared that they;
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“...now believe that the remaining steps necessary to fulfill implementation of the 
[Good Friday] agreement can be achieved by June 21, 2000 and commit 
themselves to that goal.”150
150Report of the Independent international Commission on 
decommissioning (IICD), 26 October 2000.
They had further committed that;
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“Subject to a positive response to this statement, the British Government will 
bring forward the necessary order to enable the Assembly and Executive to be 
restored by 22 May 2000.”151
151Ibid.
As noted earlier, this sequence of events, which was followed  by the IRA’s unilateral disclosing 
and allowing repeated  inspections of its weapons and ammunition dumps by the IICD had led to 
the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly. Notwithstanding, what can only be 
characterized as “good faith” actions by the IRA, no corresponding action was undertaken by the 
unionist/loyalist paramilitaries.
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   On May 10, 2001 the Court of Appeals in Northern Ireland ruled on an appeal taken by First 
Minister David Trimble from the judgment rendered by Justice Kerr earlier that year.152 In 
dismissing the appeal, Justice Carswell agreed ;
152In the Matter Of Applications By Bairbe de Brun and Martin McGuinness For Judicial
Review (2002) NICA 43 In her Majesty’s Court of Appeals In Northern Ireland,[ REF: CARF 
3482 (05 .10. 01)]
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“...with the judge’s conclusion that the terms of paragraph 5.1 of the Ministerial 
Code, but using the word ‘normally’, carry the clear implication that it is not 
obligatory to nominate the Minister responsible for the topic to be discussed.”153
153Ibid.
The Court went on to observe;
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“The appellant’s counsel submitted that although it was not in dispute that that 
Minister should be nominated, the First and deputy First Minister retained 
discretion to nominate another person in appropriate circumstances. we agree in 
principle with that submission, but in such an untested area we are reluctant to 
attempt to spell out the ambit of those circumstances. The judge expressed the 
view at pages 19-20 of his judgment that the First Minister could not be required 
to nominate someone whom he regarded as unsuitable in the sense that that 
person was working against the implementation of the Agreement. We would 
prefer to reserve our opinion on the correctness of this proposition until such time 
as it may become necessary to decide it.”154
154Ibid.
  Turning to Judge Kerr’s finding that de Brun and McGuinness had been denied their respective 
nominations due to an improper collateral purpose, their membership in Sinn Fein and the desire 
to prompt further IRA decommissioning, Justice Carswell declared;
“We are in agreement with this conclusion. The purpose of section 52 is to enable 
the working of the NSMC to proceed .The power of nomination was conferred on 
the first Minister and deputy first Minister in order to further that purpose, and 
they are obliged to use their power to carry out the statutory purpose. The refusal 
to make nominations of Ministers who were appropriate Ministers with executive 
responsibility for the topics to be discussed at forthcoming meetings inhibited the 
carrying out of that purpose, notwithstanding that it may have been intended to 
conduce to the fulfilment of another substantial purpose of the Act. If it were clear 
that the overall policy and objects of the 1998 Act were directed solely towards 
the decommissioning of arms, then it might be possible to invoke the principle 
summarised in Lord Reid’s phrase in Redfield v. Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 907 at 1030:
‘Parliament must have conferred the discretion with the intention 
that it should be used to promote the policy and objects of the 
Act...’
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We agree with the judge that is only one of the objects of the 1998 Act, however 
important, and the purposes of section 52 are directed to another and different 
object of the act, the fostering of North-South links through the operation of the 
NSMC. we therefore consider that the judge was correct in his conclusion that the 
First Minister’s refusal to nominate the applicants must be regarded as an 
incorrect exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by section 52. It must 
follow that as a matter of law it cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of that 
discretionary power. We regard it as appropriate that the judge should have made 
a declaration rather than granting any other remedy and we affirm the declaration 
contained in his order of 30 January 2001. We also agree with his description 
contained in his judgment at pages 26-7 of the action which should be taken in 
respect of further nominations.”155
155Ibid.
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  On May 30, 2001, the Commission reported that it had made a third inspection of the IRA 
weapons dump.156 In this report, the Commission members reiterated that;
156Report of the Third Inspection of IRA weapons Dumps by Martii Ahitsaari and Cyril 
Ramaphosa, 30 May 2001.
“...these dumps held a substantial amount of military material, including 
explosives and related equipment, as well as weapons and other material. We 
confirm that the arms dumps had not been tampered with and that they remained 
secure.
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We observed that the weapons and explosives continued to be safely and 
adequately stored. We remain confident that they cannot be used without our 
detection.157
157Ibid.
The Commission went on to make an observation which could only highlight the lack of similar 
activity by the loyalist/unionist paramilitaries;
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The IRA has once again fully honoured their commitments and complied with the 
terms of our engagement and we are convinced this co-operation will 
continue.”158
158Ibid.
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   On June 30, 2001, the Commission, again, reported to the two Governments.159 This report set 
forth a somewhat detailed summary of the Commission’s discussions with both the republican 
and loyalist/unionist paramilitary groups about the status of decommissioning and their 
intentions on this subject. At the outset it noted;
159Report Of The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), 30 
June, 2001.
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“3.The commitments given us to date notwithstanding, we must report that no 
decommissioning by the IRA, the UVF and UFF has yet started, although each of 
these groups has re-affirmed the circumstances under which they might do so.”160
160Ibid.
Turning to its discussions with the IRA, the Commission reported;
“4. Since March, we have held a number of lengthy meetings with the IRA 
representative, most recently within the past week. During each of the meetings 
we have pressed for answers to three questions:
a. The IRA’s commitment to put its arms beyond use;
b. The method it will use and whether it meets our remit to verify that 
arms are rendered permanently unusable; and
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c. When the process of putting arms beyond use will begin.”161
161Ibid.
 It went on to report that in response to these concerns the IRA reiterated its position of May 6, 
2000, that it would;
“5...put its arms beyond use, completely and verifiably, but only in the context of 
its statement of 06 May 2000. Taken in conjunction with the continued 
maintenance of the July 1997 ceasefire, and the opening of some IRA dumps to 
inspections by the International Inspectors, we believe that this conditional 
commitment is made in good faith.
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6. We have, however, been unable to ascertain how the IRA will put its arms 
beyond use, except for the assurance that it will be complete and verifiable. The 
IRA has taken note of our need for this information, but until we know what 
method will be used, we cannot judge if it meets our remit. We should record that 
the representative has said he wishes to continue to engage us on issues related to 
our remit as the political process continues.”162
162Ibid.
Turning to its discussions with the UVF representative, the Commission reported;
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“8. We have had a number of discussions with the UVF representative, most 
recently this week. He confirms that the statements he made earlier on 
decommissioning methods and supporting issues remain in effect; but he re-
iterates that the UVF will not consider decommissioning before they know the 
IRA’s intentions and hear that the war is over.”163
163Ibid.
Insofar as the UFF was concerned, the Commission reported;
117
“9. Similarly we have had a number of discussions with UFF representatives, 
most recently this week. At this most recent meeting, while the representatives did 
not withdraw their earlier statements on decommissioning methods and 
supporting issues, they told us that it would be difficult to discuss 
decommissioning further with us ‘while members of the UFF continue to be 
interned.”164
164Ibid.
Thus while the target date contemplated for decommissioning had come and gone, and a 
stalemate between the republican and loyalist/unionist paramilitaries existed; it is interesting to 
look at the respective positions of the various parties in light of their past actions.
118
  The IRA had taken the position that it would not specify any particular decommissioning 
method until the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom had fully implemented the 
terms of the Good Friday Agreement, including the future of British troops in Northern Ireland, 
which the IICD had considered to be beyond its remit.165 Moreover, in that same vein it had 
expressed an understandable concern about the status of the opposing paramilitaries.166 The Irish 
Times on August 10, 2001, reported that unionist/loyalist paramilitaries had engaged in 134 pipe-
bomb attacks in Northern Ireland in 2001, in which 50 had actually exploded.167 When one 
considers that those paramilitary members were in possession of approximately 150,000 
weapons,168 unilateral decommissioning would, at the very least, seem unwise. Notwithstanding 
these reservations, the IRA had, as described by the IICD, disclosed the location of weapons 
dumps containing “substantial” quantities of arms, and allowed the Commission’s inspectors to 
repeatedly inspect to the extent that the Commission was satisfied that the weapons had not been 
used or tampered with.
   In contrast, the UVF and UFF, which had refused to engage in any decommissioning unless the 
IRA went first, had apparently not disclosed the existence of any of its weapons, or allowed any 
165See, Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 11 
February 2000.
166Ibid.
167
“Police Blame UDA For Rise In Pipe Bombs,” Irish Times, 10 August 2001.
168Coogan, Tim Pat, The Troubles Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1996 and the Search for Peace, 
Roberts Rhinehart Publishers, Boulder, Colorado 1996 p.410.
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inspections of its weapons caches.
   Moreover, while the IRA was repeatedly assailed by loyalist/unionist political leaders for its 
insistence that the Good Friday Agreement be implemented concomitantly with the 
decommissioning discussions, no criticism was raised of the UFF’s reluctance to engage in 
decommissioning talks while its members were interned.
In the conclusion of its report, the Commission noted;
“ 10. We have been unable to meet either of the decommissioning target dates 
called for by the Agreement or by the Governments: respectively, 22 May 2000 
and June 2001. Some people have said they believe our inability to engineer a 
start to decommissioning has called into question our usefulness in this process, 
and suggest we now withdraw from it. Others have urged us to remain engaged 
and to continue to press paramilitary groups to begin decommissioning. We have 
given both these views careful consideration. 
  11. Given the conditions the IRA, the UVF, and the UFF say they require before 
they will put their arms beyond use, we believe we cannot influence that activity 
by making demands or by setting deadlines. But will continue to do what we can 
to implement our mandate through continuing contact and discussion with each of 
the three paramilitary groups, insisting that the objectives of the legislation calling 
for arms to be rendered permanently inaccessible or permanently unusable are 
respected. We will do so mindful that this contentious issue must be resolved as  
soon as possible.”169
169Ibid.
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   The following day, July 21, 2001, David Trimble, the First Minister, made good on a threat  to 
resign if there had been no progress from the IRA on decommissioning.170 This triggered the 
provisions of Part III, Section 16 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998.
Section 16 (4)(b) of the Act provides in pertinent part;
170CAIN Web Service, Chronology, 1 July 2001.
“The First Minister and deputy First Minister -
    (b) subject to the provisions of this Part, shall hold office until the conclusion 
of the next election fro First Minister and deputy First Minister”
Pursuant to Section 16(5)(b) of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, which provides;
“The holder of the office of First Minister...may by notice in writing to the 
Presiding Officer designate a Northern Ireland Minister to exercise the functions 
of that office-
  (a)during any absence or incapacity of the holder; or
   (b) during any vacancy in that office arising otherwise than under subsection                  
(7)(a);
but a person shall not have power to act by virtue of paragraph (a) for a 
continuous  period exceeding six weeks.
As indicated by Section 16(5)(b), subsection (7)(a) appears to limit the authority to designate a 
successor, in as much as it provides;
“If either the First Minister or the deputy First Minister ceases to hold office at 
any time, whether by resignation or otherwise, the other-
  (a)shall also cease to hold office at that time; but
   (b)may continue to exercise the functions of his office until the election required 
by subsection (8)”
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Subsection (8) provides;
“Where the offices of the First Minister and the deputy first Minister become 
vacant at any time an election shall be held under this section to fill the vacancies 
within a period of six weeks beginning with that time.”
Acting, ostensibly, under Section 16(5) of the Act, Trimble nominated a fellow Ulster Unionist 
Party member, Reg Emprey to fill his position of First Minister until an election could be held.171
   Whether Trimble’s nomination of Emprey was legally viable is an interesting question, since 
the authority to make such a designation under Section 16(5) appears to be limited by subsection
(7)(a) . Indeed, that latter subsection appeared to have the effect of also triggering a vacancy in 
the office of deputy First Minister, then held by Social Democratic and Labour Party(SDLP) 
member Seamus Mallon.172 A reading of Sections 16(5) and 16(7) together would seem to 
suggest that although Trimble’s resignation had the effect of ending Mallon’s official status but 
Mallon’s status is preserved for the six week period in which an election to fill the vacancies 
occurs, although the powers he would exercise jointly with the First Minister would be curtailed.
     On August 1, 2001, the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom set forth proposals 
for further implementation of the Good Friday Agreement covering decommissioning, policing, 
normalization of security arrangements in Northern Ireland,173 and invited the various parties to 
respond. 
     On August 6, 2001 the Independent International Commission On Decommissioning issued a 
statement in which it announced;
171British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) news timeline Northern Ireland Assembly, 
www.news.bbc.co.uk.
172CAIN Web Service, Chronology, 1998, 1 July 1998.
173
“Implementation Of The Good Friday Agreement”, Northen Ireland Office and 
Department of Foreign Affairs, August, 1 2001.
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“In a recent meeting with the Commission, the IRA representative proposed a method for putting 
IRA arms completely and verifiably beyond use.
   We are satisfied that this proposal meets the Commission’s remit in accordance with the 
Governments’ schemes and regulations.
  Based on our discussions with the IRA representative we believe that this proposal initiates a 
process that will put IRA arms completely and verifaibly beyond use.”174
   On August 9, 2001 the IRA issued its own statement confirming the Commission’s 
announcement, and further warned;
174Statement By The Independent international Commission on Decommissioning 
(IICD), 6 August, 2001.
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“We note the ongoing attempts in some quarters to prevent progress. They should 
not be permitted to succeed. Our representative will continue to meet the IICD. 
The IRA leadership will continue to monitor political developments.”175
175
 A portion of the Text of Irish Republican Army Statement on its 
meetings with the IICD, 9 August, 2001.
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  The statement of the IICD had been greeted by former First Minister David Trimble, of the 
Ulster Unionist Party Party, with the response that the IICD statement did not go far enough and 
that the UUPwould only be satisfied with seeing the beginning of actual decommissioning.176 In 
the ensuing days  all parties would meet with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,  John 
Reid, to set forth their various point of view.177 The UUP sought suspension of the devolved 
government, while Sinn Fein sought new Assembly elections.178 On August 10, Reid announced 
that he was suspending the Assembly at midnight that night. In announcing the suspension, he 
took note of the fact that the failure to elect a First Minister and Deputy First Minister would 
require his proposing a date for new Assembly election, as Sinn Fein advocated, pursuant to 
Section 32(3) of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998.179 This Section provides in pertinent part;
176CAIN Web Service, Chronology 2001, 9 August 2001.
177Ibid.
178Ibid.
179Northern Ireland Office, Media Centre, 10 August 2001.
“...if the period mentioned in Section 16(1) or 16(8) ends without a First Minister 
and a deputy First Minister having been elected, the Secretary of State shall 
propose a date for the poll for the election of the next Assembly.”
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While this language appears to be mandatory rather than permissive, Reid invoked the Northern
Ireland Act of 2000 as authority for an order suspending the Assembly. The invocation of the 
Northern Ireland Act of 2000 is an interesting tactic since a review of the Act itself does not 
reveal any provisions illuminating when the Act should be invoked. Indeed, Section (1) of the 
Act entitled “Suspension of devolved government in Northern Ireland”180simply states;
180Northern Ireland Act of 2000.
“While this section is in force, the Northern Ireland assembly is suspended and 
the following provisions have effect.”
     The Act thereafter recites all of the various powers and functions of the devolved Assembly 
and government which are suspended, and the ways in which these responsibilities are 
transferred to the British authorities, but makes no provision for what event triggers the 
suspension. In contrast, the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 provides various scenarios triggering 
dissolution of the Assembly, including that resulting where;
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“if the assembly passes a resolution that it should be dissolved the Secretary of 
state shall propose a date for the poll for the election of the next Assembly.”181
181Northern Ireland Act of 1998 Section 32(1).
as well as those previously discussed under Section 16 of the Act. Nevertheless. Reid suspended 
the government announcing;
“It is because ....I believe that we are tantalisingly close to being in a different 
world here in Northern Ireland - that I believe the parties should be given more 
time.”
As so often in Northern Ireland, we have reached an immovable date. I know that 
many people who do not find politics absorbing may groan at the prospect of 
going past that date. But I believe that dates are here to serve the people not the 
other way round.
It is now clear that the assembly cannot elect a First Minister and deputy First 
Minister before Sunday. In that case, I would then be obliged by Section 32(3) of 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998 to propose a date for the next Assembly elections 
This would be against a backdrop where, it is true, that we have not yet secured 
the final agreement that we are seeking. But since we and the Irish Government 
published our proposals on 1 August for completing the implementation of the 
Good Friday Agreement, there has been significant progress. the proposals have 
been welcomed and endorsed by several of the pro-Agreement parties. I believe 
that we have made progress on policing. The IRA’s agreement with the IICD of a 
method by which they will put their arms completely and verifiably beyond use is 
a very significant step which has been welcomed by all.
It has been put to me that, in these circumstances , at a delicate moment in the 
political process, when discussions are still continuing and the parties are still 
digesting the two Governments proposals, it would be against the interests of the 
peace process to plunge Northern Ireland into an election campaign, and the more 
polarised political atmosphere that would entail.
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I have therefore decided to make an order under the Northern Ireland act of 2000 
suspending devolved government in Northern Ireland. The order comes into effect 
at midnight tonight, and I hope that the period of suspension will be very 
short.”182
182See FN 177.
 The following day, he signed an order restoring the Assembly, which postponed the required 
election of another First Minister and deputy First Minister occasioned by Trimble’s July 1, 2001 
resignation in which he was succeeded by Emprey. 
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   While Reid believed the momentary suspension of the Assembly and its consequent 
postponement of the leadership election was the best option for him, Martin McGuinness, Vice-
President of Sinn Fein and Minister of Education in the devolved government, did not. On 
August 12, 2001 during a BBC183 telecast declared that the suspension of the Assembly together 
with the unionist response had caused a “serious situation.”184
   Just how seriously the IRA viewed the Trimble response and the Reid’s acquiescence to the 
unionist request for suspension of the Assembly rather than the request for fresh election, was 
apparent in the IRA’s announcement on August 14, 2001 that it was withdrawing its plan for 
decommissioning made the previous fortnight. In a statement that day, the IRA announced;
183British Broadcasting Corporation,
184Breakfast With Frost, BBC, Sunday, August 12, 2001.CAIN Web Service, Chronology 
2001, 12 August 2001.
“On Thursday August 8 we confirmed that the IRA leadership had agreed to a    
scheme with the IICD [independent International Commission on    
Decommissioning] to put arms completely and verifiably beyond use. Our 
initiative was a result of lengthy discussions with the IICD over a protracted 
period of time.
  This was an unprecedented development which involved a very difficult decision 
by us, and problems for our organisation. While mindful of these concerns, our 
decision was aimed at enhancing the peace process.
We recognise the very broad welcome which the IICD statement received. 
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However the outright rejection of that statement by the UUP leadership, 
compounded by the setting of preconditions, are totally unacceptable.
   The subsequent actions by the British government, including their failure to fill 
their commitments, is totally unacceptable.
  The conditions therefore do not exist for progressing our proposition. We are 
withdrawing our proposal.
  The IRA leadership will continue to monitor developments. Peacekeeping is a 
collective effort.”185
185Full Text of Irish Republican Army Statement, 14 August 2001.
   On September 11, 2001, the United States was attacked by Al-Queda resulting in the 
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York City, a portion of the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C., and the crash of an airliner in Pennsylvania and the consequent loss of 
thousands of lives. To what extent this motivated the IRA to return to discussions with the IICD 
regarding decommissioning is unclear but the mention of the attacks at the outset of their 
statement on September 20, 2001 announcing their willingness to resolve the issue of arms, 
suggests that the world opinion in the wake of the attacks was indeed a factor. In its statement, 
the IRA declared;
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“First of all we wish to extend our sympathy to the people of the United States 
and especially the families and friends of the victims of the deplorable attacks in 
New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.”186
186Text of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) Statement on 
Decommissioning 20 September 2001.
The statement went on to recount the organization’s discussions with the IICD, noting;
“On August 8 we confirmed that the IRA leadership had agreed a scheme with the 
IICD...to put IRA arms completely and verifiably beyond use.
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 This unprecedented IRA initiative was the result of lengthy discussions with the 
IICD over a long period. It was another expression of our willingness to enhace 
the peace process and it involved considerable problems for us and our 
organisation.”187
187Ibid.
 Turning to the response their August 8 proposal had received, the statement continued;
132
“The IRA leadership’s ability to speedily and substantially progress the decision 
was completely undermined by the setting of further preconditions and outright 
rejection of the IICD statement by the Ulster Unionist Party leadership. 
Subsequent actions by the British government including a continued failure to 
fulfil its commitments, remove the conditions necessary for progress. On August 
14 we withdrew our proposal.”188
188Ibid.
The IRA then went on to offer a renewed dialogue with the Commission, stating;
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“However, as an earnest of our willingness to resolve the issue of arms, the IRA 
leadership wish to confirm that our representative will intensify the engagement 
with the IICD. This dialogue within the context of our commitment to deal 
satisfactorily with the question of arms. It is with a view to accelerating progress 
towards the comprehensive resolution of this issue.”189
189Ibid.
The statement closed with a veiled warning cloaked in its commitment to the peace process, 
declaring;
“Progress will directly be influenced by the attitude of the other parties to the 
peace process, including and especially the British government. The IRA’s 
commitment is without question.
  However, as we have said before, peace making and peace keeping is a 
collective effort. It is our considered view that the Irish peace process can 
succeed. The continued failure or refusal to sustain the political process and to 
deliver real and meaningful change has a direct bearing on how this will be
accomplished.
134
  The IRA has contributed consistently and in a  meaningful way to the creation of 
a climate which would facilitate the search for a durable settlement. We will 
continue to do so, including through our engagement with the IICD, particularly 
at this difficult time, and in the period immediately ahead.”190
190Ibid.
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   Despite the IRA’s offer to renew contact with the IICD, John Reid , Britain’s Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, announced a second suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly. this 
suspension was the result of a deadlock to reinstate the First Minister. Reid further announced 
that he would not carry out such a technical order again.191
   On October 23, 2001, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning 
reported, in a follow-up to the Agreement of August 6, 2001 with the IRA, that;
191See Fn. 170.
“2. We have now witnessed an event - which we regard as significant -in which 
the IRA has put a quantity of arms completely beyond use. The material in 
question includes arms, ammunition and explosives.
 3. We are satisfied that the arms in question have been dealt with in accordance 
with the schemes and regulations. We are also satisfied that it would not further 
the process of putting all beyond use were we to provide further details of this 
event.
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  4.We will continue our contact with the IRA representative in pursuit of our 
mandate.”192
192Statement By The Independent International Commission on 
Decommissioning (IICD) 23 October 2001.
  Perhaps nothing better reveals the divergent positions involving the primacy or priority that 
decommissioning has in the overall peace process than the respective statements made by Gerry 
Adams, President of Sinn Fein and British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, John Reid, 
preceding the Statement by the Independent International Commission On Decommissioning on 
October 23, 2001.
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   In a speech entitled “Looking To The Future”193 made at Conway Mill in west Belfast, Adams 
declared;
193CAIN Web Service.
“The current crisis in the peace process has for many been a source of great 
frustration, annoyance and anger.
  Nationalists and republicans see the potential of the peace process being frittered 
away by a British government not honouring its commitments, and a unionist 
leadership obstructing the fundamental change that is required.
 Unionists tell us that they are prepared to share power with nationalists and 
republicans
 They argue that they see the issue of the IRA arms as crucial to this. For this 
reason David Trimble says that he has triggered the latest crisis.
 The British government’s suspension of the institutions, its remilitarisation of 
many republican communities, its emasculation of the policing issue, and the 
premature movement by others towards this inadequate position, along with the 
loyalist campaigns have all created difficulties which are coming to a head.
 From this clash of positions and perceptions has emerged a threat to the peace 
process that risks undoing the advances of the last decade.
 This must not be allowed to succeed.
  Our aim is to save the Good Friday Agreement.
 Sinn Fein’s commitment to the process is absolute. The initiatives we have taken, 
the initiatives we have encouraged others to take, including the IRA, have 
contributed decisively to the peace process.”
Turning to Sinn Fein’s view of the Good Friday Agreement and the various issues it was 
intended to resolve, Adams made clear that, in their view, decommissioning was just one of 
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many having equal importance, arguing;
“Republicans and nationalists want to be convinced that unionism is facing up to 
its responsibilities.
  Most fair minded people on this island want to believe that a British government 
is prepared to usher in a new dispensation based on equality.
  But Sinn Fein is not naive. Our strategy is based upon objective realities. It is 
guided among other things by the fact that the democratic rights and entitlements 
of nationalists and republicans cannot be conditional. These rights are universal 
rights. They effect all citizens.
  In the Good Friday Agreement matters such as policing, the political institutions, 
demilitarisation, human rights, the justice system and the equality agenda are 
stand alone issues. These are issues to be resolved in their own right.
  We have put this to all of those we have been in negotiation with.
  It is clear to Sinn Fein leadership that the issue of IRA weapons has been used as 
an excuse to undermine the peace process as well as the Good Friday 
Agreement.”194
194Ibid.
Turning to the one-sided nature of the decommissioning that had been engaged in by the IRA up 
to that point, Adams declared;
“Many republicans are angry at the unrelenting focus on silent IRA weapons. This  
is in marked contrast to the attitude to loyalist weapons and bombs in daily use, 
and the remilitaraisation by the British Army of republican heartlands in the 
north.
  The issue of all arms must be resolved. But not just IRA weapons - British 
weapons as well. 
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  This is a necessary part of any conflict resolution.”195
195Ibid.
Ultimately he concluded;
“The Good Friday Agreement is after all an agreement that the British 
government is part of.
  The implementation of that agreement is not secondary to the issue of IRA 
weapons.
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  It has been the consistent view of Sinn Fein that the arms question can be 
resolved as part of a collective move forward in which the issue of weapons is 
completely removed as a precondition for progress in other issues.”196
196Ibid.
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In contrast, that same day, John Reid, in a speech to the Society of Newspaper Editors in 
Belfast197,
summarized the British Government’s position, noting;
197CAIN Web Service.
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“On Friday I met with Brian Cowen198 to agree the way forward. We believe we 
have enough material to work with: David Trimble has said that, with movement 
from republicans, the UUP resignations would not have been necessary.
  Martin McGuinness has said that, if it were up to him, he’d sort out 
decommissioning tomorrow.
  So thee is common ground. Now we need to build on it - and urgently.
   To do so will take courage on all sides. It will mean facing real challenges.
    I do not mean to underestimate the difficulties for paramilitary groups in 
resolving the issue of arms. Nor do I underestimate the significance of the steps 
they have already taken. They are being asked to enter a new historical dynamic.
  So I want to say to the paramilitaries:
   ‘If you are able to do what the people of Northern Ireland want so desperately -
to put arms beyond use and to take politics onto a new plain - then I believe you 
will not find the response from this government, from the Irish government, the 
American administration and the whole international community, to be grudging 
or ungenerous.
  Those of us who support the Good Friday Agreement passionately will be 
allowed to press forward with its implementation.
  ‘ But if you cannot make the final transition to democratic means then I believe 
the same international community and more importantly, the people of Ireland, 
north and south, will simply not understand why.’
  Freeing the logjam that has held back the implementation of the Belfast 
Agreement is our task for the coming days. I cannot promise anything except that 
we will be urging all sides to reach out, negotiate and accommodate to save 
devolved government and to build the best possible social and political culture for 
198Minister for Foreign Affairs, Republic of Ireland.
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all the people of Northern Ireland.”199
199See Fn.194.
  Reid’s words clearly implied that the British government, and perhaps the Irish government, 
viewed the IRA as a continuing obstacle to decommissioning, justifying Trimble and the UUP’s 
withdrawal from the power-sharing government, and suspension of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly. It is little wonder that the republican movement, and particularly the IRA, felt that 
their efforts at decommissioning, heretofore engaged in with the IICD, went unrecognized and 
unappreciated
 Particularly when only the republicans had taken such steps. 
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  Reid’s viewpoint notwithstanding, the IICD met with Trimble the following day, and 
pronounced the IRA decommissioning event “complies with decommissioning legislation and 
regulations.”200 Two days hence, the Commission also met with the Democratic Unionist Party, 
represented by Ian Paisley, Peter Robinson, Iris Robinson and Nigel Dodds during which it 
pronounced the IRA decommissioning event to be “an act that was significant.”201 That same 
day, October 24, 2001,Cyril Ramaphosa and Martii Ahtisarri, the two IICD inspectors that had 
overseen the inspections of the IRA weapons dumps resigned claiming that they were no longer 
needed since the IICD and the IRA were dealing with the weapons issue.202
   On November 1, 2001 Secretary of State Reid was faced with an even more complicated 
dilemma than that which confronted him on August 10. David Trimble failed to secure enough 
votes to be elected First Minister of the Assembly in the election triggered by the September 21st
suspension.203 Reid was now faced with a menu of three choices. He could simply suspend the 
Assembly indefinitely and re-introduce direct rule; set a date for new elections pursuant to 
Section 32(3) of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998; or engage in another “technical” suspension 
as done previously thereby triggering another six week window in which the parties could try 
200Meeting between the Ulster Unionist Party and the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning on October 23, 2001. Note taken and released by the UUP.
201Meeting between the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and 
the Democratic Unionist Party, October 25, 2001. Note taken and released by the DUP.
202
 Cain Web Service, Chronology, 2001, 24 August 2001.
203Ibid. Chronology 2001, 2 November 2001.
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and rectify the situation, although authority for this, again, appears dubious. Instead, Reid 
decided to ignore the deadline. After some inter-party machinations to increase the size of the 
unionist bloc, Trimble was re-elected.204
.  On January 9, 2002, the issue of arms decommissioning in Northern Ireland was addressed in 
the British House of Commons. Section 2(3)(b) of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning
Act of 1997 was amended to extend the time allowed for decommissioning for one year and 
allowed annual extensions for a maximum of five years.205 Opposed by the Unionist parties, 
Trimble warned that if the British did not apply pressure to the IRA, that he would.206
   On April 8, 2002, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning reported 
that the IRA had, again, decommissioned a large quantity of weapons.207 In its report, the 
Commission stated;
204Ibid.
205Ibid.
206Ibid.
207Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, 8 April 
2002.
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“1. we wish to inform you that we have witnessed an event in which the IRA 
leadership has put a varied and substantial quantity of ammunition, arms and 
explosive material beyond use. In accordance with the Governments’ Scheme and 
Regulations, we have made an inventory of the arms concerned, which we will 
provide to the two governments when our task is completed.”208
208Ibid.
That same date, the IRA issued a statement in which it declared;
“The leadership of Oglaigh na h-Eirann has taken another initiative to put arms 
beyond use...
  The initiative is unilateral at a time when there are those who are not fulfilling 
their obligations. It could be argued that the IRA should not take such an 
initiative, but it is precisely because of this that an initiative has been undertaken, 
so the peace process can be stabilised, sustained and strengthened.... 
This is a leadership initiative.
We are relying on the discipline and commitment of our support base and 
volunteers. We remain committed to achieving our republican objectives. 
However, the securing of a democratic peace settlement is not solely a task for 
Irish Republicans and we are mindful of the primary obligation of the British 
government and of the Unionist leadership.
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The process can work if there is the political will to make it succeed, the IRA has 
once again demonstrated that will.”209
209Text of Irish Republican Army Statement on decommissioning, 8 April 
2002.
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   Eight days later, on April 8, 2002, The IRA issued an apology to all those “noncombatants”210
killed or injured in their operations that commenced in 1972. In the statement the IRA reached 
out to the unionist/loyalist paramilitaries, stating;
210Text of the Irish Republican Army statement of apology, 16 April 2002.
“Their have been fatalities amongst combatants on all sides. We acknowledge the 
grief and  pain of their relatives.
  The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or 
closed minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes 
all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants.
  It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are 
deemed more or less worthy than others.
  The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgment of the 
grief and loss of others. On the anniversary, we are endeavouring to fulfil this 
responsibility to those we have hurt.
  The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and 
peace in Ireland.
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  We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the 
challenges and difficulties this presents. This includes the acceptance of past 
mistakes and of the hurt and pain we have caused others.”211
211Ibid.
   Despite these two statements and the act of decommissioning, British Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, John Reid, the following month declared that a cease-fire by the IRA was not 
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enough and that there had to be a “sense that the war is over.”212 Reid’s singling out the IRA for 
this criticism is, at best, inexplicable in light of a report by the Police Service of Northern Ireland 
(PSNI), on the past January 4, in which it reported that loyalist paramilitaries had committed 
twice as many “punishment” attacks as republicans during 2001.213 As noted previously, the 
Irish Times had reported in August 2001 that loyalist paramilitaries had engaged in 134 pipe-
bomb attacks during the same period.214 Reid’s criticism is notably devoid of any commentary 
on the failure of unionist/loyalist paramilitaries to engage in any decommissioning or calling 
212See Fn. 170..
213CAIN Web Service; Overall there were 331 attacks in 2001; an increase in 25% on the 
2000. figure. Loyalist paramilitaries were responsible for 121 shootings and 92 beatings while 
republicans were responsible for 66 shootings and 53 beatings.
214See Fn.166.  The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) reported essentially the same 
figures, attributing 129 pipe-bomb attacks to the loyalist paramilitaries during 2001. 53 exploded 
and 89 defused.
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upon them to do so.
     Reid’s criticism of the IRA could only have encouraged UUP First Minster Trimble to issue a 
declaration on September 21, 2002 threatening to withdraw th UUP from the power-sharing 
executive. In the declaration, the UUP stated;
“1. The Ulster Unionist Party reaffirms the commitment we gave to the people of 
Northern Ireland in our election manifesto in 1998, namely that ‘we will not sit in 
government with unreconstructed terrorists.’
  2. The Ulster Unionist Party further reaffirms its commitment to the Mitchell 
Principles of democracy and non-violence and its determination to achieve a real 
and lasting peace, with stable government in Northern Ireland. The Ulster 
Unionist Party will judge all the terrorist organisations in terms of the level of
commitment to the Mitchell Principles . In particular, the UUP will continue to 
demand total disarmament and disbandment of all terrorist groups including the 
IRA.
3....In view of the failure of Sinn Fein/ IRA to honour their commitment to 
exclusively peaceful and democratic means, the Ulster Unionist Party will, with 
immediate effect, adopt a policy of non-participation in meetings of the North-
South Ministerial Council at both plenary and bilateral level. In the absence of 
Ulster Unionist ministers, the NSMC will cease to function.”
5. The Ulster Unionist party will initiate talks with the other partys and the 
Government over the next three months to ensure that there is a viable basis for 
the future governance of Northern Ireland and that unless upon conclusion of such 
talks it has been demonstrably established that a real and genuine transition is 
proceeding to a conclusion, the party leader will recommend to a reconvened 
UUC meeting on January 18, 2003, the immediate resignation of all Ulster 
Unionist ministers from th administration.”215
215Ulster Unionist Council meeting on 21 September 2002.
   Other events, however, would quickly occur to render the January 18, 2003 deadline set by 
Trimble moot. On October 4, 2002 the Sinn Fein offices at Stormont were raided by the PSNI as 
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part of a police investigation into alleged “intelligence gathering” by republicans.216 Ten days 
later, 
on October 14, 2002, Reid, without singling any particular party or group out for blame, invoked 
the Northern Ireland Act of 2000 and suspended the government returning Northern Ireland to 
direct rule by Britain. In his statement announcing the suspension, Reid observed;
216
 See, Fn. 170.
“As you know, over the past weeks and months the political process in Northern 
Ireland has encountered increasing difficulties. My sincere hope was that we 
would be able to overcome those challenges. But it is obvious that this would 
prove impossible in the short term.
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  Regrettably therefore, I have today made an Order under the Northern Ireland 
Act of 2000, suspending devolved government in Northern Ireland. It will come 
into effect at midnight tonight.”217
217Statement by John Reid, on the suspension of Devolution, Hillsborough, 
14 October 2002.
After reaffirming the British Government’s commitment to the Good Friday Agreement, Reid 
went on to make several points concerning the continuation of the peace process;
“Firstly, the recent difficulties in Northern Ireland stem from a loss of trust on 
both sides of the community. In particular it is essential that concerns about the 
commitment to exclusive democratic and non-violent means are removed. It is 
also essential that each community has confidence in the commitment of the other 
to the Agreement.”
........................................................................................................
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  Thirdly, I want to stress that this is an impasse - hopefully short lived - in one 
aspect of the Agreement. It isn’t the whole Agreement. It isn’t the whole peace 
process. We will continue, in co-cooperation with the parties and our colleagues 
in the Irish Government, to carry forward that process and the implementation of 
the Agreement...”218
218Ibid.
   On October 19, 2002, David Trimble, speaking to the UUP annual conference, accused both 
Reid and British Prime Minister of duplicity by suspending the government rather than excluding 
Sinn Fein from participation in it, noting;
“On 24 July John Reid gave Republicans what he called the yellow card. he 
promised that if they were caught with their hand in the till again the Government 
would support the exclusion of Sinn Fein from the Executive.
  Which would be the just result. Not the unfair result of suspending everyone -
punishing the innocent along with the guilty!
155
     Reid and Blair have not bothered to justify breaking their word. Evidently they 
do not seek to explain. It’s just what they do.”219
219Speech by David Trimble at the UUP annual conference, Londonderry, 
19 October 2002.
Trimble’s criticism of  Reid’s unilateral suspension of devolved government as a remedy 
for Sinn Fein’s alleged transgression, rather than initiating exclusion is specious at best. Section
30 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 clearly provides Trimble, himself, with the means of 
bringing about Sinn Fein’s exclusion from the government, if grounds for such exclusion exist.
Section 30(2) of the Act provides;
“If the Assembly resolves that a political party does not enjoy the confidence of 
the Assembly-
    (a)because it is not committed to non-violence and exclusively peaceful       
and democratic means; or
    (b)because it is not committed to such of its members as are or might 
become Ministers or junior Ministers observing the other terms of the 
pledge of office,
members of that party shall be excluded from holding office as Ministers 
for a period of twelve months beginning with the date of the resolution.”
Subsection 5 of this provision sets forth the requirements for such a motion being made, as 
follows;
“A motion for a resolution under this section shall not be moved unless-
(a) it is supported by at least 30 members of the Assembly;
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(b)it is moved by the First Minister and the deputy First Minister acting 
jointly; or
(c)it is moved by the Presiding Officer in pursuance of a notice under
subsection (6).”
Subsection (6) , additionally provides that;
“If the Secretary of State is of the opinion that the Assembly ought to consider-
(b) a resolution under subsection (2)(a) in relation to a political party,
       he shall serve a notice on the Presiding Officer requiring him to move a 
motion for such a resolution.”
In conjunction with this, subsection (7) requires that;
In forming an opinion under subsection (6), the Secretary of State shall in 
particular take into account whether the Minister or junior Minister or the political 
party-
(a) is committed to the use now and in the future of only democratic and    
peaceful means to achieve his or her objectives;
(b)has ceased to be involved in any acts of violence or of preparation for     
violence;
(c) is directing or promoting acts of violence by other persons.
(d) is co-operating fully with any Commission of the kind referred to in     
Section 7 of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act in    
implementing the Decommissioning section of the Belfast Agreement.”
   Finally, Subsection 8 of this Section requires that;
“A resolution under this Section shall not be passed without cross-community  
support.”
   Thus, Trimble, as First Minister, had a statutory framework within which he could have sought 
the ouster of Sinn Fein from the government, provided that he had grounds to do so; could 
persuade the deputy First Minister, who was not a member of Sinn Fein, to join in the motion; 
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that the evidence was persuasive enough to draw the support of at least thirty members of the 
Assembly; and the case against Sinn Fein was compelling enough to draw cross-community 
support. Yet, he took no such action. 
   Similarly, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland could have initiated the same action 
under 30(6)(b) of the Act, rather than invoke the Northern Ireland Act of 2000 to suspend the 
devolved government.
    One can only surmise why neither official availed himself of this course of action.
   In Trimble’s case, assuming that the stated reasons for the PSNI raid, i.e. to uncover evidence 
of republican intelligence gathering, came within the ambit of Section 30(2)(a), “ a lack of 
commitment to non-violence and exclusively peaceful means”, then support from the deputy 
First Minister as well as the votes of thirty members of the Assembly on a cross-cultural basis, 
should not have been hard to come by. Particularly given the rivalry and antipathy that existed 
between the SDLP and Sinn Fein.  
   Of even greater interest is the question of why Trimble did not seek judicial review of Reid’s 
invocation of the Northern Ireland Act of 2000, as a basis for suspension for the devolved 
government ? As noted earlier, Reid’s use of this Act to declare suspensions is somewhat 
questionable when the text of the Act is reviewed. While Section 1 of the Act provides in 
pertinent part;
“(1) While this section is in force, the Northern Ireland Assembly is 
suspended....”
no prefatory language is contained in the Act setting forth the situations in which the Act is 
authorized to be invoked. As noted earlier, the remainder of the Act merely specified those 
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functions which are suspended and the methods by which suspension may be ended and the 
effect of restoration. Moreover when juxtapositioned with the plethora of mechanisms to both 
sanction members and restore leadership contained  in the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, a 
challenge to the use of this Act to suspend the government would have seemed ripe. Trimble’s 
failure to undertake any of these options can only lead to the conclusion that he, and the unionist 
preferred direct rule. This conclusion is buttressed even more, in light of Trimble’s history of 
threatening to pull his party out of the government each time they didn’t get their way on an 
issue.
 Reid’s use of the Northern Ireland Act of 2000 rather than the exclusion provisions of Section
30 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 has a more interesting dimension to it. As noted earlier, 
although the Secretary of State may initiate exclusion proceedings under this section, before he 
may do so, he must take into account whether the political party is co-operating in a 
decommissioning scheme pursuant to subsection 7(d) of the Act. In forming such an opinion, 
Reid would have been forced to deal with the fact that the IRA was the only paramilitary group 
engaged in such activity with the IICD out of all the paramilitary groups. Despite Sinn Fein’s 
denials, all of the loyalist/unionist parties and the British Government contended that the IRA 
was an alter ego of Sinn Fein. Thus, under that view, Reid would have to wrestle with the image 
of the only party to be repeatedly engaged with the IICD being expelled from the government. 
Suspension of the devolved government must have seemed easier.
   Trimble, to his credit, did have some harsh words for the loyalist paramilitaries in his speech at 
the annual conference, stating;
“We will not be satisfied with some phantom disbandment. The paramilitaries 
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really do have to go away. Their day is over.
   But please note, I said ‘paramilitaries’-plural.
   This message goes out to loyalists as well. People are fed up to the back-teeth 
with racketeering and feuding that is disguised as loyalism.
  We congratulate the Police on the raids of Friday fortnight. We also congratulate 
them on the recent arrests arising from loyalist violence. We hope there will now 
be consistent action to bring charges and obtain convictions against all 
racketeers.”220
220Ibid.
  Trimble’s speech  revealed a unionist view  which spelled trouble for the future of the peace 
process and the ultimate accommodation of the republican and unionist aims, when he observed;
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“It is not the only mistake they make in Dublin.221 There is an ideological blind-
spot there. The doctrine of consent is widely accepted in Irish public life but its 
implications are not fully grasped. There is still an unwillingness to accept the 
depth and solidity of our community’s commitment to the Union and the political 
and cultural implications that flow from that.....
  Too many people in nationalism see unionism as a problem to be got around 
rather than a noble tradition to be accommodated in a spirit pf genuine 
engagement.”222
221Trimble was referring to the Republic of Ireland’s speculation that it 
could work with Peter Robinson, a member of the rival Democratic Unionist 
Party.
222Fn. 203, Ibid.
This observation was a prelude to Trimble’s expression of how he viewed the concept of 
devolved government and his suspicion of the British government’s intentions concerning the 
future of Northern Ireland.
  “Equally dangerous is the loose talk about joint authority. This is lacking in any 
shard of realism. Under the arrangement that we all agreed Her Majesty’s 
Government retains sovereignty as they demonstrated by suspending the 
institutions yet again.
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  Like anyone else, the Irish can put forward their ideas. The danger lies with the 
direct rule Ministers and the Northern Ireland Office where there are too many 
unreconstructed minds, dark corners where the notion of consent has not 
penetrated..”223
223Ibid.
  Clearly Trimble was expressing the unionist view that its participation in the devolved power-
sharing government was, at best, grudgingly undertaken; and that it viewed the prospect of a 
united Ireland under a republican form of government as being non-existent.
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    The suspension of devolved government led to the IRA issuing a statement on October 30, 
2002, announcing that it would suspend its contact with the IICD.224 In its statement, the IRA 
charged that it had acted unilaterally in furtherance of the peace process and cast the blame for 
its failure on the unionist/loyalist paramilitaries, arguing;
224Full Text of Irish Republican Party statement announcing the suspension of contact 
with the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 30 October 2002.
“Recent events show that the leadership of unionism have set their faces against 
political change at this time.
  There is also a real threat to the peace process from the British establishment and 
its agencies, as well as the loyalist murder gangs.
For our part, the IRA remains committed to the search for a just and lasting peace.
  The complete cessation of military operations announced in July 1997 remains 
intact.
  In the past the IRA leadership has acted unilaterally to save and enhance the 
peace process.
  We have also outlined how, in our view, the full implementation by the two 
governments of their commitments could provide a political context with the 
potential to remove the causes of the conflict.
  Despite this, the British government says the responsibility for this present crisis 
and its resolution lies with us and there is an effort to impose unacceptable and 
untenable ultimatums on the IRA.
  At the same time the British government by its own admission, has not kept its 
commitments.
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  The IRA has therefore, suspended contact with the IICD.
  The onus is on the British government and others to create confidence in the 
process. They can do this by honoring their obligations.”225
225Ibid.
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  On February 8, 2003, Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams, in a speech to party activists in 
Belfast226, responded to David Trimble, observing;
226CAIN Web Service.
   “There is a lot of speculation about what is happening within unionism but one 
thing is clear Mr. Trimble’s approach has not changed in the last 5 years.
     Over the last five years on several occasions ha has sought to have Sinn Fein
expelled from the Executive. He has not been successful.
     But what he did succeed in doing was to get British government to act outside 
the terms of the Agreement and to unilaterally introduce suspension legislation. It 
is apparent that the British government are pursuing a strategy whereby the 
survival of David Trimble as leader of the UUP is more important than the 
survival of the Agreement itself.”
    And Mr. Trimble has successfully exploited the willingness on the part of 
London. This approach has been aided by other elements of the British system 
who are waging war against republicans.
   In the almost 5 years since Good Friday 1998 the political institutions, in a clear 
breach of the agreement, have been functioning less than half of that time. On 4 
separate occasions, at the behest of the UUP leadership, the British Government 
has, suspended them.
   Of course, Mr. Trimble has to deal with the reality of the anti-Agreement 
faction in his own party and the anti-agreement DUP who are electorally snapping 
at his heels.
   But for many republicans there is a serious question mark over whether Mr. 
Trimble is willing or able to lead Unionism in support of the Good Friday 
Agreement.
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   What is clear is that resistance to change has created yet another crisis in the 
process. And four months into this crisis there is no sign so far that the British 
government are willing to move effectively to deal with this.”227
227Ibid.
  Turning to the position taken by Secretary of State Reid, and the unionist parties demands for 
IRA decommissioning, he declared;
“Accordingly we have seen much speculation in the media about a possible move 
by the IRA.
   Let’s put all of this into some sort of perspective. In the negotiations Sinn Fein 
are seeking the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement as agreed by 
the British governments and the unionists.
   For instance there is not a new beginning to policing. And let me be clear again 
about this. Sinn Fein is not prepared to endorse the current policing format on 
SDLP terms. We seek to continue to seek the new beginning outlined in the Good 
Friday Agreement.
   We do not have equality of human rights.
   We do not have a just or fair criminal justice system. We do not have 
demilitarisation. People are not living free from harassment and sectarian attack. 
We do not have Irish language rights.
   The reality as Mr. Blair acknowledges is that the agreement has not been 
implemented. And the political institutions are suspended. Again.
   Political unionism continues to oppose changes and seek to undermine the 
agreement.
   British securocrats continue to target republicans.
   While loyalist death squads wage war on the Catholic community and each 
other and their actions temporarily fill our TV screens, the focus continues to be 
on the Irish Republican Army. Is this the climate for a significant move on the 
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IRA ? I hardly think so. Does anyone think there will be movement unless 
everyone 
moves ? Unless the British government honours its obligations ?
   The current crisis in the peace process is not about the IRA. Of course the 
existence of the IRA is an affront to its enemies. But this process is about 
changing all that in a way which will bring an end to all of armed groups. Can that 
be achieved by ganging up on republicans ? Or making movement towards the 
basic rights conditional on movement by the IRA ? Or by punishing Sinn Fein 
voters and other citizens if the IRA doesn’t comply with unionist demands.
   The underlying problems in the process and the current crisis is about resistance 
to change and the role of Sinn Fein as an engine of that change. It is about trying 
to delay the equality agenda. it is about the growth of republicanism across this 
land.
   That is why the unionists are boycotting the negotiations. That is why we have 
the British securocrats making strenuous efforts to wreck the situation through 
leaking spurious stories to the media.
   That is why the UUP is lobbying for a postponement of the May elections. That 
is why new electoral legislation was brought in to deal with the registration of 
voters here. This legislation has wiped tens of thousands of voters from the 
register. Every political party is affected by this, but the areas most affected are 
those where Sinn Fein is strongest. Nationalist, working class and young voters 
have particularly disenfranchised. This is an issue of democratic rights. Every 
political party should concerned about the fact that th people are being 
disenfranchised. It is my very firm view that the motivation behind this legislation 
is designed to limit Sinn Fein’s growth as a political party.
  The focus for us must be to thwart the efforts to prevent the process of change. 
We must continue to build our political strength, and to defend the Good Friday 
Agreement.”228
228Ibid.
  Adams, thus, called into question Trimble and the unionists commitment to the implementation 
of the Good Friday Agreement and reiterated to the British authorities the republican position 
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that decommissioning  was one ingredient of the Good Friday Agreement rather than a 
precondition to its full implementation.
 Adams repeated some of these themes at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis229 held on March 29, 2003.230
In addition, he chastised the Republic of Ireland’s government  when he observed;
229The party’s annual convention.
230CAIN Web Service.
“All of which brings us to the current difficulties. depending on your viewpoint 
the crisis has been caused by unionism, or by the Irish republicans or by the 
British government or by the Irish government or by the accumulation of factors 
involving or allegedly involving all of these elements. I am not going to engage in 
the blame game in this speech and I want to acknowledge in a very clear way that 
the difficulties within unionism have been severely exacerbated by the ongoing 
focus on alleged IRA activities. And of course, on the republican and nationalist 
side there is anger, frustration and annoyance because there is little focus on the 
ongoing activities of unionist paramilitaries or the actions of the British forces. 
Should we give up hope in the process ? No.
  But we have to face up to the reality that the British government holds the 
survival of David Trimble and the ascendancy of the UUP within unionism as 
priority objectives, This might be a fair enough tactical approach if the dynamic 
was not being drained out of the process; if Mr. Trimble was fighting his corner 
and promoting the Agreement; and if the changes for which the British 
government has direct responsibility were proceeding regardless. But this is not 
the case. And where stands the Irish government in all of this? The Good Friday 
Agreement is an international treaty between the Irish and British governments. 
They have joint co-equal responsibility for its implementation. The British 
government has no right to act unilaterally and it needs to be told this again and 
again.
  In particular Irish citizens, victimised and targeted by sectarian violence, have a 
right to expect effective political protection from the government of Dublin. And 
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all sections of the electorate have the right to expect that the Irish government will 
uphold their rights in the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, instead of stepping 
outside the agreement to bring in sanctions.”
Adams then turned to the question of whether the other parties were genuinely working honestly 
for full implementation of the Agreement, declaring;
“While I believe that the majority of unionists want to embrace change it is clear 
that their political leaders do not want the Good Friday Agreement to be 
implemented. That seems to be the Ulster Unionist Party’s current position. Ian 
Paisley has always been clear about this. It appears that the demands of unionism 
are insatiable. They are also not deliverable. Not unless the two governments tear 
up the Good Friday Agreement. Not unless people in the south allow them to do 
this. Not unless nationalists and republicans in the north decide to accept less than 
our basic entitlements. We have no intention of doing that.”231
231Ibid.
He then went on to point out the fact that decommissioning, up to that point, had been one-sided, 
stating;
  “Our strategy, and Mr. Trimble knows this, is about bringing an end to physical 
force republicanism, by creating an alternate way to achieve democratic and 
republican objective. It wasn’t us who promoted the issue of arms 
decommissioning as a precondition on an Agreement but it was us, and others , 
who moved so that the IRA came to do the unthinkable. To not only work with 
the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning but also to put 
arms beyond use under its auspices at a time when unionist paramilitaries were on 
a killing spree, when sectarian orange marches were being forced into Catholic 
neighborhoods and when the British Army was remilitarisisng.
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  It wasn’t us who came up with another demand once progress on the arms issue 
was being made. Sinn Fein is not the IRA but we have used our influence, as 
every party to the Agreement is obliged to, in order to advance the objectives of 
the Agreement. This party is not accountable for the IRA and I will not accept that 
we or our electorate can be punished or sanctioned for alleged IRA behaviour but 
I do have to say that the IRA is serious and genuine about its support for a peace 
process.”232
232Ibid.
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  One day later, at the same Ard Fheis, Martin McGuinness, Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator, 
commented on the UUP’s unwillingness to participate in all party talks since the suspension of 
devolved government,233 noting;
233CAIN Web Service.
“Some weeks after the suspension of the institutions of the governments fully 
convened all-party talks. In advance of these talks Sinn Fein set out for all the 
parties our view on all the issues which needed to be addressed.
  These included:
   The political institutions and the democratic rights of all sections of the 
electorate. Equality and Human Rights Victims of the Conflict, The Irish 
Language, The use of flags and public emblems for public purposes, The issue of 
Demilitarisiation Policing and Justice Transfer of powers on policing and Justice 
Prisoners.
   Once it became clear that discussions would in fact deal with the broader range 
of issues rather than the single item agenda the UUP withdrew from these 
discussions.”
He then turned to the issue of sanctions on parties outside of the framework of the Agreement, 
declaring;
   “A related matter is the issue of sanctions outside the terms of the Agreement. 
This has recently become a part of the story around this phase of the negotiations.
    So let us be clear. Sinn Fein will not be held responsible fro any words or deeds 
other than our own.
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    We demand for our electorate the same democratic rights, entitlements and 
treatment as all other sections of the electorate. We reject all sanctions outside the 
terms of the Agreement.”234
234Ibid.
  McGuinness’s concerns about these types of sanctions was well founded as events would prove.
172
  On April 13, 2003, The IRA issued two statements, one public, the other private, concerning 
recent developments in the peace process.  The public statement explained that it was being 
made for the purpose of explaining the private, unpublished statement that was not released to 
the public until May 6, 2003. In its public statement the IRA announced a third act of 
decommissioning in which it put more arms beyond use.235 In its private statement the IRA 
noted;
235Irish Republican Army statement on recent developments in the peace process, 13 
April 2003.
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“Although the Irish Republican Army is not a party to the Good Friday 
Agreement, we are disappointed that the Agreement has not been 
implemented”236
236Text of Irish Republican Army (private) statement on recent 
developments in the peace process given to the British and Irish Governments 13 
April 2003 [released publicly on May 6, 2003].
Addressing the issue of further decommissioning, the statement went on;
“The IRA leadership reiterates our commitment to resolving the issue of arms. 
The commitments from the two governments, including the ending of the 
suspension of the political institutions, and the firm pledge by the leader of the 
Ulster Unionist Party that he will actively support the sustained working of the 
political institutions and other elements of the Good Friday Agreement, enables us 
to do this.
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  We have authorised our representative to meet with the IICD [Independent 
International Commission on decommissioning] with a view to proceeding with 
the implementation of a process to put arms beyond use. This will be verified 
under the agreed scheme.”237
237Ibid.
The statement then, surprisingly, offered something of an olive branch to the unionist 
community, 
as it continued; 
“We are Irish republicans. Our objective is a united Ireland. We are not unionists 
or British and no one should expect us to set aside our political objectives or our 
republicanism.
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We do not claim to fully understand unionist perceptions. But we are prepared to 
listen and to learn. And we are committed to playing our part in creating the 
conditions in which unionists, nationalists and republicans can live together 
peacefully.”238
238Ibid.
Joint Declaration By The British And Irish Governments
           April 2003
      The following month, the Governments of Ireland and Britain put forth a Joint Declaration 
setting forth their joint views on what had been accomplished under the Good Friday Agreement 
as well as proposals to be accomplished under it in the future. At the outset of the Declaration, 
the Governments noted;
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“3. A key impediment to completing the evolution to such a society in Northern Ireland is that 
both major traditions have lacked confidence and trust in each other. A major factor in 
contributing to the erosion of the confidence and trust of law abiding people throughout the 
community has been the continuing active manifestations of paramilitarism, sectarian violence 
and disorder.”239
  In the section entitled “Acts of Completion”, they pledged;
“5. The two Governments wish to see the devolved institutions restored as soon as possible. But 
devolved government in Northern Ireland can only flourish on the basis of trust between the 
parties. In order to re-establish that trust, it must be clear that the transition from violence to 
exclusively peaceful and democratic means is being brought to an unambiguous and definitive 
conclusion. It is also essential that each party has confidence in the commitment of the 
representatives of the others to the full operation and implementation of the Agreement in all 
respects and accords respect to each others’ democratic mandate.”240
In regard to the political institutions the British Government pledged that it would;
239Joint Declaration By The British And Irish Governments, April 2003, p.3, para. 3.
240Ibid., para.5.
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“...be prepared to repeal the power in the Northern Ireland Act 2000 to suspend 
these institutions by order.”241
241Ibid., para. 9.
Although the Joint Declaration went on to spell out very comprehensive proposals and goals in 
the areas of security normalization, devolved policing, and equal rights, it was the declarations 
concerning paramilitarism which would receive the most immediate action and have the most 
significant impact on the future of the peace process. In the section dealing with 
“Paramilitarism”, the two Governments declared;
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“We need to see an immediate, full and permanent cessation of all paramilitary 
activity including military attacks, training, targeting, intelligence gathering, 
acquisition or development of arms or weapons, other preparations for terrorist 
campaigns, punishment beatings and attacks and involvement in riots.”242
242Ibid., p.5, para. 13.
On the issue of decommissioning, it urged;
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“All paramilitary groups should actively engage with the Independent 
International Commission on Decommissioning with a view to putting arms 
beyond use in a manner that is conducive to creating public confidence and all 
parties should, in accordance with the Agreement, use their influence to 
encourage and support the completion of that process. in accordance with its 
mandate, the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning will 
continue its existing functions. The two governments continue to believe that 
putting all arms beyond use remains an indispensable part of implementing the 
Agreement.”243
243Ibid., p.5, para. 14.
In what could only be a tacit recognition of the IRA’s decommissioning events with the IICD, 
the 
Governments observed;
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“Paramilitary groups need to make it clear that they have made such a historic act 
of completion, and that it is reflected in reality on the ground. The Governments 
are aware of the strides made by some groups and acknowledge that the 
paramilitary ceasefires, independent arms inspections and acts of 
decommissioning have been important in enabling and sustaining the political 
process over recent years.”244
244Ibid., p.5, para 15.
   When one reads those words, it is hard to fathom why Reid was castigating the IRA the 
previous May because it had not “declared the war over,” particularly in light of the next 
observation that is made;
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“The Governments believe it is essential that those paramilitary groups that have 
not, to date, shown a willingness to follow the route towards peace should do so 
now. Should these groups fail to respond positively and decide instead to pursue 
criminal activities, such a course will not be tolerated.”245
245Ibid., p.6, para. 16.
Agreement Between The British And Irish Governments
April 2003
  On May 1, 2003, the two Governments announced an Agreement to create a new body to 
monitor and report on the fulfillment of the commitments to end paramilitary activity and 
breaches of the obligations under the Good Friday Agreement. Although only three paragraphs 
long, the Agreement was significant in the aims it hoped to achieve, and in what it ultimately 
spawned. It’s opening paragraph recounted the past, noting
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“On account of the divisive legacies of the past and the deficit of confidence 
between both communities, we now judge it necessary to build various safeguards 
and assurance mechanisms into the proposals set out in the Joint Declaration. 
These do not reflect a lack of confidence by the two Governments in the 
willingness of the various parties to meet their commitments. However, it is our 
judgement that, without such mechanisms , it will be impossible to generate the 
confidence which is required all round if we are to achieve the necessary 
outcomes. We accept that some of the parties will not be able to endorse these 
proposals, but the two governments believe that they are essential to the secure 
the future of the Agreement.”246
246Agreement Between the British And Irish Governments, April 2003.
The Agreement next spelled out the creation of the new body, declaring;
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“A new independent body will therefore be created that will monitor and report 
on the carrying out of the commitments relating to the ending of the paramilitary 
activity and the programme of security normalisation , as set out in paragraphs 12-
19 and Annex 1 of the Joint declaration. It will also have a more general 
responsibility to consider the claims by any party in the Assembly that another 
party is fundamentally in breach of requirements in the Declaration of Support or 
elsewhere in the Agreement. The body will have four members, two appointed by 
the British Government (including one from Northern Ireland) and one each by 
the Irish and U.S. Governments. It will carry out its activities with a view to 
promoting public confidence and ensuring that any serious non-compliance with 
these acts of completion is identified and reported. These terms of reference of 
this independent body are outlined in the attached annex.”247
247Ibid.
The Agreement then proceeded to lay out the procedures that would be followed by the body in 
its operation,
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“The following procedures will apply. Any incidents of non-compliance by any 
party will, in the normal course of events, be subject to either the political 
exposure or where appropriate, the process of law. However, with a view to 
further enhance the public confidence, the Governments recognise that it will also 
be important to consider other appropriate responses to non-compliance in the 
light of any reports on breaches by the Independent Monitoring Body. In this 
connection, the Governments propose that if the Independent Monitoring Body 
concluded, following its own inquires, that there were good reasons to believe that 
a party or individual member of the Assembly was in breach, it would report its 
findings to the two Governments, making clear what action needed to be taken to 
remedy the breach and what measures, if any, it would be appropriate to apply. 
The Governments would initiate discussions in the Implementation Group to 
consider the action to be taken in response to the report. If the Implementation 
Group recommended that a motion be put before the Assembly, the Secretary of 
State would give notice requiring the motion to be moved. Any motion put before 
the Assembly following the tabling of a report would be subject to decision on a 
cross-community basis. Where such a motion failed to attract cross-community 
support, or where the Implementation group had failed to agree on a course of 
action, it would be a matter for the British Government in consultation with the 
Irish Government and the parties, to resolve the matter in a manner consistent 
with a report of the Independent Monitoring Body. The British Government 
would envisage amending the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 to enable a variety of 
responses appropriate to the gravity of the breach in question, including motions 
of censure, the withholding of allowances, temporary suspension from 
participation in the Agreement’s institutions or, in the most serious cases, 
exclusion for varying periods, to be made.”248
248Ibid.
Annexed to the Agreement was a document entitled “Terms Of reference Of The Independent 
185
Monitoring  Body, which dealt with specific functions of the proposed body.249 The document 
dealt with the issues of paramilitary groups and political parties among other issues. In regard to 
paramilitary groups, the annex recited;
249Ibid.
“In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups the Independent 
Monitoring Body would publish its findings on:
any continuing paramilitary involvement in attacks on the security forces, 
murders, sectarian attacks, involvements in riots, and other criminal 
offenses;
any continuing involvement of paramilitary groups in training, targeting, 
intelligence gathering, acquisition or development of arms or weapons and 
other preparations for terrorist campaigns;
the extent to which any paramilitary groups still appear to be engaged in 
punishment beatings/attacks and exiling;
their assessment of whether the leaderships of such organisations are 
directing such incidents or seeking to prevent them; and
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trends in security incidents.”250
250Ibid. Annex. p.4, para. 1.
  Insofar as political parties were concerned, the Annex provided for certain measures which 
could be taken where breaches of the Good Friday Agreement were alleged, as follows;
“3. At the request of the Governments, the Independent Monitoring Body may be 
asked to consider claims by any party in the Assembly that another party is in 
breach of requirements in the Declaration of Support or elsewhere in the 
Agreement.
4. The Independent Monitoring Body would report to the two Governments, 
making recommendations as to appropriate remedies for particular breaches and 
what measures, if any, it would be appropriate to apply.
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5. The Independent Monitoring Body would have acces to all the information 
necessary to carry out its functions, subject to appropriate conditions to ensure 
confidentiality.”251
251Ibid.
  On October 21, 2003, The IICD issued a statement in which it confirmed the third act of 
decommissioning that the IRA had announced it would undertake in its statement on the previous 
April 13. In the statement, John de Chastelain described the breadth of the act of 
decommissioning, 
“The arms comprise light, medium and heavy ordinance and associated 
munitions.
They include automatic weapons, ammunition, explosives and explosive material.
The quantity of weapons involved was larger than the quantity put beyond use in 
the previous event.
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I do want to make the point-and that is why we have indicated this time-that the 
amount of arms put beyond use was larger-I would say considerably larger-than 
the previous event.”252
252Statement By The Independent International Commission On 
Decommissioning (IICD) 21 October 2003.
Fellow Commission member, Andrew D. Sens, added;
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“The material put beyond use this morning could have causes death or destruction 
on a huge scale had it been put to use.”253
253Ibid.
The Northern Ireland (Monitoring Commission Etc.) Act 2003
 On September 18, 2003, the British Parliament passed the Northern Ireland (Monitoring 
Commission etc.) Act of 2003. (hereinafter referred to as the “Northern Ireland Act of 2003")the 
Republic of Ireland passed a companion act on November 25, 2003.
Section One of the Northern Ireland Act of 2003 provides that the functions of the Commission 
include;
(a) monitoring activities of paramilitary groups,
(b) monitoring security normalisation, and
(c) reporting on claims relating to commitment to the observing of terms of the 
pledge of office set out in Schedule 4 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (c.47).
Section Two entitled “Commission’s duty to avoid prejudicial effects” provides;
“(1) The monitoring commission shall not do anything in carrying out its 
functions which might-
( c) have a prejudicial effect on any future legal proceedings.”
   This section, however, limits the duty imposed under this restriction in that it recites;
“(2) The duty under subsection (1) is owed to Her Majesty’s Government in the 
United Kingdom.”
   This particular provision will be examined further in this article.
   The Northern Ireland Act of 2003 more significantly amended Section 30 of the Northern 
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Ireland Act of 1998 to provide greater latitude for both the Assembly and the office of Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland to be able to exclude ministers and political parties from the 
Assembly for conduct prohibited under Section 30 0f the 1998 Act. 
Subsection one of section 30, which had previously called for exclusion from the assembly 
pursuant to an exclusion resolution, was amended to alter the time period for exclusion from 
twelve months to a period of ;
 “...not less than three months and not more than twelve months...”254
254Northern Ireland Act of 2003, Section 4, para.2.
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It further added a new subsection which allowed the Assembly to extend the period of exclusion 
for a similar time period, provided it did so before the expiration of the initial exclusion 
resolution.255 Identical time periods were set forth for the exclusion and extension of exclusion of 
party members from holding ministerial positions in an amendment to section 30(2) and (3) of 
the Northern Ireland Act of 1998.256
Subsection (6) and (7) of Section 30 were also amended with respect to the requirements which 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland must meet in recommending that a resolution of 
exclusion should be laid before the Assembly. In addition to the factors the Secretary must 
consider in forming such an opinion was added;
255Ibid., Section 4, para. 3.
256Ibid., Section 4, para 4 and 5.
“( c ) any recommendation about steps the Assembly might consider taking which 
is contained in a report-
( i ) made by the Commission mentioned in section 1 of the Northern 
Ireland (Monitoring Commission etc.) Act 2003,or
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( ii )made under the Agreement establishing that Commission by members 
of that Commission.”257
257Ibid., Section 4, para. 7( e ).
  The Act further added new provisions to strengthen the Secretary of State’s hand in the area of 
exclusion by granting the Secretary the authority to take the same disciplinary action authorized 
by the original Section 30 and its amended provisions in the event a resolution failed to attract 
the necessary cross-community support originally contemplated to give such a remedy 
legitimacy. Section 30A was added which provided that in the event a resolution to exclude 
either a minister, junior minister or a political party failed because it did not attract cross-
community support;
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“...the Secretary of State may by direction, exclude the Minister, junior Minister 
concerned from holding office as a Minister or junior Minister for such period of 
not less than three months, and not more than twelve months...”258
258Northern Ireland Act of 2003, Section 5, para.1.
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 The same authority for the exclusion of political parties is set forth in new Section 30A ( 5 )259, 
and
the Secretary may extend the periods of exclusion prior to the expiration of the exclusion order in 
the same manner as the Assembly could where the motion passed with cross-community 
support.260
  As if this authority was not sufficiently arbitrary, a new Section 30B was added to the Act 
entitled “Secretary of state’s powers in exceptional circumstances.”261 This grant of authority 
allowed the Secretary of State to exclude a Minister or junior Minister until either
259Ibid.
260Ibid., see Section 5.
261Ibid., Section 6.
“( a) a report from the Commission has been made; or
( b) the Assembly has considered a resolution under section 30(1) or (2); or
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( c) a period of two weeks has elapsed.”262
262Ibid.
The “exceptional circumstances” permitting the exercise of this authority included;
“( a) there is insufficient time for the Commission to make a report; and 
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  ( b) there is insufficient time for the Assembly to consider a resolution under 
Sections 30(1) or (2).”263
263Ibid.
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Exercise of the authority under this provision does require that such a direction be presented to 
the British Parliament in writing.264
   In addition to the sanction of exclusion, the 2003 Act also added new sections to the 1998 
legislation allowing for the reduction of remuneration of individual ministers and political 
parties. Action by the Assembly under new Section 47A requires that the it cannot be moved 
unless;
264Ibid.
“( a) it is supported by at least 30 members of the assembly;
( b) it is moved by the First Minister and deputy First Minister acting jointly; or
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( c) it is moved by the presiding officer in pursuance of a notice under subsection       
(7).”265
265Ibid., 47A( 6)( a), ( b), (c).
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Subsection 7 of this new section merely allows the Secretary of State to submit such a 
resolution to the Presiding Officer of the Assembly after forming an opinion, taking into account 
all of the criteria required for submitting a resolution for exclusion under Section 30(7) of the 
Act of 1998 as amended.266 Like a resolution for exclusion, this sanction may not be invoked 
unless it is passed with cross-community support.267
  A new Section 47B was also enacted as part of this Act empowering the Secretary of State to 
take the action of reducing the remuneration of a Minister, junior minister or political party, 
where it is recommended by the Independent Monitoring Commission, despite there being no 
cross-community support for such action.268 This particular section applies if;
266Ibid, para 7 and 8.
267Ibid., para. 9.
268Ibid., Section 47B.
“( a) the Monitoring commission has, or members of that commission have under 
the agreement establishing it, made a report containing a recommendation about 
steps the assembly might consider taking;
( b) the taking of those steps by the assembly requires the passing of a resolution 
under section 47A(1),(2),(3) or (4) in relation to a Minister, junior Minister or 
political party, and;
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( c) the first motion for a resolution under that provision in relation to the 
Minister, junior Minister or political party concerned that is put to the vote after 
the making of the report does not attract cross-community support.”269
269Ibid, 47B(1).
Subsection 2 of this particular section provides where all three of the foregoing conditions
exist, the Secretary of State may, by direction, reduce or suspend the remuneration of any 
Minister, Junior Minister.
Subsection 3 additionally authorizes the Secretary of State to extend the period of suspension 
or reduction, if, a motion to extend has failed.
Subsection 5 and 6 authorize the Secretary of State to take the same action in the same manner 
with respect to the remuneration of members of a political party.
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  A new section, 47C, was also enacted, which provided for two related outcomes.270 Section
47C(1) set forth the days on which the resolution for suspension or reduction of remuneration 
took effect, lasted and could be extended.271 Section 47C(2) further provided that pension 
benefits would not accrue during any period of suspension or reduction.272
  The Northern Ireland Act of 2003 also added a new section, 51A, to the 1998 Act which 
allowed the Assembly to suspend all or a portion of funding that a political party might be 
eligible for under the Political Parties Act (Northern Ireland) 2000 for the reasons set forth in 
Section 30 of the 1998 Act.273 Like the other sanctions enacted in the 2003 Act, a motion for 
under this section requires the support of at least 30 members of the Assembly, must be moved 
jointly by the First Minister and junior First Minister or by the Presiding Officer at the instance 
of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.274 The Secretary of State is required to consider 
those same factors required to be considered for an exclusion resolution in Section 30 of the 
1998 Act as amended Like the other provisions, a motion under this section requires cross-
community support.275
270Ibid., 47C.
271Ibid. 47C(1) allowed for a period up to twelve months, and which could be extended 
for an additional twelve months.
272Ibid., 47C(2).
273Ibid.,Section 8 Reduction of Financial Assistance 51A.
274Ibid., 51A(5) and (6).
275Ibid., 51A(8).
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  A companion section, 51B was also added giving the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland the 
authority to impose this sanction, in the same manner as authorized by Section 30A and 47B, 
where the Independent Monitoring Commission has made a report containing recommendations 
the Assembly might consider taking and a motion to impose this sanction has not attracted cross-
community support.276  Action pursuant to this particular section would become the basis of 
litigation by Sinn Fein .
   A new section 51C authorizing extension of this sanction until the end of the financial year but 
not more than 12 months was also added.277
  The Northern Ireland Act of 2003 further contained a section authorizing the Assembly to 
censure the first Minister, a junior Minister or political party for the reasons set forth in Section 
30 of the 1998 Act, if such resolution had the support of 30 members of the Assembly, was 
moved jointly by the first Minister and junior First Minister or by the Presiding Officer of the 
Assembly at the instance of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 30(7) of the 1998 Act as amended.278
  Finally, in a new section, 95A, the Act spelled out the manner in which a direction by the 
Secretary of State would be implemented pursuant to Sections 30A, 47B and 51B. As noted 
above each of these sections empower the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to exclude, 
reduce or suspend remuneration to Ministers and junior Ministers of a political party and suspend 
276Ibid., Section 8, 51B.
277Ibid., Section 51C.
278Ibid., Section 9, Censure resolutions, 51D.
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or reduce payments to a political party under the Financial Assistance to Political Parties Act of 
2003, where motions seeking the same have failed due to lack of cross-community support. Such 
action must be preceded by a direction in writing.279 Subsection 3 of this particular Section 
provides that no direction shall be made unless it is first approved by both Houses of 
Parliament.280 Notwithstanding this “safeguard,” this provision does not apply where;
279Ibid., Section 10, Secretary of State’s directions: procedure etc., 95A.
280Ibid.
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“...where the secretary of State considers it expedient for the direction to be made 
without the approval mentioned in that subsection...”281
281Ibid., 95A(4)
205
  In such a situation, the copy of the direction shall be presented to Parliament after the it has 
been given, and, unless it is approved within 40 days of the date of the direction, it shall no 
longed have effect.282 Similarly, if either House of Parliament rejects a motion to approve the 
direction within the 40 days, it ceases to have effect that day.283 In calculating the 40 days, any 
time period in which Parliament is  dissolved, postponed, or adjourned for more than four days, 
is not counted.284
  In analyzing the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 2003, enacted by the British Parliament 
it is hardly coincidental that the addition of the new sanctions which could be imposed on 
Ministers, junior Ministers, and political parties, particularly those that could now be imposed by 
the Secretary of State after cross-community support could not be obtained, were adopted in the 
wake of the unionist parties attempts to exclude Sinn Fein had twice failed285 and Sinn Fein had 
added seats in the Assembly, making it the largest nationalist party in Britain and Northern 
282Ibid., 95A(5) and (6)
283Ibid., 95A(7).
284Ibid., 95A(8).
285On September 24, 2001, Trimble and DUP leader Ian Paisley met to try and reach 
agreement on obtaining enough voted to bring forward a motion to exclude Sinn Fein. The UUP 
motion lacked three votes and the DUP motion lacked one. On October 8, 2001 both motions 
failed due to a lack of cross-community support CAIN Web Service, Chronology 2001, 24 
September 2001.
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Ireland.286
The Independent Monitoring of 2003
   The Independent Monitoring Commission Act of 2003 passed by the Republic of Ireland, is, by 
comparison, extremely spare. This enactment provides for little more than the reciprocal 
requirements concerning nomination to, composition of, and functions of the Commission as 
referenced in the Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic 
of Ireland entered into on November 25, 2003 incorporated into the legislation.287 The Act 
contains a reciprocal provision concerning the duty to avoid prejudicial effect to both the United 
Kingdom and the Republic.288 It further provides authorization for members of the Republic’s 
police authority, (Garda Siochana), to disclose such information to the IMC that is necessary to 
the performance of its function, and prohibits any members or employees of the Commission 
from disclosing the same.289 It also requires that the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform shall present the Commission’s reports to both Houses of the Oireachtas (Legislative 
body).290
286In the general election held in Britain and Northern Ireland on June 7, 2001, Sinn Fein 
replaced the Social Democratic and Labor party (SDLP) as the largest nationalist party. Cain 
Web Service, Chronology 2001, 7 June 2001.
287Independent Monitoring Commission Act 2003, Section 1
288Ibid., Section 6.
289Ibid., Section 7.
290Ibid. Section 10.
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  As noted earlier, membership of the Commission was spelled out in the Agreement between the 
two Governments in the Agreement of November 25, 2003. Article 10 of the Agreement called 
for the selection of four members. The agreement recited that;
“( a) two members, one of whom shall be from Northern Ireland, shall be          
appointed by the Government of the united Kingdom of great Britain and         
Northern Ireland.;
( b) one member shall be appointed by the Government of Ireland;
( c) one member appointed jointly by the two Governments, who shall be a         
nominee of the Government of the United States of America.”291
291Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and the 
Republic of Ireland, November 25, 2003, Article10.
  Perhaps nothing more starkly highlights the differences between this Commission and the 
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IIDC), their conclusions, actions 
and outcomes than the differing backgrounds of their respective members.
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   It will be recalled that the IIDC, at the outset, had as its members John de Chaseltain, Tauno 
Niemines and Donald C. Johnson.292 DeChaseltain, who was appointed chairman of the IIDC 
was a retired Chief of the Canadian defense forces, and a former Ambassador to the United 
States.293 Tauno Nieminem was a retired Finnish military officer, and Donald Johnson was an 
American career foreign service officer.294 Johnson resigned from the IIDC on July 2, 1999, and 
was replaced by Andrew D. Sens, a senior United States State Department official and a staff 
member of the Commission295.
  In contrast, the IMC was composed of John Alderice, a member of the British House of Lords, 
former Presiding Officer of the Northern Ireland Assembly and a leader of the loyalist Alliance 
Party;296 Richard Kerr, a former Deputy director of the United States Central Intelligence 
292Mitchell, George J., Making Peace, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. New York, New York, 1999, 
p114, fn.6.
293Ibid., p.27. DeChaseltain had also been a member to the forerunner organization, the 
International Body on Decommissioning, along with United States senator George J. Mitchell, 
and Harri Holkeri, former Prime Minister of Finland.
294See Fn. 270.
295Northern Ireland Office, Media Centre, statement, 25 June, 1999.www.nio.gov.uk
296Independent Monitoring Commission, www. independentmonitoringcommission.org 
and CAIN Web Service.
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Agency;297 Joe Brosnan, a former secretary General of the Department of Justice in the Republic 
of Ireland;298 and John Grieve, former Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police in 
London.299 Grieve’s professional  experience included being the Director of Intelligence for the 
Metropolitan Police, and in that capacity he led the MPS Intelligence project and the Anti-
Terrorist Squad as National Coordinator during the 1996-1998 bombing campaigns.300
  Clearly, while the IICD was composed of members with substantial diplomatic training; the 
IMC  members were steeped in intelligence and policing backgrounds. 
   Although the IMC is charged with examining and reporting on several different subjects, this 
Article will focus on the reports and recommendations made under Article 4 of the Agreement 
between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom establishing the IMC since this subject 
area, like decommissioning, and the Commission’s recommendations,  seem to have had the 
greatest impact on the ongoing peace process. Article 4 provides as follows; 
297Ibid.
298Ibid.
299Ibid.
300Ibid.
“In relation to the remaining threat from paramilitary groups, the Commission 
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shall:
( a) monitor any continuing activity by the paramilitary groups including:
i.  attacks on the security forces, murders, sectarian attacks,      
involvement in riots, and other criminal offenses;
ii. training, targeting, intelligence gathering, acquisition in      
development of arms or weapons and other preparations for       
terrorist campaigns;
 iii. punishment beatings and attacks and exiling;
( b) assess:
i. Whether the leadership of such organisations are directing such 
incidents or seeking to prevent them: and
ii. Trends in security incidents.”301
301Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of great Britain and Northern Ireland establishing the 
Independent Monitoring Commission 7 January 2004, Article 4.
Article 4 further provided for the intervals at which the reports on these activities should be 
submitted;
211
“( c) report its findings in respect to paragraphs ( a) and ( b) of this article to the 
two Governments at six monthly intervals; and, at the joint request of the two 
Governments, or if the Commission sees fit to do so, produce further reports on 
paramilitary activity on an ad hoc basis.”302
302Ibid.
212
  In April 2004, The IMC submitted its First Report concerning the continuing activity of 
paramilitary groups.303 This report dealt with the activities of paramilitary groups and spelled out 
their links to political parties on the “republican”304 side as well as the “unionist/loyalist”305 side. 
303First report of the Independent Monitoring Commission April 2004, Section 1.1.
304
“Republican” paramilitary groups were identified as “Continuity Irish Republican 
Army”(CIRA) and Republican Sinn Fein (RSF); Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and 
Republican Socialist Party (RSP); Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA); Real Irish 
Republican Army (RIRA); Thirty- two County Sovereignty Movement (32SCM). First Report of 
the Independent Monitoring Commission, April 2004, section 3 (3.2), (3.5), (3.10), and (3.15).
305
“Loyalist/Unionist” paramilitary groups were identified as Loyalist Volunteer Force 
(LVF); Ulster Defense Association (UDA); Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF); and Redhand 
Commando (RHC), Ibid., Section 3((3.7), (3.20), (3.26).
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It proceeded to analyze the history of paramilitary homicides in the six years following the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement, reporting;
“The number of  deaths attributable to paramilitary groups declined sharply after 
1998 and has not exceeded 18 in any one year. Whereas loyalists killed fewer 
than republicans in the year before the Belfast Agreement, since 2000 they have 
consistently killed more.”306
306Ibid., at 4(4.3).
  The Commission went on to further analyze the incidence of nonlethal attacks by paramilitaries 
since the signing of the Agreement, noting;
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However recent years, and particularly the years since the Belfast Agreement, 
have seen a marked increase in total paramilitary violence by both republican and 
loyalist groups. Loyalist violence has increased at a higher rate.”307
307Ibid., at 4(4.4).
       Pursuant to Article 7 of the Agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission, 
the Commission is required it to report on any remedial measures, if any, it considers might 
appropriately be taken by the Northern Ireland Assembly, if it were in operation. In Section 7 of 
the Report the IMC alleged that;
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“Two parties that would be represented in a restored Assembly have links to 
paramilitary groups - Sinn Fein and the Progressive Unionist Party.”308
308Ibid., Section 7 (7.3).
Addressing the alleged link between Sinn Fein and the PIRA, the Report charged;
“It is difficult to be precise about what the relationship between Sinn Fein and the 
PIRA really is about or the PIRA’s own decision making processes. Nevertheless 
on the basis of the information that we have received we believe that the situation 
can reasonably be summarised as follows:
-some members, including some senior members of Sinn Fein, are also 
members, including some members of PIRA.
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-Sinn Fein, particularly through their senior members, is in a position to 
exercise considerable influence on PIRA’s major policy decisions, even if 
its not in a position actually to determine what policies or operational 
strategies PIRA will adopt. We believe that decisions of the republican 
movement as a whole about these matters lie more with the leadership of 
PIRA than with Sinn Fein.309
309Ibid., at 7(7.4).
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  In essence, the Commission charged, Sinn Fein was an alter ego of PIRA or, at worst, one and 
the same. This accusation flies in the face of the history documented by the IIDC in its earlier 
reports in which it noted it had discussions with Sinn Fein about decommissioning, at a time 
when the IRA had not nominated a representative to meet with the it310 Moreover, once the IRA 
had nominated a representative to work with the IICD, all of the IICD’s subsequent reports 
documented that its decommissioning events resulted from its interaction with the IRA 
representative not with the representative of Sinn Fein. While Sinn Fein and the IRA had a 
readily acknowledged common interest in the full implementation of the Good Friday 
Agreement, Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams had been clear that they and the IRA were not one 
and the same.311
Indeed, Adams has been quite explicit about this point, writing;
310See, Report of the Independent International Commission on decommissioning (IICD) 
2 July 1999, para. 5-6, and its Report of 10 December 1999, para. 3.
311See, Presidential Address by Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, Dublin 29 March 
2003, CAIN Web Service.
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“Sinn Fein is not the IRA. The IRA has continued to make its own judgments and 
is protective of its right to do so. The simplistic notion that Sinn Fein represents 
the IRA or that we are its ‘political wing’ is wrong. If that were the case, it would 
be much easier to manage republican responsibilities and obligations to a conflict 
resolution process. It has never been easy. However in all my dealings with the 
British and Irish governments, with the United States government, and with other 
political parties and political representatives, I have worked in two simple rules of 
thumb. First, I will not deceive them about the IRA. Second, I will not deceive the 
IRA.”312
312Adams, Gerry, A Farther Shore, Ireland’s Long Road to Peace, 
Random House trade Publications, New York, N.Y. (2005), p.35.
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This position has been reaffirmed by Sinn Fein’s chief negotiator, Martin McGuinness.313
Moreover, the history of the talks leading up to the Good Friday Agreement belies this 
accusation. While the entry of Sinn Fein into the talks was predicated on the IRA announcing a 
ceasefire, there was a very public split between Sinn Fein and the IRA concerning each entities 
acceptance of the Mitchell Principles and their requirement of a commitment to non-violence.314
Indeed. During September ,1997 An Phoblacht, the Sinn Fein newspaper, published an interview 
with an IRA spokesman in which the IRA disputed portions of the Mitchell Principles but 
acknowledged that Sinn Fein was free to subscribe to them.315 Furthermore this dichotomy was 
implicitly acknowledged by the various parties to the Good Friday talks on September 23, 1997 
when the Ulster Unionist Party unsuccessfully moved to have Sinn Fein expelled from the talks 
because of the IRA’s reticence to accept the Mitchell Principles.316
    What is disturbing about this allegation by the IMC is that it is made without the slightest 
illumination about the either the source or nature of the information upon which it is based, other 
than the vague assertion of “information that we have received.”317 This technique of making 
damaging accusations without the slightest substantiation would foreshadow a pattern of making 
313See, Report on Current Negotiations, Martin McGuinness, Dublin, 30 March 2003, 
CAIN Web Service.
314CAIN Web Service, ibid.
315Ibid.
316Ibid.
317Independent Monitoring Commission, First Report, 7(7.4).
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more damaging charges in future reports, leading to troubling developments for  Sinn Fein and 
ultimately the peace process..
   Having linked Sinn Fein to the IRA, the IMC went on to damn both of them with the faintest of 
praise, observing;
“We recognise that there might not have been a PIRA cease fire in the first place without 
influence from the leadership of Sinn Fein. By the same token Sinn Fein must bear its 
responsibility for the continuation by PIRA of illegal paramilitary activity and must recognise 
the implications of being in this position.”318
  Like almost all of its conclusions regarding connections between Sinn Fein and the IRA, the 
IMC offered no evidence to substantiate its claims319, and in this instance ignored the historical 
record concerning the renewal of the IRA cease-fire. The only document offering an explanation 
of th IRA’s impetus to renew its cease-fire in July 1997, was a statement issued by the IRA on 
July 19, 1997 which made no mention of Sinn Fein.320 While this statement had been preceded 
the day before by appeals from Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, as well as a joint 
318Ibid., 7.(7.5).
319In Annex II to its report, the IMC, describing how it intended to go about performing 
its task, justified its apparent use of unattributed hearsay with the statement: “In reporting on the 
activities of paramilitary groups we are thus seeking the best information and intelligence 
possible from the maximum number of sources. We will make our assessments on th basis of 
that material using our best judgment. We are not bound by the strict rules of evidence 
applicable in a court of law.” (emphasis added) Ibid., para. 18.
320Statement by the Irish Republican Army. 19 July 1997, CAIN Web Service, ibid.
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statement by Adams and John Hume of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) urging a 
return to the cease-fire321, the IRA statement made no allusion of either of them. Indeed, it would 
seem that if one could conclude that Sinn Fein’s appeal to the IRA to return to the peace process 
is evidence of its influence on the IRA; then the same could be said of the SDLP, which made 
the same appeal. Yet no similar conclusion was drawn nor sanction imposed. Thus, the 
accompanying finding that;
321CAIN Web Service, ibid.
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“...Sinn Fein must bear its responsibility for the continuation of illegal 
paramilitary activity and must recognise the implications of being in that 
position.”322
322Fn. 294, ibid.
should be evaluated accordingly.
  What is also of considerable interest is the way in which the IMC treated the loyalist party, the 
Progressive Unionist Party, and its alleged links to loyalist paramilitary groups. Like Sinn Fein, 
the IMC, in making its evaluation apparently relied on unattributed hearsay information. In the 
Report, it charged;
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“While the Progressive Unionist Part is currently represented by only one person 
in the Assembly, the overall leadership of the party has close personal links with 
the leadership of the UVF and the RHC and we believe it is aware of the 
paramilitary activiteis of both organisations. The Progressive Unionist Party’s 
leadership as a whole does not determine these activities and may not be in a 
position to ensure prevention of them, but it can exert appreciable influence. 
While we are satisfied that the Progressive Unionist Party and others exerted a 
positive influence in achieving the loyalist ceasefires we believe it has not 
sufficiently discharged its responsibility to exert all possible influence to prevent 
illegal activities on the part of the UVF and RHC.”323
323Ibid., 7.(7.6).
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  Unlike the IRA, which nominated its own representative to interact with the International 
Independent Monitoring Commission, the Ulster Volunteer Force nominated Billy Hutchinson, a 
member of the Progressive Unionist Party, for the same role;324 thus establishing a clear 
identifiable link between the PUP and the UVF with the former having apparently considerable 
authority to speak for the latter on an issue of vital importance to the viability of the paramilitary 
group. Notwithstanding this disparity in the respective connections between the parties and the 
paramilitary groups, the IMC, which found that “loyalist groups were now responsible for more 
violence than republican ones,”325 declared that it would have recommended that both parties be 
excluded if the Assembly had been in session,326 and went on to make a recommendation that the 
Secretary of State;
324Report of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), 2 
July 1999, para. 5.
325Ibid., 8(8.3).
326Ibid.,8(8.5).
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“...should consider taking action in respect of the salary of assembly members 
and/or the funding of Assembly parties so as to impose an appropriate financial 
measure in respect of Sinn Fein and the Progressive unionist Party.”327
327Ibid. 8(8.6).
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   On April 20, 2004, Paul Murphy, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced that he 
had accepted the IMC’s recommendation and would suspend the financial assistance that both 
parties would receive commencing on April 28.328 In taking this action, Murphy stated;
328Statement by Paul Murphy on Publication of the First Report of the Independent 
Monitoring Commission (IMC) 20 April 2004, CAIN Web Service, ibid.
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“When we debated the legislation relating to the Commission last year in this 
House, I made it clear that the Government believed it very important that the 
commission’s recommendations should be given effect. And I indicated that, in 
circumstances where the Commission had made recommendations but action had 
not been taken, I would be able to use the powers of last resort granted to me by 
the Act to take action myself in line with such recommendations.”329
329Ibid.
In effectuating the recommendation, Murphy invoked the new legislation under the Northern 
Ireland 2003 Act declaring;
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“I have therefore today made an Order under the urgency procedure, amending 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998, as amended by the legislation we passed last year, 
to allow me to take this step in the absence of a sitting Assembly. It will also 
permit me to reduce members’ salaries should I see fit to do so in light of a future 
IMC report.”330
330Ibid.
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  Thus, the British Government, by virtue of the provisions of the 2003 Act, was able to sanction 
the Northern Ireland parties, without having to seek cross-community support, on the strength of 
a report based on unattributed, undisclosed hearsay before an unelected Commission. If the 
procedures reminded one of those utilized in the Diplock courts331, it was not hard to see why.
  While the IMC’s next report dealt with the issue of security normalization in Northern 
Ireland,332 its Third Report, again, returned to the issue of paramilitary activity.333 In its 
assessment of current activities of the paramilitary groups, it reported;
331Single judge courts in which terrorism offenses are tried. They are presided over by 
anonymous judges with relaxed evidentiary rules.
332Independent Monitoring Commission, Second Report, 20 July 2004.
333Independent Monitoring Commission, Third Report, 4 November 2004.
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“PIRA has committed no murders and has engaged inn a lower level of violence 
than in the preceding period, committing fewer paramilitary shootings and 
assaults.”334
334Ibid., 3(3.10).
In the same paragraph, however, it charged;
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“We believe it was responsible for the major theft of goods in Dunmurry in May 
and was engaged in significant amounts of smuggling.”335
335Ibid.
Again, however, no evidence was offered in support of this allegation.
    In contrast, commenting on the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the Commission observed;
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“Though it has not been responsible for any murders it did undertake shootings 
and assaults. In August members of the UDA are believed to have undertaken a 
vicious attack against 3 Catholic men.”336
336Ibid., 3(3.15).
  Reporting on the incidence of violence and exiling among the paramilitary groups, it reported;
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“The six month period since our last report has seen continuing high levels of 
paramilitary violence. However the rate is considerably lower than before, 
particularly by republican groups.”337
337Ibid., 4(4.4).
   Almost as an afterthought, the IMC raised the issue of paramilitary groups funneling the 
proceeds of criminal activity to political parties. Without singling any particular paramilitary 
group or political party out, the report declared;
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“In Section 7 of this report we address the question of the leadership of 
paramilitary groups and of the links with the leadership of political parties. Such 
links have given rise to public debate on whether funds which paramilitary groups 
raise through crime or in other ways reach political parties, and whether there 
might be measures to prevent this. To date there is a dearth of empirical evidence 
to support allegations to this effect.”338
338Ibid., 6(6.20).
Although it cited no “empirical evidence” to support this proposition, it went on in Section 7 to 
repeat its charges concerning the relationship between Sinn Fein and the IRA as well as the 
Progressive Unionist Party and UVF and RHC, utilizing its previously unsubstantiated claim 
with Sinn Fein as a bootstrap in making its case, noting;
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“In our first report we found that there were associations between the leadership 
of paramilitary groups and two of the parties elected to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, namely Sinn Fein in respect of the PIRA and the Progressive Unionist 
Party in respect of the UVF and RHC.”339
339Ibid.,7(7.2)
The Commission went on to note; 
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“The circumstances and associations were not the same in each case but we 
concluded that neither party had sufficiently discharged its responsibility to exert 
all possible influence to prevent illegal activity by the paramilitary groups which 
they were associated. We note that had the Assembly been functioning at that 
time we would have recommended measures against both these parties up to and 
possibly including exclusion from office, and that any recommendations we might 
make following restoration of the Assembly would be proportionate to the then 
prevailing circumstances. Because the Assembly was not restored at the time of 
our report we recommended that the Secretary of State should consider taking 
action in respect of the salary of the Assembly members of these two parties 
and/or the funding of the parties. He decided to do the latter for a period of twelve 
months.” report.”340
340Ibid.
   In its Conclusions the Commission found;
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“-Paramilitary violence in the form of murder, shootings and assaults has 
considerably reduced in the past six months but remains at a disturbingly high 
level. The proportionate reduction is greater on the part of republican groups. 
Most violence is attributable to loyalist groups.”341
341Ibid., 8(8.2).
This development notwithstanding, funding to Sinn Fein remained suspended. Indeed, in its 
recommendations, the Commission suggested;
238
“-In considering future controls over the funding of political parties both the 
British and Irish governments should take into account of allegations that 
paramilitary groups may be able to divert illegal funds to such parties, and should 
ensure that appropriate steps are taken to prevent this.”342
342Ibid., 8(8.6).
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   On December 20, 2004 the Northern Bank of Belfast was robbed and 2.6 million pounds was 
stolen.343  On February 10, 2005 the IMC issued its fourth report which was devoted exclusively 
to a robbery of the Northern Bank of Belfast on December 20, 2004.344
In the prefatory portion of its report, the IMC opined;
343Independent Monitoring commission, Fourth Report, 10 February 2005.
344Independent Monitoring Commission, Fourth Report, 10 February 2005
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“We believe that the robbery demands a special report for a number of reasons. It 
was exceptionally serious. It was a high risk crime which required careful and 
lengthy advance planning. It involved the violent abduction of two employees of 
the Northern Bank and the unlawful imprisonment of their families who continue 
to suffer as a result. In addition there are many other secondary victims, not least 
other bank employees who face the fear that similar things might happen to them 
and their families. The question of responsibility for the robbery had a significant 
impact on affairs in Northern Ireland and very different views have been publicly 
expressed about it. Thee possible involvement of aa paramilitary group falls 
squarely within our remit.”345
345Ibid., p.3, para.3.
Like the First report, the IMC relied, again, on untested, unattributed hearsay in pinning 
responsibility for the robbery on the IRA. Summarizing its fact-finding process, the Commission 
wrote;
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“We have obtained information from a variety of official and other sources in 
Northern Ireland and the South. As we indicated in our last report, we meet a 
large number of people.346
346In a footnote, the Commission categorized the people as “political 
parties; government officials; police; community groups; churches; charities; 
pressure groups and other organisations; businesses; lawyers; journalists; 
academics; private citizens, individually and as families(Third report, 
p.10).”ibid.,p.4, para.4.
    Turning to Sinn Fein, it observed;
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“In view of the public comments of senior representatives of Sinn Fein about 
responsibility for the robbery, and in particular the public statements that they had 
received a denial of responsibility direct from members of the PIRA, we invited 
them to meet us and give us the benefit of their understanding. Sinn Fein have 
said that while they had no knowledge of who was responsible fro the robbery, 
they did not believe it was the IRA: that Mr. Martin McGuinness had asked the 
IRA if they were involved and had been assured they were not; and that they 
believed this denial, which has been made public in these circumstances, and in 
the light of their views about the IMC, they said they did not believe a meeting 
with us would serve a useful purpose. We have taken into account, though we 
regret that they have felt unable to accept out invitation.”347
347Ibid.para.4.
Turning to the sources of the information it was going to rely upon in accusing the IRA of the 
robbery, the Commission echoed its procedure in its first and Third reports, stating;
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“We recognise from the clarification which has emerged during the course of the 
investigation. We have probed the information we have received from all sources 
so as to satisfy ourselves that the conclusion we draw is well founded, and 
particullarly that there are not alternative conclusions which might be reasonably 
drawn from the same material. We recognise too that although at the time of 
completing our report the police have made no arrests there may be arrests in the 
future and that it is essential that nothing we say could prejudice any criminal 
proceedings which could ensue. We are fully aware that we are not a criminal 
court and have very evidential requirements.”348
348Ibid. para.5.
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With that said, and no more, the IMC accused the IRA of committing the robbery.349
   Not content to make this accusation solely, the Commission next proceeded to accuse the IRA 
of three additional robberies.350 In support of the latter accusations, it attempted to bootstrap 
these claims by alluding to their prior reference in the Third Report.351 Examining these 
references 
made in the Third Report, however, provides no further basis for these claims. At paragraph 3.10 
of the Third Report, referenced in footnote 1, the Commission declared;
349Ibid., para7.
350Ibid., para. 8-11.
351Ibid., para 8-9, fn.1and 2.
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“We believe it [PIRA] was responsible for the major theft of goods in Dunmurry 
in May and was engaged in significant amounts of smuggling.”352
352Independent Monitoring Commission, Third Report, 3(3.10)
In paragraph 5.7 it similarly stated;
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“We believe that members of the republican military groups were involved in 
recent large scale robbery and violent theft. We cannot yet make a more firm 
attribution.”353
353Ibid., para. 5.7.
While claiming that since that report, it had 
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“...been able to consider in depth the significant further material which had 
become available about some of these incidents.”354;
354Independent Monitoring Commission, Fourth Report, 10 February 
2005, para. 9.
the Commission was not forthcoming about the nature of this “further material.”
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  In its Section entitled “Implications for Sinn Fein”355 the IMC restated its charges, made in its 
First and Third Reports, that Sinn Fein and the IRA were closely linked.356 In this report it did 
not stop there, but went on to paint a much deeper involvement, charging;
355Ibid., para12-15.
356Ibid., para 13.
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“...In our view Sinn Fein must bear its share of responsibility for all of the 
incidents. Some of its senior members, who are also senior members of PIRA, 
were involved in sanctioning the series of robberies. Sinn Fein cannot be regarded 
as committed to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic means so 
long as its links to PIRA remain as they are and PIRA continues to be engaged in 
violence or other crime. Although we note Sinn Fein has said it is opposed to 
criminality of any kind it appears at times to have its own definition of what 
constitutes a crime. We do not believe the party has sufficiently discharged its 
responsibility to exert all possible influence to prevent illegal activities on the part 
of PIRA.”357
357Ibid., para. 14. (emphasis added)
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  In the Recommendation portion of the Report, the Commission reviewed its recommendations 
made in the First report concerning the possible exclusion of Sinn Fein and the Progressive 
Unionist Party, had the Assembly been sitting and the financial sanctions it recommended the 
Secretary of State ultimately imposed on both parties.358 Concerning its findings in the current 
Report and its charge that the IRA committed the bank robbery with acquiescence of Sinn Fein, 
the IMC declared;
358Ibid., para.18.
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“If the Northern Ireland Assembly was now sitting we would be recommending 
the implementation of the full range of measures listed in paragraph 12, including 
exclusion from office. We say this recognising that this would have implications 
for the running of the Executive and the Assembly.”359
359Ibid., para.20.
In making its recommendation of sanctions that could be imposed by the Secretary of State, the 
Commission observed;
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“We are very aware that the imposition of financial penalties is bound to seem 
paltry against the background of a robbery of 26 million pounds. It has also been 
put to us that if the financial penalties are imposed Sinn Fein will try to benefit 
from that by portraying themselves as victims. Be that as it may, in light of the 
provisions of the legislation we have decided to recommend that the Secretary of 
State should consider exercising the powers he has in the absence of the 
Assembly to implement the measures which are presently applicable, namely the 
financial ones. It has also been suggested that Sinn Fein should not continue to 
receive public money from other sources if they are denied in the context of the 
Northern Ireland Assembly. However, this is outside the measures available to us 
to recommend.”360
360Ibid., para, 21.
      What is interesting about the IMC’s Fourth Report, apart from the fact that it contained not a 
shred of information upon which its accusation was based, is that it was preceded by a statement 
by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland making the same charge, thus making the IMC’s 
conclusion seem virtually preordained. On January 11, 2005, the Secretary told the British 
Parliament;
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“As the House will be aware a major robbery took place at the Northern Bank in 
Belfast just before Christmas. At the end of last week the Chief Constable of 
Northern Ireland indicated that in his professional opinion responsibility for that 
robbery should be attributed to the Provisional IRA...”361
361Statement by Paul Murphy then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
on the Northern Bank robbery to Parliament, House of Commons, (11 January 
2005)
In the statement the Secretary revealed;
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“The Police Service of Northern Ireland thought initially that five groups could 
have been responsible for the robbery. Only when a great deal of evidence had 
been sifted did the Chief Constable make his statement.”362
362Ibid.
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Missing from the Secretary’s statement was any information or evidence tending to substantiate 
this charge. What was contained in the statement, however, was a signal to the Unionists in 
Northern Ireland that they could forebear from working with Sinn Fein to effectuate the goals of 
the Good Friday Agreement unless the IRA gave up “all other forms of criminality.”363 In this 
regard, Murphy declared;
363Ibid.
“But we are in no doubt that it can only be achieved if the Provisional IRA not 
only gives up terrorism but also all other forms of criminality in which it is 
implicated. Unionists in Northern Ireland have made it clear that if those tests are 
met, they will work with Sinn Fein in a power-sharing executive.
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   As my Right Honorable friend the Prime Minister has said repeatedly, it is 
entirely reasonable for Unionists to withhold their co-operation until those tests 
are met.”364
364Ibid.
   The Secretary’s position in this regard is, to say the least, remarkable, in light of the IMC’s 
First and Third Reports. Those reveal that violence and crime by the unionist paramilitary groups 
consistently exceed that of republican groups and no suggestion was ever made that Sinn Fein or 
the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SDLP) should have refrained from participating in the 
Assembly.
   Equally interesting is the apparent evolution of the connections claimed to exist between Sinn 
Fein and the IRA. As noted previously, the IMC in its First Report claimed that it was 
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“difficult to be precise about what the relationship between the PIRA really is or 
about the PIRA’s own decision-making processes.”365
365Independent Monitoring Commission, First Report, 7(7.4)
No different claim was made in the Third Report issued almost three months later. Yet in this 
Report, the Commission declared that senior members of Sinn Fein are also senior members of 
the 
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IRA and “were involved in sanctioning the series of robberies.”366 Like its previous reports, no 
evidence to substantiate its claims was cited or offered. 
     In defense of its failure to offer any concrete proof of its claims, the IMC has repeatedly cited 
its obligation under Section 2 of the Northern Ireland Act 2003 and Section 6 of the Independent 
Monitoring Commission Act 2003 passed by the Republic of Ireland367. Under these provisions 
the IMC shall;
366Independent Monitoring Commission, Fourth Report, ibid., para.14.
367See Independent Monitoring Commission, First Report, 2(2.8); Independent 
Monitoring Commission, Fourth Report, para.5.
“...not do anything in carrying out its functions which might
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( c)have a prejudicial effect on any present or future legal proceeding.”368
368Northern Ireland Act 2003, Section 2(1)( c); Independent 
Monitoring Commission Act 2003, Section 6( c). 
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While the Commission purports to honor this commitment, in reality, it does so in the breach. 
Putting side the obvious prejudice that would inure to anyone charged with the robbery of the 
Northern Bank, the Commission has repeatedly recommended sanctions up to and including 
expulsion from the Assembly and financial penalties to members of a political party based 
undisclosed information which for all practical purposes, is not open to challenge. At this 
writing, while some arrests for the robbery have been made, no link to either the IRA or Sinn 
Fein has been established.369
   Ultimately, and not surprisingly, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland accepted the 
IMC’s report and recommendation. In a statement to the House of Commons on February 22, 
2005, Murphy declared;
369See, “Police Make Bank Robbery Raids,” Irish Voice , Vol. 19 No. 45, November 9, 
2005-Nov. 15, 2005, p.3. Also, “Two Charged In Northern Raid” Irish Echo, Vol. LXXVII, No. 
45, Nov. 9-15, p.5.
 “I came to the House on 11 January to make a statement relating to the Northern 
Bank robbery on 20 December...
Since then a major police investigation has been under way. As the House is 
aware the Chief Constable of Northern Ireland has made his conclusion clear that 
the Provisional IRA were responsible for the robbery. The Prime Minister and I 
have indicated that we accept the Chief Constable’s judgement which is also 
shared by the Irish Government and their security advisers...
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Earlier this month. On 10 February,  I laid before the House a copy of a report 
presented to the British and Irish Governments by the Independent Monitoring 
Commission. That report, which the Commission had elected to produce in 
addition to its normal twice-yearly reports to the two Governments, concluded 
that the Northern Bank robbery was planned and undertaken by the Provisional 
IRA and that this organisation was also responsible for three other major 
robberies during the course of 2004.
The IMC concluded, on the basis of its own careful scrutiny, that Sinn Fein must 
bear its share of the responsibility for these incidents. They indicated that had the 
Northern Ireland Assembly been sitting, they would have recommended that the 
full range of measures referred to in the relevant legislation be applied to Sinn 
Fein, including the exclusion of its members from holding Ministerial office. In 
the context of suspension, they recommended that I should consider exercising the 
powers I have to apply financial penalties to Sinn Fein.
Mr. Speaker the House will recall that following the IMC’s first report in April 
last year, I issued a direction removing for twelve months, the block financial 
assistance paid to the Assembly parties in respect to both Sinn Fein and the 
Progressive Unionist Party.
Having reflected on the IMC’s latest report I have concluded that it would be 
appropriate for me to issue a further direction removing Sinn Fein’s entitlement to 
this block financial assistance for a further twelve month period, the maximum 
period permitted under the legislation.”370
370Statement by Paul Murphy, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
about Financial Sanctions against Sinn Fein following the Fourth report of the 
Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), House of Commons,( 22 February 
2005), CAIN Web Service, ibid.
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  After briefly addressing an ancillary motion to suspend payment to the four Sinn Fein members 
who refused to take the oath of allegiance to the Queen as a prerequisite to taking their seats in 
Parliament, Murphy returned to the import of his action;
“...The debate on that motion is for another day, but I should emphasize to the 
House, lest anyone accuse us of denying Sinn Fein’s electoral support, that the 
measures we are proposing are designed to express the disapproval of all those 
who are committed to purely democratic politics at the actions of the Provisional 
IRA. All in this House recognise the degree of support for Sinn Fein, but we also 
believe that the actions of the republican movement are letting down everyone in 
Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein voters.”371
371Ibid.
     In opting to impose this sanction rather than exclusion from Ministerial office, Murphy 
argued that it furthered inclusiveness and stability in Northern Ireland;
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“...the reality remains that long-term stability in Northern Ireland will not come 
about if we focus on exclusion. The objective requires inclusion.”372
372Ibid.
   That sentiment, notwithstanding, Murphy declared that if the Assembly had been in session, 
the 
scenario might have been very different, and indeed, still could be. He observed;
“Had the robbery occurred while the Assembly was in operation, however, the 
decision about exclusion would have been very different It is inconceivable, in 
my view, that members of Sinn Fein could again hold ministerial office while the
issue of parliamentary activity and criminality on the part of the Provisional IRA 
remained unsolved.
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The suggestion is made in some quarters that I should restore the Assembly and 
then, if the Assembly itself failed to take action to exclude Sinn Fein, that I should 
take action myself using the powers available to me to exclude them. Mr. 
Speaker, that would be very difficult in the absence of a clear plan which would 
see the parties in the Assembly come together on a cross-community basis to form 
a government for Northern Ireland. But as I said to the House on 11 January, I 
have not ruled anything in or out as we continue to assess possible ways forward 
for achieving greater local political accountability.”373
373Ibid.
  This last statement is almost breathtaking in what it reveals about the British and Unionist view 
of the autonomy of the devolved government. That it can be suspended and restored at a whim.
Despite Murphy’s bromides to inclusiveness  being preferred to exclusion, as a rationale for 
suspending block financial assistance to Sinn Fein rather than exclusion from Ministerial office; 
the fact of the matter was that suspension of block financial assistance to Sinn Fein was far more 
crippling than exclusion, if only because there was nothing to exclude Sinn Fein from, since the 
government had been suspended..
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   Murphy, in the same statement, made a point continuing the suspension of block financial 
assistance to the Progressive Unionist Party that was imposed after the IMC’s First Report along 
with Sinn Fein’s suspension.374 While one might assume this reflected an even handed approach 
to both republican and unionist parties, it is important to remember that the PUP had a 
demonstrably identifiable link to the UVF and LVF as reflected by their nomination of a PUP 
member as their representative to the IICD.375 Moreover, unlike Sinn Fein, which had become 
the largest nationalist party in the Northern Ireland Assembly376, the Progressive Unionist Party 
had received 0.59% of the vote and elected no members to that body.377 Thus the penalty fell far 
harder on Sinn Fein than the PUP.
In The Matter Of An Application By Sinn Fein For Judicial Review
   Murphy’s Order came on the heels of a ruling by the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland 
which rejected Sinn Fein’s challenge to the suspension of its funding following the IMC’s First 
Report, which had been adopted by the Secretary of State in accordance with the Northern 
Ireland Act of 2003. In a decision entitled In The Matter Of An Application By Sinn Fein For 
Judicial Review, [2005]NIQB 10, Ref: WEAC5196, Delivered:14/02/2005, Justice Weatherup 
rejected the challenges made by Sinn Fein. The decision is an interesting one in the way it 
analyzes the IMC’s findings regarding both Sinn Fein and the Progressive Unionist Party, as well 
374Ibid.
375See, Fn. 83.
376CAIN Web Service, Westminster General Election results, 7 June 2001.
377Ibid.
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as its determination of the Secretary of State’s reliance on the IMC Report.
   After setting out all of the relevant portions of the  Good Friday Agreement, the Northern 
Ireland Acts of 1998 and 2003, as well as the Agreement between the Governments of Ireland 
and Britain establishing the Independent Monitoring Commission, the Justice turned to Sinn 
Fein’s challenge to the IMC and the Secretary of State.
   Among the challenges to the IMC report were that;
“IMC activity should as far as practicable be consistent with and not obstruct the 
implementation of the Good Friday Agreement and the acts examined by the IMC 
must be acts of ‘political violence’”378
378In The Matter Of An Application By Sinn Fein For Judicial Review,
[2005]NIQB 10,WEAC 5196, p.7,[17].
and
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“The IMC could not have reasonably concluded that Sinn Fein should bear any 
responsibility for PIRA activity.”379
379Ibid.
One of the challenges brought against the Secretary of State’s action was;
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“The Secretary of State could not  reasonably have concluded that Sinn Fein was 
not committed to non-violence and exclusively peaceful and democratic 
means”380
380Ibid.
and
269
“The Secretary of State was exercising his statutory powers for the ulterior 
purpose of accommodating political sensitivities which were based on expediency 
rather than principle.”381
381Ibid.
Both sides submitted evidence in affidavit form. Justice Weatherup summarized the 
evidence relied on by Sinn Fein in support of its challenge;
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“The affidavit of Conor Murphy, a Sinn Fein member of the Assembly, in support 
of the application stated that Sinn Fein is a completely independent political party 
with its own constitution. The party has no constitutional link to the IRA. Sinn 
Fein is committed to non-violence and exclusively peaceful means and is 
committed to such of its members as might become ministers or junior ministers 
observing the pledge of office Sinn Fein has also endorsed the Mitchell Principles 
(para.13). It is stated not to be within Sinn Fein’s power to bring paramilitary 
activity to an end, that it is committed to exclusively peaceful and democratic 
means and is not aware of any decision that could be construed as diluting Sinn 
Fein’s commitment to the peace process (para 14).Reference is made to 
statements made in support of that position by Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams 
and to the British Government’s recognition of Sinn Fein’s commitment as 
recently as 28 October 2003.”382
382Ibid., [18].
He next laid out the evidence put forth by the Secretary of State;
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“Nicholas Perry, Director of Policy and security in the Northern Ireland Office, 
made an affidavit on behalf of the Secretary of State.. He stated that the Secretary 
of State gave very considerable weight to the IMC’s Report and recommendations 
but that the government had made its own assesment; it was the Secretary’s view 
that the IMC Report provided a firm foundation for his conclusion that Sinn Fein 
was not committed to non-violent and exclusively peaceful and democratic means 
and that he was satisfied that it was appropriate to take action in the form of 
making the direction made (para. 10).”383
383Ibid., [19].
272
Turning to the challenges made to the IMC, the Justice quickly disposed of the one predicated on 
the assertion that the Commission was limited to monitoring acts of “political violence” only. He 
pointed out that both the International Agreement establishing the Independent Monitoring 
Commission and the Joint Declaration by the Governments of Ireland and Britain incorporated 
language specifically referring to paramilitarism as criminality masquerading as a political 
cause.384
Ultimately, he decided that;
384Ibid.,[22].
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“...given the scope of paramilitary activity that is described as the target of the 
International Agreement establishing the IMC, and given that the 2003 Act is 
making provision in connection with the establishment of the IMC, it is apparent 
form the scope of paramilitary activity that is to be monitored by the IMC that the 
sanctions against political parties are not, and were not, intended to be, limited to 
violence as a means of furthering political ends.”385
385Ibid.,[26].
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   Turning to the issue of procedural unfairness, Sinn Fein raised the issue, which was apparent 
from even a cursory review of the IMC reports, the fact that it was based upon “untested and 
unpublished information from unidentified sources” and was based on “incorrect 
information.”386
   The court in resolving this issue, reasoned that;
386Ibid., [33].
“It is in the nature of the IMC monitoring of continuing activity by paramilitary 
groups that it receives intelligence information. Section 2 of the 2003 Act imposes 
on the IMC a duty to avoid prejudicial effects. It is required not to do anything in 
carrying out its functions which might prejudice national security, put at risk the 
safety or life of any person or have a prejudicial effect on any present or future 
legal proceedings. Further by the 2003 Order the IMC is granted immunity from 
suit and process. That is the context of the IMC duty of procedural fairness in 
carrying out its statutory functions in relation to the monitoring and assessment of 
paramilitary groups.
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  That is also the context of such monitoring and assessment as reaches into 
political parties. Whether procedural fairness has been achieved will depend on 
the circumstances of the case. When the information provided to the IMC in the 
course of its monitoring and assessment is intelligence based there will be public 
interest concerns relating to the disclosure of the information. In that context, as 
in all cases, the requirements of procedural fairness will depend on the legal 
framework of the decision making. In the present case the applicant met the IMC 
in January 2004 and March 2004. At these meetings representatives of the 
applicant outlined their objections to the operation of the IMC as being outside 
the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The opportunity was available to 
examine and make representations on the inquiries undertaken by the IMC. 
However the applicant did not avail of the opportunity but elected to voice its 
opposition to the operation of the IMC The procedures that would have applied if 
the applicant had engaged with the IMC have not been established. The applicant 
cannot maintain a challenge to the procedural fairness of the IMC methods of 
monitoring and assessment, in so far as those methods touched the applicant, 
when the applicant failed to avail of the opportunity to address the IMC approach. 
Accordingly the applicant has not established that the procedures were unfair.387
387Ibid., [33-34].
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 This rationale is confusing at best. At the outset of the analysis, Justice Weatherup seems to be 
saying that whatever analysis he conducts, it might not have any precedential value since the 
question of procedural fairness “...will depend on the circumstances of the case.”388  At the same 
time he appears to arrive at two separate and distinct conclusions which leaves the question 
raised even more unsettled.   On the one hand, Sinn Fein has not made out a case for procedural 
unfairness on the facts presented because it failed to raise specific arguments or objections to the 
IMC’s factual findings and instead challenged its method of operation. On the other hand, the 
Court seems to suggest, that had it made specific factual objections, no guiding principles for 
such a challenge had been formulated.
   Turning to the issue of whether the IMC was justified in concluding there was a link between 
Sinn Fein and the IRA, the Court’s reasoning became even more murky and it put an imprimatur 
on the IMC’s conclusion that was totally vacuous. On this issue, Justice Weatherup wrote;
388Ibid.
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“... the applicant contended that it was necessary to establish some credible link 
between the applicant as a political party and the activities of PIRA. Accordingly 
it was submitted that it would have been necessary to establish that the applicant 
had control over those activities or their perpetrators and could have prevented 
them or at the very least that they condoned the activities. It was submitted that, 
on the contrary, Sinn Fein had restated its commitment to non-violence and 
exclusively peaceful and democratic means.389
389Ibid., [37].
In responding to this position, the Court restated Sinn Fein’s argument about the IMC’s 
findings, and, although already set forth previously, in the context of the conclusion the Court 
reaches, they are worth repeating here.
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“The IMC conclusions were that there were some common members and senior 
members of Sinn Fein and PIRA, that Sinn Fein was in a position to exercise 
considerable influence on PIRA’s major policy decisions, that there might not 
have been a PIRA  ceasefire in the first place without influence from the 
leadership of Sinn Fein and by the same token Sinn Fein must bear its 
responsibility for the continuation of Sinn Fein activity. The applicant contrasted 
the above statements with those applied to the Progressive Unionist Party and its 
links to the leadership of the UVF and the RHC. While being satisfied that the 
Progressive unionist Party had exerted a positive influence in acheiving the 
loyalist ceasefires the IMC stated ‘we believe it had not sufficiently discharged its 
responsibilities to exert all possible influence to prevent illegal activities on the 
part of the UVF and RHC.’ The IMC conclusions and recommendations indicated 
that political parties should not be associated with illegal activities of any kind, 
including that by paramilitary groups, that Sinn Fein had links with PIRA and that 
all politicians must exert every possible influence to bring about a cessation of 
paramilitary activity, which included not only public calls for such a cessation but 
also included encouraging individuals to take a stand personally and collectively 
against paramilitaries.”390
390Ibid.
  The Justice went on to sustain the IMC’s position, without expressly endorsing their view, 
holding;
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“The conclusion reached by th IMC that Sinn Fein was not exercising available 
influence on PIRA is within the range of conclusions that the IMC was entitled to 
reach. In Judicial Review proceedings it is not for the Court to accept or reject 
that conclusion but rather to establish whether it is a rational decision made within 
the IMC remit and taking account of relevant considerations and leaving out of 
account irrelevant considerations. It has not been established that there is any such 
grounds for setting aside the conclusion.”391
391Ibid., [39].
The court then went on to express, what can only be called, a very curious view of the IMC’s 
conclusion, observing;
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“The IMC finding against the applicant concerns a failure of the leadership to 
exercise sufficient influence over PIRA. It is not a finding that the applicant is 
controlling events or is actively encouraging the activity or that it has the power to 
stop the activities but that it has not exerted the influence that the IMC believes it 
has. This is not inconsistent with the finding that it did exercise considerable 
influence on a previous occasion. The applicant has not established any of the 
stated grounds for Judicial Review of the approach of the IMC.”392
392Ibid., [40].
It goes without saying, that this view of the IMC’s rationale and the endorsement of its power to 
levy sanctions predicated upon it, could lead to some very strange inquiries Query; What exactly 
is “sufficient influence” ? Is Sinn Fein being punished because it had previously exercised some  
influence to persuade the IRA to enter a ceasefire ? If Sinn Fein’s influence on the IRA to enter a 
ceasefire had come up short, could it have been similarly sanctioned for any paramilitary activity 
the IRA might have engaged in because of its lack of influence?
If the Court was disinclined to second-guess the IMC in its findings, it also gave the green light 
to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to do so too. Ruling on the challenge to the 
Secretary it held;
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“The IMC Report was the basis on which the Secretary of State was satisfied that 
the applicant was not committed to exclusively peaceful and democratic means 
required positive action to further those goals and that positive influence was 
possible and had not ben exercised. The applicant contended that the Secretary 
had taken a quantum leap from a finding of the exercise of insufficient influence 
to being satisfied there was not a commitment to non violence. The Secretary’s 
conclusion that an absence of exercise of available influence amounted to a lack 
of the necessary commitment was one that the Secretary was entitled to reach.”393
393Ibid., [43].
Thus, at the end of the day, the Court held that the IMC could predicate its findings on untested, 
unattributed hearsay evidence and recommend the imposition of sanctions. That the Court would 
not second guess the Commission in making such findings and recommendations. Further that 
the Secretary of State could rely upon such findings and recommendations in imposing such 
sanctions, utilizing the streamline procedural mechanisms provided in the Northern Ireland Act 
of 2003, with out regard to the lack of cross-community support. It would be hard to draw any  
conclusion other than that such a state of affairs was likely to impede the advance of 
reconciliation rather than further it.
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   On May 24, 2005, the IMC submitted its Fifth Report394 to the Governments of the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. This report contained an assessment of paramilitary 
activity, as well as the murder of Robert McCartney.395 At the outset of the report the IMC 
trumpeted the fact that it had prevailed over Sinn Fein in the Party’s judicial challenge to the 
suspension of block financial assistance following its first report.396
   In its review of paramilitary activities concerning the IRA, the IMC renewed its charge that the 
group was responsible for the robbery of the Northern Bank in Belfast and added a new 
accusation that;
394Independent Monitoring Commission, Fifth Report, 24 May 2005.
395Ibid.
396Ibid., 1(1.7).
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“It was also responsible for an arson attack against a fuel depot in early 
September.”397
397Ibid., 2(2.10).
Once again, neither charge was made with any amplification or substantiating evidence. It next 
turned to certain language utilized by the British and Irish Governments the previous December 
when they floated a proposal for a comprehensive political agreement to get the peace process 
back on track, noting;
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“In view of the attention it has attracted there is one other matter to which we 
wish to refer. The proposals for a comprehensive political agreement in Northern 
Ireland which the British and Irish governments published on 8 December last 
year we spoke of an ‘immediate full and permanent cessation of all paramilitary 
activity by the IRA’ (i.e.PIRA). With it was the draft of a statement which the two 
governments had hoped that PIRA would put out in the event of a successful 
conclusion of the talks. The draft statement referred to the need not to endanger 
anyone’s personal rights or safety and to all PIRA volunteers being instructed not 
to engage in any activity which might endanger th new agreement. The statement 
which the PIRA actually put out following the failure to achieve an agreement 
contained the last phrase, but not the reference to ensuring the rights and safety of 
everybody. Two things are clear from what we say in this report and from our 
account of the activities of PIRA in our ad hoc report. First, there have continued 
to be occasions before and since early December 2004 when the rights and safety 
of others have been disregarded.. Second, the manifest abuse of safety and rights 
which the abductions and robbery at the Northern Bank involved were being 
planned long before the December announcements; we are unable to say whether 
they would have been called off had there been a political agreement.”398
398Ibid., 2(2.12).
It then went on to conclude;
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“ We believe that PIRA is at present determined to maintain its effectiveness , 
both in terms of organised crime, control in republican areas, and the potential for 
terrorism. We have no present evidence that it intends to resume a campaign of 
violence despite the political collapse of political talks in December 2004, but its 
capacity remains should that become the intention.”399
399Ibid., 2(2.13).
   Turning to the Ulster Defence Association, the loyalist paramilitary group, the Commission 
observed;
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“In November last year the Secretary of State announced the de-specification of 
the UDA following the statement that it would desist from ‘all military activity’, 
focus on social and economic issues within the community, and work with the 
British Government towards an end to all paramilitary activity.”400
400Ibid., 2(2.17).
Notwithstanding the UDA’s promises, the Commission charged;
“In September and October 2004 the UDA were involved in both violence and 
targeting. Members of the UDA shot Darren Thompson on 29 September 2004 
(he died on 1 October ). On 19 September 2004 UDA members, with the approval 
of the local leadership, attacked Stephen Nelson who died on 18 March 2005. As 
part of the dispute with the LVF in Belfast they were responsible for an arson 
attack in late October. At the end of  November 7 UDA and an eight associate 
were arrested before being able to commit an abduction and armed robbery, 
which known to the North Belfast leadership of the organisation. More recently, 
they have engaged in a targeting in anticipation of a possible dispute halt the LVF 
following the release of Johnny Adair from prison in January 2005, and have 
monitored the dissident republicans with a view to mounting attacks if they 
themselves are attacked. In January 2005 UDA members forced two families from 
their homes. We have found nothing to suggest that the UDA have agreed to the 
return to Northern Ireland of the people it has exiled or that it is considering doing 
so. The organisation was, we believe , responsible for shootings and assaults. It 
remains involved in organised crime, and members were responsible for two 
robberies in February 2005.
287
We have always recognised that transition may be a messy and difficult process 
for aa paramilitary group. To date it is not clear if the UDA will achieve the 
transition it pointed to in the statement of November 2004. Certainly the process 
is still very far from complete, and the fact remains that during the period under 
review it was responsible for two murders.”401
401Ibid., 2( 2.18-2.19).
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Perhaps there is no better example of the uneven-handed approach on the part of the IMC and the 
British authorities in there dealings with republican and loyalist parties and paramilitaries than is 
demonstrated here. On September 28, 2001 the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, John 
Reid, announced that he was prepared to specify the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and 
declare their ceasefire over, for engaging in paramilitary violence.402  Reid declared that his 
intention had been to specify the UDA at that time but;
402Statement by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, John Reid at Hillsborough, 28 
September 2001.
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“...in the course of the briefing received within the last two hours it was 
communicated to me that the leadership of the UDA has accepted the damage 
their violence is doing and decided to bring it to a halt.”403
403Ibid.
   Two weeks later, on October 12, 2001, Reid made good on his threat, announcing;
“ The UDA and UFF have undoubtedly been responsible for recent attacks, 
notably in Belfast last night,. I have warned them in stringent terms on 28 
September that any further violence would cause me to specify them without 
further warning.
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I have also assessed the actions of the LVF over the recent period taking into 
account of the murder of Martin O’Hagan two weeks ago, and have concluded 
that they no longer maintain a ceasefire.”404
404Statement by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, John Reid, 
Hillsborough, 12 October 2001.
Spelling out the implications of what specification meant, Reid went on;
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“ The attacks by these organisations are incompatible with any claims to be on 
ceasefire. Society cannot tolerate these actions. The result is that early released 
prisoners associated with the UDA, UFF, and LVF can now have their licences
suspended and be returned to jail if they are believed to continue to support the 
organisation; the provisions now embodied in the Terrorism Act 2000 relating to 
charges of membership introduced originally after the Omagh bombing in 1998 
will also apply to all three organisations; and any UDA, UFF or LVF person 
found guilty of a scheduled offence that took place before the Good Friday 
Agreement cannot qualify for early release provisions.”405
405Ibid.
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As noted previously, the IMC in its First and Third Reports had found that loyalist/unionist 
paramilitary  violence was consistently twice the level of republican groups.Nevertheless, on 
November 15, 2004, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy went ahead and 
announced that he would despecify the UDA and the UVF.406 In making his announcement, 
Murphy was cognizant of the IMC findings, as he noted;
406Statement by secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy, House of 
Commons, 15 November 2004.
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“I appreciate that some may question that decision in light of negative comments 
in recent IMC reports. I have carefully studied both relevant IMC reports and 
support the strong language directed against a range of paramilitary organisations. 
But it is clear between the first and second relevant reports, that there has been a 
reduction of UDA activity. Other material provided to me would endorse that 
view. 407
407Ibid.
  Despite the Commission’s documentation of murder, arson, and planned attacks on republicans, 
no recommendation was made about imposing any sanctions on the group, nor was any levied by 
the Secretary of State in the period following the report. While unsubstantiated criminal activity 
by the IRA could lead to sanctions being imposed on Sinn Fein, paramilitary violence on the part 
of the UDA was viewed as just being “messy.”
   The Fifth report contained two further subjects that are worth commenting on. The first was the 
Murder of Robert McCartney and the second was the comparative difference of paramilitary 
violence by republican and loyalist groups, as well as the recidivism rates of prisoners of both 
sides released pursuant to the Good Friday Agreement.
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   Robert McCartney was murdered outside a pub in Belfast on January 20, 2005.408 While the 
Commission found that;
408Independent Monitoring Commission, Fifth Report, 4(4.2).
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“...members of PIRA were involved in the murder. We do not believe that the 
central PIRA leadership sanctioned it in advance, but those concerned may have 
believed they were acting at the direction of a local senior PIRA member at the 
scene.”409
409Ibid.
296
  The report goes on to recount the sometimes conflicting directives given by the IRA to its 
members concerning cooperation with the investigating authorities, as well as statements made 
by Sinn Fein also encouraging cooperation.410
What is curious about the IMC’s discussion of this incident is that the McCartney murder was a 
non-sectarian killing of a fellow Catholic from a republican family during a an altercation in a 
pub. No claim was ever made that McCartney was killed for sectarian purposes.
   Like the findings concerning the incidence of paramilitary violence in the First and Third 
reports, the Fifth Report summarized the incidence of republican and loyalist paramilitary 
violence, noting that;
410Ibid., 4(4.3- 4.5).
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“Loyalists continue to commit more violence than republicans: over four times as 
many shooting victims and 25% more victims of assault.411
411Ibid., 3(3.10).
   It did note that despite this disparity, loyalist violence appeared to be declining at a greater rate 
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than republican in comparison to the corresponding period in 2003-2004.412
    As noted before, the report also contained section devoted to the recidivist activities of 
prisoners released pursuant to the Good Friday Agreement.413 This was the first such analysis 
and covered the entire period under the Agreement through September 2004.414 The analysis 
concerned 430 prisoners released, who had documentable paramilitary links prior to 
imprisonment.415 Almost half, 49%, were IRA members, 24% were UDA/UFF members, 16% 
were UVF/RHC members, 7% were INLA members, and 4% were LVF members.416 The IMC 
reported that;
412Ibid.
413Ibid., section 5.
414Ibid., 5(5.3).
415Ibid., 5(5.4).
416Ibid., 5(5.5).
299
“In the period until September 2004, some 3% of the prisoners released in 
Northern Ireland had been convicted or were being prosecuted for paramilitary 
type offences and 11% for non-paramilitary offences, making a total of 14%.”417
417Ibid., 5(5.7).
In terms of specific group members if found;
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“...the two republican groups have the lowest percentage of released members 
convicted or with a prosecution pending. The LVF had by far the highest 
percentage for paramilitary offences and the UVF/RHC th highest for non-
paramilitary offences...”418
418Ibid.
  Despite the more positive overall conduct of the republican paramilitary groups in contrast to 
the unionist/loyalist groups in the areas of paramilitary violence, the IMC and British authorities 
chose to sanction the republicans and defer any criticism of the unionists, except for the 
Progressive Unionist Party upon whom it imposed a meaningless penalty of suspending block 
financial assistance when it had no elected members.
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   On July 28, 2005, the IRA issued a statement announcing the end of its armed campaign.419
In the Statement the group declared;
419Irish Republican Army Statement, 28 July 2005.
“All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms.
  All volunteers have been instructed to assist in the development of purely 
political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means
   Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.
   The IRA leadership has also authorised our representative to engage with the 
IICD [Independent International Commission on Decommissioning] to complete 
the process to verifiably put its arms beyond use in a way which will further 
enhance public confidence and to conclude this as soon as possible.
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   We have invited two witnesses from the Protestant and Catholic churches, to 
testify to this.”420
420Ibid.
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  Reaction to the announcement was immediate and generally favorable. The Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, Peter Hain, in a letter to Parliament lauded the announcement and called 
upon the IMC and the IICD to monitor and confirm the decommissioning.421 These sentiments 
were echoed by the Irish Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, the British Prime 
Minister on that same date.422 Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, also issued a Statement that 
day, laying out what the development meant to the republican community.423 In it he declared;
421Text of Letter from Peter Hain to members of Parliament, 28 July 2005, CAIN Web 
Service, ibid.
422Joint Satement by Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern and British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on 
28 July 2005, CAIN Web Service.
423Statement by Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, 28 July 2005, CAIN Web Service.
“Today’s IRA initiative also presents challenges for others.
In my April appeal I made the point that commitments, including commitments 
from the two governments were reneged in the past. History will not be kind to 
any government which plays politics with today’s developments.
In particular this means an end to the pandering to those unionists who are 
rejectionist....
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It means the unionists who are for the Good Friday Agreement must end their 
ambivalence. And it is a direct challenge to the DUP to decide if they want to put 
the past behind them, and make peace with the rest of this island.
Today’s IRA statement can help revive the peace process; it deals with genuine 
unionist concerns and removes from the leadership of unionism its excuse for 
non-engagement.”424
424Ibid.
   Adams’s olive branch to the Democratic Unionist Party was rejected by its leader, Ian Paisley, 
who issued a statement in which he declared;
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“The history of the past decade in Northern Ireland is littered with IRA statements 
which we were told were ‘historic,’ ‘ground-breaking’, and ‘seismic’. These same 
statements were followed by the IRA reverting to type and carrying out more of 
its horrific murders and squalid criminality. The unionist community feels no 
obligation to cheer the words of P.O’Neill.425 We will judge the IRA’s bonafides 
over the next months and years based on its behavior and activity.
Even on the face of the statement, they have failed to explicitly declare an end to 
their multi-million pound criminal activity and have failed to provide the level of 
transparency that would be necessary to truly build confidence that the guns had 
gone in their entirety. This lack of transparency will prolong the period the 
community will need to make its assessment.
We treat with contemp their attempt to glorify and justify their murder campaign 
and we will be evaluating the extent of the price paid by the Government and the 
consequences that will have for the political process.”426
425A pseudonym under whose name all IRA statements are issued.
426Statement by Ian Paisley, CAIN Web Service.
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   In September 2005, the IMC issued an ad hoc report to the British and Irish Governments on 
the subject of a violent feud between two loyalist groups, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and 
the Loyalist Volunteeer Force (LVF).427
    In describing the background of the UVF the Commission noted;
427Independent Monitoring Commission, Sixth Report, September 2005, para. 1.
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“We drew attention in our report published in November 2004 to the fact that the 
UVF leaders had restated their commitment to the loyalist ceasefire of 1994. The 
Combined Loyalist Military Command ceasefire statement expressed ‘abject and 
true remorse’ for the victims of the previous twenty years. Nevertheless the UVF 
has not decommissioned weapons, has suspended contact with the IICD and in the 
past two years has been involved in murders, shootings, assaults and in organised 
and other crime.”428
428Ibid., para.5.
In describing the LVF it noted that it;
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“...declared a ceasefire in 1998 and handed over some weapons to the 
International Independent International Commission on Decommissioning but 
despite this has been involved in murders, shootings, assaults and other crimes 
since that time.”429
429Ibid., para.6.
What is interesting about these two observations is that it is the first time that the IMC has cited 
any paramilitary group’s history of interaction with the IICD as a factor which is significant in 
the group’s history. Clearly the IMC considered the LVF’s act of decommissioning with the 
IICD as a positive aspect of that group’s history, and the UVF’s failure to engage in 
decommissioning as a negative part of the UVF ‘s history. Yet, in all of its allegations about the 
IRA, it never apparently considered that group’s repeated acts of decommissioning with the IICD 
as a consideration that should be weighed in determining its commitment to non-violence and the 
peace process as it weighed whether to impose sanctions on Sinn Fein.
     In arriving at its conclusions about the leadership of the LVF and the vicarious responsibility 
of the Progressive Unionist Party, the IMC declared;
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“We have noted the comments of Mr. Ervine of the PUP in response to the 
announcement of the Secretary’s intention. He said that neither he nor other PUP 
leaders were in leadership positions of the UVF and that they had not broken any 
law. He argued that it was contrary to natural justice to punish people who were 
not responsible for what the paramilitaries did and he subsequently made 
representations to the Secretary of State.”430
430Ibid., para 22.
Responding this argument, the IMC stated;
We are aware of the view that the PUP is not strong enough to influence the UVF 
– in effect that it is the UVF rather than the PUP which leads. But two facts 
remain. First, the PUP is a political party represented at both Assembly and local 
government levels, and in the case of the latter it stood in the May 2005 elections. 
Second, it is associated with the UVF. No democratic political party can expect to 
have it both ways. It can either disassociate itself from the paramilitary group, or 
it must accept the consequences of its association. The circumstances of the 
current feud make that all the more important.”
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We believe that there is still an association between he PUP and the UVF. We 
think now, as we have before, that the PUP has not done all that could be done to 
prevent paramilitary activity and has not credibly voiced or exerted its opposition 
to paramilitaries, and the UVF in particular. The events we describe in this report 
reinforce the conclusions we reached in our last report, namely that removal of 
block financial assistance from the PUP in the Northern Ireland Assembly for 
twelve months should be renewed.”431
431Ibid., para. 23-4.
311
    In the days following the issuance of this report, Belfast and other loyalist towns and villages 
were the scene of some of the worst rioting and sectarian violence by loyalist groups and 
paramilitaries in nearly a decade.432 Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Orde, of the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI) charged that both the UVF and LVF were involved in the clashes along 
with the Orange Order, who were angered by re-routing of a parade to avoid a Catholic 
enclave.433  The rioting was preceded by comments by Ulster Unionist Party Leader, Reg 
Empey, and Democratic Unionist Party leader, Ian Paisley, who said that;
432
“Loyalist Rioting Erupts in Belfast”, Irish Voice, Vol. 19, No.37, September 14-20, 
2005, p.3.
433Ibid.
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“The issue could be the spark which kindles a fire there would be no putting 
out.”434
434Ibid.
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  Officials in the aftermath of the rioting pointed to the comments of both Empey and Paisley as 
the catalyst for the violence and disorder that ensued.435
   On September 26, the International Independent Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 
announced that the IRA had put all of its arms beyond use.436  In its announcement, the IICD 
made it clear that based upon what it had learned during the previous decommissioning events, 
the estimates provided by “security forces in both jurisdictions, and the number of arms 
decommissioned, it believes that the IRA had put the “totality of its arms” beyond use.437 In 
concluding its report, the Commission declared;
“ 7. In summary, we have determined that the IRA has met its commitment to put all its arms 
beyond use in a manner called for by the legislation.
   8. It remains for us to address the arms of the loyalist paramilitary organizations, when these 
are prepared to cooperate with us in doing so.”438
  This report was accompanied by a statement from two clergymen, one Catholic and the other 
Protestant, who witnessed the decommissioning event.439 In a press conference that same day, in 
435
“Reiss Says Loyalists Lack Leadership,” Irish Voice, ibid.
436
 Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) Report, 26 
September 2005
437Ibid.
438Ibid.
439Joint Statement by the Eyewitnesses, Reverend Harold Good and Father Alec Reid, on 
the Decommissioning of IRA Weapons, (26 September 2005), CAIN Web Service, ibid.
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response to a question about when loyalist decommissioning might take place, John 
DeChaseltain said;
“With regard to the loyalists, I don’t know. We worked with the loyalists in the 
early years of this process, with the UVF right from the start. They [UVF and the 
UDA] have both since broken off contact with us. Indeed, it has been a number of 
years since we talked with the UVF.
  More recently, the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG) has talked to us on 
behalf of the UDA to try and open some dialogue, but not in terms of talking 
about decommissioning.”440
440Transcript of Press Conference given by the Independent International 
Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), 26 September 2005, CAIN Web 
Service, ibid.
   As expected, the announcement by the IICD was greeted with praise by politicians in the 
Republic and the United Kingdom who sought to take credit for the development. In a joint 
statement, Berie Ahern, the Taoisech (Irish Prime Minister) and British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, stated;
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“We welcome this landmark development. Having sought to achieve this outcome 
for so many years, its significance now needs to bee acknowledged and 
recognised.”441
441Joint Statement by Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair on the 
Decommissioning of IRA weapons, 26 September 2005, CAIN Web Service, ibid.
 In a separate statement that same day, Ahern was even more self-effusive, stating;
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“ I have worked unstintingly for this outcome for the past seven years to fulfill the 
mandate that the people gave me in that referendum, to secure a permanent peace 
on this island. In spite of the many setbacks and disappointments, I have 
continued to pursue that goal because, as a Constitutional Republican, I was 
convinced that it was the only way to achieve a final resolution of the Northern 
conflict.”442
442Statement by Bertie Ahern on the Decommissioning of  IRA Weapons, 
26 September 2005, CAIN Web Service, ibid.
   Oddly enough, the only politician who seemed to recognize where the credit for this move 
belonged was Ian Paisley, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, who denounced the 
witnesses, the IICD, the IRA, and Sinn Fein. In his statement, Paisley declared;
“This afternoon the people of Northern Ireland have watched a program which 
illustrates more than ever the duplicity and dishonesty of the two Governments 
and the IRA. Instead of openness there was the cunning tactics of cover-up and a 
complete failure from General John de Chaseltain to deal with the numerics of 
decommissioning...
The witnesses could only testify that the General was correct in his report and the 
General had already declared that his report was based on IRA assurances. The 
witnesses were clearly under the control of the General and they were not given 
any further opportunity to comment during the press conference. In fact they had 
no extra detail to add to the proceedings.
It must be clearly stated that both witnesses were approved by the IRA and 
therefore were accepted by the IRA and in no way could be independent.
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...The people of Ulster are not going to be forced by IRA/Sinn Fein or by the two 
Governments along the pathway of deceitfulness and treachery. The hidden things 
of darkness are surely coming to light when the extent of the shameful betrayal of 
truth will be uncovered. Ulster is not for sale and will not be sold.”443
443Statement by Ian Paisley, Leader of the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP) on the Decommissioning of IRA Weapons 26 September 2005, CAIN 
Web service, ibid.
   In his statement lauding the IRA decommissioning, Sinn Fein President, Gerry Adams, alluded 
to the loyalist violence that had recently swept Northern Ireland and suggested that it had a 
darker motive than mere outrage at the re-routing of the Orange Order Parade, observing;
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 “The words of some in the past have fueled sectarian violence against Catholics 
and this has been a  particularly difficult summer. There were serious attempts to 
provoke a reaction from nationalists and republicans. There may well be other 
attempts in the time ahead so I call upon people to show the calm and discipline 
that was evident over the summer months and particularly in recent times.”444
444Speech by Gerry Adams About the IRA’s decision to Put its Arms 
Beyond Use., (26 September 2005), CAIN Web Service, ibid.
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In the aftermath of the IRA’s decommissioning there were calls for the loyalist paramilitaries to 
decommission also,445 however, no credit or recognition was given to Sinn Fein had made 
445See, e.g., Joint Statement of Bertie Ahern and Tony Blair, ibid.; Statement by Reg 
Empey, Leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), on IRA Decommissioning of Weapons, 26 
September 2005; Statement by Mark Durkan, Leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) on the Decommissioning of IRA Weapons, 26 September 2005; and Speech by Dermot 
Ahern, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Ireland, to the Dail on Recent Developments in 
the Peace Process, 28 September 2005, CAIN Web Service, ibid.
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repeated calls for the IRA to take such action.446
      On October 19, 2005, the IMC issued its Seventh Report, and the last at this writing.447 It was 
the first report since the IRA’s July 28, 2005 statement that it would end its armed campaign and 
authorizing the IICD to verify that its arms had been put beyond use, and the IICD report of 
September 26 that they had been put beyond use.
   At the outset of its report the IMC took note of these developments and quoted from the IRA 
statement of July 28 which directed that;
446Statement by Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein, calling on the IRA to End the 
‘Armed Struggle’, Belfast, 6 April 2005; Speech by Gerry Adams to the Derry Chamber of 
Commerce, 11 April 2005; Statement by Gerry Adams on Confirmation From the IRA 
Leadership That A Discussion About the April 6 Initiative Had Been Authorized By The IRA, 26 
April 2005, CAIN Web Service, ibid.
447Independent Monitoring Commission, Seventh Report, 19 October 2005.
“All volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political 
and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means...
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 Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.”448
448Ibid., 2(2.2).
The IMC interpreted these words to mean;
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“...that members of PIRA have been instructed to give up all forms of criminal 
activity whatsoever.”449
449Ibid.
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  After reviewing the paramilitary activities of the republican splinter groups450, and the LVF,451
it 
turned to the IRA. Among the assessments it made with respect to the them, it noted;
450Ibid.,3(3.2)-3(3.9).
451Ibid., 3(3.10-3(3.12).
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“We believe that PIRA generally wanted the summer’s marching season to pass 
without civil disorder incited by republicans and that it sought to prevent rioting 
by nationalists. PIRA did organise protests at this time which led to some 
disorder, and as in the past years made preparations for weapons to be available 
should nationalist communities need to defend themselves from loyalist 
attacks.”452
452Ibid., 3(3.16).
  Despite the IRA’s fulfillment of its announced intention to decommission, the IMC declared;
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“In conclusion, on PIRA we emphasise again that as the PIRA statement of 28 
July came at a point when 5/6 ths of the period under review had already elapsed 
it is too early to be drawing firm conclusions about possible overall changes in 
behaviour, although we do note some indications of changes in PIRA’s structures. 
Clearly we are looking for cumulative indications of changes in behaviour over a 
more sustained period of time, building on the PIRA statement of 28 July and the 
decommissioning of weapons by the IICD on 26 September.”453
453Ibid., 3(3.18).
  In assessing the Ulster Defense Association, which had been involved in the rioting in Belfast 
and other parts of Northern Ireland the month before, as the IMC indicated it was well aware of 
this conduct as it summarized;
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“Although the rioting in September 2005, which was extremely violent falls 
outside the period under review in this report a number of things are already clear. 
It involved such serious violence that we feel compelled to comment. We believe 
that both the UDA and the UVF were involved in the planning and execution. 
Over 100 shots including high velocity rounds, were fired at the police and army 
and some 150 blast bombs were used. There were numerous injuries to members 
of the police and the Army. The ostensible cause of the rioting was the anger on 
the part of the Orange Order and its supporters about the rerouting and 
postponement of the march. But it is clear that the rioting was spontaneous 
community disorder; it was planned, and individual members of the Orange Order 
were involved, some wearing their regalia. When the Orange Order or any 
organisation brings people on to the streets it bears some responsibility for the 
consequences, including the attacks on the police.”454
454Ibid. 4(4.13).
Nevertheless it had this to say about the conduct;
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“...Some of the UDA activities of the UDA described above raise questions about 
the status of the UDA ceasefire. We will address this more fully in our next 
report.”455
455Ibid., 3(2.26).
   In contrast turning to the issue of leadership of the IRA and Sinn Fein, the 
IMC had this to say;
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“We have said earlier in this report that five of the sixths months under review 
precede the PIRA statement and that it is therefore too early for us on this 
occasion to be drawing firm conclusions about possible changes to the 
organisation’s over all behaviour. Although the initial signs are encouraging we 
do not therefore make any comment at this stage on the recommendation we 
previously made about the financial support Sinn Fein receives in the Northern 
Assembly. Nor do we pursue the point we then made separately about whether it 
should receive public money from other sources.”456
456Ibid., 6(6.4).
 And on the issue of the suspension of block assistance to the Progressive Unionist Party, the 
IMC
declared;
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“...up to the time of presentation of this report we have not seen evidence which 
presently causes us to change our previous recommendation on the removal of 
financial support for the party in the Northern Assembly.”457
457Ibid. 6(6.6).
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      While this sanction appeared somewhat toothless in light of the fact that the PUP had elected 
no members during the last Assembly elections, following the Commission’s report, there were 
revelations which made it appear totally edentulous, when it was disclosed that the party had 
been receiving funding since April 2005.458
   Although the IMC has linked Sinn Fein to the IRA’s alleged criminality, based upon 
unattributed and undisclosed evidence, and sanctioned them accordingly; it has been positively 
myopic in its failure to acknowledge the Democratic Unionist and Ulster Unionist Parties’ 
responsibility for the rioting and violence caused by the UDA during September 2005. No 
clearer example of a violation of Section 30(1)(A) of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, exists 
than the remarks of both Paisley and Empey which preceded this event. Yet, no recommendation 
of any sanction was taken up by the Commission for action by the Secretary of State was 
contained nor even hinted at in this Report.
     On October 19, 2005, Peter Hain, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced that 
he had received the latest IMC report and was restoring Sinn Fein’s funding.459 Whether this 
action was taken as a recognition of the decommissioning by the IRA or because of the 
458
“Loyalist Group Retains Links,” Irish Voice, Vol. 19 No. 42, October 19- October 25, 
2005, p.3.
459
 Statement by Peter Hain, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, on the Seventh 
Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), House of Commons, 19 October 
2005, CAIN Web Service.
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revelation that the PUP funding had been secretly restored previously, is unclear.
     In December 2005 the Northern Ireland Bureau of Public Prosecutions dismissed charges
against Dennis Donaldson, a Sinn Fein Party official, his son-in-law, and a British civil servant 
who were arrested following the October 4, 2002 raid on Sinn Fein offices at Stormont for 
allegedly gathering intelligence on Northern Ireland officials for the IRA.460 While the Bureau of 
Public Prosecutions would only state that the reason for this decision was that it was “in the 
public interest,”461 the dismissal followed the trial court’s denial of a gag order sought by the 
British Government on the evidence to be disclosed during their impending trial.462 Donaldson 
subsequently disclosed that he had been spying on Sinn Fein for M-15, the British intelligence 
agency, for the past two decades, and that “The so-called Stormont-gate affair was a scam and a 
fiction. It never existed. It was created by Special Branch.”463 There can be little doubt that the 
British Government manufactured this incident as a pretext to suspend the devolved government 
ten days later because it was concerned about Sinn Fein’s growing popularity in the Northern 
Ireland electorate.
460
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Times, December 17, 2005, p3.
461Ibid.
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Times, December 23, 2005, p.3.
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Conclusion
 At various times throughout the peace process, participants and observers have proclaimed the 
prospect of a lasting peace to be “tantalisingly close,”464 only to have events occur that leave the 
hopes and dreams dashed yet again. In pursuit of this dream, legislation was crafted and bodies 
and schemes devised to try and achieve this ultimate reconciliation. At the beginning of the 
process, the creation of the International Independent Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) 
and the passage of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 with its provisions for an Assembly, power-
sharing executive and requirements for cross-community support showed great promise in the 
path toward an ultimate peace. Unfortunately, as the electoral process unfolded and the 
republican parties, like Sinn Fein, grew in strength as the unionist parties fractured, the prospect 
of devolved government with Sinn Fein in the ascendancy appears to have become more 
frightening to the unionists, the British Government, and to a lesser extent, the Republic of 
Ireland. The British, as we have seen, manufactured a crisis as a pretext to suspend the devolved 
government with the tacit approval of the Government of Ireland. On the heels of that suspension 
both the British and Irish Governments have enacted legislation, namely the Northern Ireland 
Act of 2003 and the Independent Monitoring Commission laden with measures designed to 
thwart the growth of Sinn Fein, as well as water down and undermine the guarantees of 
procedural fairness that were so essential to instilling confidence in all the parties in the 
Assembly and its associated bodies. To make matters worse, the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland and the IMC have exercised these powers in an arbitrary and uneven-handed manner, 
464See Fn. 178
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even in the face of realized, long-sought goals, such as the complete decommissioning of arms 
by the IRA..
   The Irish historian, Tim Pat Coogan, in his biography of Michael Collins observed;
“There is a well-established British tradition for dealing with such problems. Buy 
time, be seen as doing something, set up a tribunal, a commission, a forum, an 
assembly, a convention. The history of Ireland is strewn with such milestones.”465
465Coogan, Tim Pat, The Man Who Made Ireland, The Life and Death of 
Michael Collins Roberts Rinehart Publishers, Niwot Colorado 1992, p.66.
  Unless the Governments of Britain and Ireland and the various entities they have created to 
facilitate and further the goals of the Good Friday Agreement begin to engage in the process in 
an honest, forthright and even-handed way, the parties in Northern Ireland are doomed to repeat 
their history.
